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This Special Report evaluates the way the Ukraine 
crisis affected EU-Russia relations and provides 
recommendations on how cooperation might be 
restored and the stalemate overcome. At the same 
time, it takes a broader perspective of EU-Russia 
relations by looking at their complex economic, political, 
and security interactions, but also their divergent 
approaches to various salient issues on the regional 
and global agenda.  
The irst part of the report evaluates the roots of the 
Ukraine crisis and analyses them in the context of the 
past and future of EU-Russia relations. 
The irst chapter of the report explores the factors that 
led to the breakdown of EU-Russia relations in the 
context of the Ukraine crisis. Tuomas Forsberg and Hiski 
Haukkala highlight that the Ukraine crisis was caused 
by a dangerous mix of decisions and choices made by 
all sides involved in the conlict: Ukraine, Russia, the 
EU, and the United States. 
Looking towards the future, Fyodor Lukyanov explains 
how Russia perceives the EU’s model of integration 
in the post-Soviet space. He argues that due to the 
asymmetric way in which the EU’s integration project 
has developed, relations between Russia and the EU 
sufer from a severe strategic impasse. He particularly 
recommends that the EU starts engaging with 
Russia on issues such as energy, demographics or 
cross-border cooperation in order to revive the ‘Greater 
Europe’ project.
In his review of security relations on the European 
continent, Roy Allison argues that Russian challenges to 
the international order have developed incrementally 
since the end of the Cold War and have been partly 
a response to Western actions. He recommends 
European leaders stick irmly to the current rules of 
the international order and resist the Russian rhetoric 
of ‘changing the rules of the game’. 
Maxine David provides another piece of the puzzle of 
EU-Russia relations by uncovering the efect of member 
states’ bilateral relations with Moscow. According to 
her, bilateral relations might lead to disunity when it 
comes to the EU’s common approach, but they can 
also lay the groundwork for dialogue and negotions 
in times of crisis. 
The second part of the report looks at how the EU and 
Russia interact in their shared neighbourhood. 
Elena Koroteleva’s chapter focuses on the EU’s foreign 
policy strategy towards the post-Soviet states. She 
argues that the EU and Russia have been blind to each 
other’s projects in the region. She proposes that the EU 
provides more leeway to the neighbourhood states by 
allowing its integration project to be complementary 
and not in competition with the one promoted 
by Russia.  
In a similar way, Alexei Gromyko’s chapter explores 
Russia’s foreign policy strategy towards the post-
Soviet states. He contends that both Europe and Russia 
Executive summary
 Cristian Nitoiu
relations between the European union (Eu) and russia have been traditionally characterised by the dichotomy between conlict and cooperation. this has inluenced the abstract nature of the Eu-russia 
strategic partnership. 
the ukraine crisis has had a deep impact on the Eu’s foreign policy and its approach towards russia. It 
highlighted that the Eu’s eastern neighbourhood is characterised by intense geopolitical competition with 
russia. the crisis also underscored the weakness of the Eu’s ‘low politics’ approach in its relations with russia 
and post-Soviet space. on the other hand, russia’s actions in ukraine have made Eu member states more 
willing to act together and take a harder line against moscow. 
thus, Eu-russia relations have entered a period of stalemate.  
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should start directing their attention to common risks 
and threats in the post-Soviet space, with the EU and 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) engaging on a path 
towards meaningful cooperation.
Being disillusioned by the EU’s promotion of liberal 
values and partly due to the desire to leave behind a 
lasting legacy, Putin has actively pushed for the creation 
of the EEU. David Lane argues that the Russian led 
integration is reactive, not based on a clear ideology, 
and ultimately modelled on the example of the EU. He 
proposes that the EU should take seriously the EEU, seek 
accommodation, and refrain from trying to achieve 
hegemony in the post-Soviet space.  
Sergii Glebov believes that the Black Sea region is a 
space where both the EU and Russia could agree on a 
set of common principles and start a dialogue.
The third part of the report focuses on a series of key 
issues on the agenda of EU-Russia relations. 
In his chapter, Andrei Kazantsev explains how Russia’s 
and the EU’s approaches to energy security have 
developed during the Ukraine crisis. He argues that both 
the EU and Russia should engage in conidence building 
measures that would contribute to rebuilding mutual 
trust in the energy sphere. In this sense, both actors 
should focus on compromise rather than unilaterally 
imposing their interests. 
The impact of the Ukraine crisis on the EU and Russia’s 
economic relations is evaluated by Christopher Hartwell. 
He argues that economic relations between the two 
were, even before the crisis, not built on solid ground, 
with both sides drifting apart and not inclined to 
negotiate as equals. He suggests that the EU either 
adopt more stringent sanctions towards Russia or drop 
them altogether. 
Alexander Titov highlights the potential ways in which 
Russia and the EU can enhance their cooperation on 
various issues on the global agenda other than the 
Ukraine crisis. He proposes that European leaders and 
the Kremlin should agree on a common set of norms and 
values in international relations akin to the Westphalian 
system: sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, and great 
power management of global issues.
Richard Sakwa examines the way in which external 
forces afect EU-Russia relations. He inds that the 
European continent is stuck between two mutually 
exclusive directions: Atlanticism and Euransiasm. Russia 
is increasingly embracing its Asian identity, while 
Europe relies more and more on the US for assuring 
its security needs. This situation will only deepen the rift 
between the EU and Russia, if both actors do not seek 
to substantiate a common pluralistic understanding 
of ‘Greater Europe’. 
In this report’s concluding contribution, which 
overviews the key issues of contention in EU-Russia 
relations and presents possible recommendations, 
Cristian Nitoiu argues that cooperation will most likely 
be re-established by glossing over the challenges to 
the regional order caused by the Ukraine crisis. If in the 
past both the EU and Russia were careful not to discuss 
contentious issues – which made their partnership 
fragile and prone to break down – future cooperation 
(and a potentially revived strategic partnership) should 
go beyond mere symbolism. Nevertheless, future 
cooperation should not translate into a ‘Yalta type’ 
agreement which delineates clear spheres of interests 
and leaves the small states in the shared neighbourhood 
at the mercy of two giants. Ŷ
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PrEFAcE: 
Europe-Russia Relations  
Before and After 2014
Vladislav Zubok
What happened between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the EU in 2013 provides a new illustration to the old saying by Charles Maurice Talleyrand: C’est pire qu’un crime, c’est une faute 
(It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder). Talleyrand was an immoral and cynical manipulator, 
an unlikely source of advice to European foreign policy today. Yet, as this special Report testiies, 
European policymakers ended up in a very tricky position, when good principles routinely extended 
as an operational policy in the eastern neighbourhood contributed to an unexpected conlict with 
grave and lasting consequences. 
Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea not in a it of paranoid 
whim, but after concluding he could defy the 
Western international order and ensure, by force 
and with violation of international legal norms, 
Russia’s security ‘bufer zone’ in Eastern Europe. His 
calculations stemmed from his view of Europe, where 
the US was a superpower  seeking to counteract 
its decline by expanding the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) eastward. Putin also perceived 
that the EU had no political will or strategy of its own, 
and complied with American interests. Frustrated 
by Russia’s inability to keep status quo in Ukraine 
by economic and political means, Putin decided to 
change the game by creating faits accomplis on the 
ground by force. 
Putin’s moves came as a shock to Western countries; 
the shock turned into indignation after Russia 
engaged in a hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine and 
especially after the MH17 airplane was shot down 
by a Russian-made missile on July 17, 2014. The 
international community, the US, Canada, Australia, 
and members of the EU reacted by imposing 
sanctions on Russia. In the fog of war, fear, and moral 
indignation, leaders ostracised Putin, and kicked 
him from the club of world leaders. Global markets, 
already taking light from Russia, were in a hurried 
exodus: Russia threatened to become an outcast not 
only politically, but also inancially and economically. 
The crisis revealed the painful absence of wise men 
and women in Europe, Russia, and in the US; the 
rashness and cliché-ridden political rhetoric, media 
reporting, and social networks’ comments reminded 
many of 1914. The ‘fog of indignation’ fomented by 
the multitude of mostly non-governmental, and 
therefore irresponsible, agents in the public domain 
created a climate that suited an escalation of conlict, 
not its settlement. Only the last-minute intervention 
of the German and the French leaders stopped this 
trend. As this Report shows, the fog of fear and 
indignation is slowly lifting, but the international 
landscape it reveals is unpromising and often ugly. 
The EU may be satisied with the fact that all its 
members maintained sanctions as a modicum of 
common policy vis-à-vis Russia. Yet the idealistic 
European strategy of building “a circle of peaceful 
well-governed states” is in ruins, the eastern 
neighbourhood is defunct, and the task of even 
returning to the situation before 2014 to the East 
of the EU boundaries is daunting.  Both sides 
are not ready – intellectually and politically – for 
a constructive bargain beyond the manifestly 
unworkable Minsk-II agreements. Some actors on 
the Western side want to punish Russia, to make it 
feel the pain. Too few actors so far are ready to risk 
the opprobrium of making ‘a deal’ with Vladimir Putin. 
In practical terms, there are too many linkages 
between foreign policy and domestic politics, 
between various actors in international relations: 
these linkages produce almost a mosaic of situations 
reminiscent of Peter Breugel’s paintings. US foreign 
policy is a hostage to the electoral campaign and 
domestic ethnic diasporas, all of which see the 
Ukrainian-Russian situation as a zero-sum game. 
The EU sanctions regime vis-à-vis Russia is linked 
to Minsk-II and now to the future of Crimea; the 
entire process of settlement negotiation is made 
a hostage to Ukrainian domestic politics. Among 
international organisations in existence, from the 
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United Nations (UN) to the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or NATO, none can 
be used credibly and efectively to help the settlement: 
both because Russia would feel isolated dealing with 
them, or because they are too complicated. This creates 
an almost irresistible urge in Washington, Brussels and 
Berlin to remain in ‘muddle through’ mode and hope 
there will be no other major outbreak of violence. 
However, this attitude enhances the chances of exactly 
this kind of development. Plus, ‘muddling through’ 
means for the EU a tacit acknowledgement of the end 
of its grand design: to transform international realities 
in Eastern Europe by ‘liberal means.’ One can wait, of 
course, for Russia’s decline and retreat as a result of its 
structural economic crisis. Yet Russia’s retreat would not 
necessarily mean an automatic advance for the EU. A 
mutually damaging standof is another likely outcome. 
The Report demonstrates the return of geography and 
national security interests to the agenda. And this is 
actually bad news for the future of Eastern Europe. The 
EU’s policies towards Russia and Ukraine until recently 
were based on the belief that security and geography 
no longer mattered, replaced by universal principles. 
In fact, geography never disappeared, and Brussels 
oicials had to maintain a tricky balance between 
policies of inclusion and exclusion with regard to Russia 
and Ukraine, with a tacit understanding that neither 
country had a chance of permanent membership. As 
some chapters of the Report show, Germany and some 
other older members of European community remained 
sceptical of the attempts of some newer members, such 
as the Baltics and Poland, to deal with Russia as a security 
challenge and prioritise political and security relations 
with Russia’s neighbours. The unspoken spectre of a 
new cordon sanitaire to contain Russia hovered in the 
imagination of some politicians but did not translate 
into political realities. 
What ultimately led to the end of this balance was the 
EU ofer of association to Ukraine without consideration 
of Russia’s reaction, and Putin’s leadership in creating 
a Eurasian Union to increase Russia’s economic and 
political weight in the region. The clash between these 
two projects is an essential background for explaining 
Putin’s reaction to Euromaidan and the perceived ‘loss 
of Ukraine The period of the Fall of 2013 and early 2014 
was the historical moment when Talleyrand’s saying 
became a reality. The uncertainty about the future 
status of Ukraine vis-à-vis Western institutions led to 
Putin’s brutal reaction. It was worse than a crime, it was 
a mistake. The issue of Ukraine’s international status was 
kicked like a can down the road. Now this backired. 
After 2014, the securitisation effect replaced the 
shattered prospects of the eastern neighbourhood 
in Eastern Europe, with a political lobby within the 
EU favouring assistance to Ukraine and containment 
of Russia. This is a new political reality that will play a 
considerable role at least as long as the securitisation 
efect remains in place. It is commonly said that what 
happens next will depend on Putin’s policies and 
choices. The new dynamics however may be more 
complicated. In the new political environment, other 
actors, even local actors, can also play destabilising 
role and grow into an international ‘scare’, as the recent 
political instability in Moldova demonstrates. 
In the past, in the late 50s and during the 80s, European 
politicians and thinkers were able to convert a crisis 
of European ‘idea’ into an opportunity. This is not the 
irst time when Europe fur Sich (EU politics) and Europe 
an Sich (an idea of Europe) have clashed with each 
other.  But it is particularly bad now. The EU became 
too complex, institutionalised, and bureaucratised to 
leave enough room for a group of imaginative political 
transactors and entrepreneurs ‘to sell the future’ to the 
complex entity of almost thirty countries. Another 
problem is the disappearance of the two factors that 
had helped Euro-visionaries in the past: a) the clear 
and present dangerous Other – the Soviet Union; b) the 
security cocoon created by the friendly Other – the US. 
Attempts in the West to demonise Putinism and make 
it responsible for all European woes are rather farcical. 
And the US cannot by itself make Europe secure against 
new challenges, such as international terrorism, danger 
of Grexit, and the mass low of refugees. 
The realities on the ground created by Putin’s actions, 
including two self-proclaimed ‘people’s republics 
in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, changed European 
international politics irreversibly. While the international 
community and some European countries could 
continue to deal with Russia by ignoring territorial frozen 
conlicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria, 
with the of addition of Ukrainian territories they become 
efective vetoes on the normalisation of relations, and 
even in some way to negotiations. For instance, the 
Minsk-II format already appears in permanent deadlock 
not only because of Russia’s intransigence (which exists), 
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but because of new transnational realities that emerged 
in Eastern Europe, with local actors, some of them 
armed, constraining freedom of actions for state leaders 
and international peace-making actors. In this sense, 
Putin’s actions were a mistake that damaged not only 
Russia’s interests and future, but also efectively blocked 
the prospects of peaceful future settlements, probably 
even after Putin leaves the Kremlin. 
The Report calls for an open-minded reconsideration 
of Eastern European realities, and return to realistic, 
sober language of assessments. Moral indignation is 
a poor guide in international politics. And signalling 
to Russia should not become the same as ostracising 
it. Russia, whatever the gyrations of oil prices and 
economic situation, will remain a regional power with 
its interests. The Report convincingly concludes that 
Russia is not capable of changing European rules and 
norms, however hard its diplomats and propaganda 
chips away at European solidarity. This is excellent news, 
because the fear of losing solidarity was and remains 
an argument that paralyses attempts to speak about 
a softer political strategy than a mere containment. At 
the same time Russia, as the old saying goes, is never as 
weak as one hopes. And it would be quite impossible 
to achieve restoration of Ukraine as a robust state 
and economy with the revisionist and outcast Russia 
sitting on Ukraine’s borders. Whatever Putin’s ‘crimes’ 
and ‘mistakes’ are, a frozen conlict between Ukraine 
and Russia is impossible and counterproductive for 
peace and security in this part of the world. 
What are the EU’s choices, as it discusses its new 
strategy in general, and policies towards Russia 
and Ukraine? 
First, allow the conlict to continue, and various quasi-
policies, such as a policy of sanctions on Russia and a 
policy of assistance to Ukraine to proceed on separate 
tracks. This option may further the process of emergence 
by default of a new cordon sanitaire against Russia, and 
the implicit securitisation of EU common foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the East. In this scenario, the EU passes the brief 
on Russia not only to some of its Eastern members, but 
also to NATO. 
Second, using another wonderful French saying: 
reculer pour miuex sauter, to start by writing a new 
more pragmatic strategy with regard to Eastern Europe 
as a ‘special trouble-shooting policy’ combining EU 
principles and a long-haul view about the future of the 
region, with consideration to the political and historical 
factors in the region. It would be something that the 
Brussels had not done before. This time, legal experts 
and technocrats must sit side by side with top-ranking 
politicians, historians and area experts. As with other 
transnational endeavours, complete transparency and 
a continuous dialogue with the main parties (Ukraine, 
Russia) are preconditions for this work. 
Talleyrand’s warning should be answered. Perhaps there 
is a better way to deal with a crime than simply punishing 
Russia: addressing past mistakes in a comprehensive 
manner and developing wiser policies might contribute 
to a stable peaceful international environment. Ŷ
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EU-Russia Relations:  
past, present, Future
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Could it have been Diferent?  
The Evolution of the EU-Russia Conlict  
and its Alternatives
Tuomas Forsberg and Hiski Haukkala  
In hindsight the conlict in ukraine and the consequent rupture in Eu–russia relations were a ‘perfect storm’ generated in the context of a combination of choices and mistakes made by all the parties. 
It seems safe to conclude that the current situation is one that no one wanted nor actively aspired to. 
this leaves us with the di cult question of inding a constructive way forward. In this respect it is easy 
to be a pessimist. A lot of mistakes have been made and a lot of trust essential for the restoration of 
ties has been lost. Indeed, if Eu and russian leaders want to restore their relations, it is fundamental 
to rebuild some trust. For that the Eu and russia can not only look at future cooperation, but they also 
need to address the past. It is not possible to simply swipe the slate clean and let bygones be bygones.
The conlict in Ukraine and the consequent crisis in 
EU-Russia relations took the EU and its member states 
largely by surprise. Russia’s reaction to the domestic 
crisis in Ukraine and the forced annexation of Crimea 
was, in the words of the EU High Representative 
Catherine Ashton, “an act of aggression” and a 
“breach of Russia’s international obligations and its 
commitments” that has made the EU ponder both 
the relative merits of its own policies as well as the 
future prospects of meaningful relations with Russia.1 
The same applies also on the Russian side, where in 
a recent intervention the Russian Ambassador to the 
EU Vladimir Chizhov remarked that there should be 
no return to ‘business as usual’, but a more thorough 
rethinking of relations is called for.2
In hindsight it is easy to argue that both the EU 
and Russia should have seen the crisis coming. The 
dramatic nature of the rupture was a surprise of sorts, 
but otherwise the events of 2014 were perhaps a 
natural culmination of a longer term crisis in relations 
between the EU and Russia, an unwanted outcome 
that was nevertheless bound to take place eventually 
between the two increasingly disillusioned ‘strategic 
partners’.3  Yet, if neither Russia nor the EU actually 
wanted this crisis, it should have been avoidable. 
When and how did EU–Russia relations end up on 
a trajectory where the confrontation in fact became 
unavoidable? Was it doomed already from the 
beginning or did it depend on some unfortunate 
decisions as the Ukraine crisis unfolded? 
There are several possible answers to these questions, 
and each of them implies slightly diferent kinds of 
solutions to the present crisis.  We argue that the 
clash over the shared neighbourhood was inevitable 
in terms of the identities and worldviews the EU and 
Russia held, but these could have been mitigated 
and their manifestation into an either-or choice 
for Ukraine could have been avoided if diplomatic 
sensitivity had been taken more seriously, and the 
Ukrainian leadership been more capable in steering 
the country through rocky waters. The sharpening of 
the conlict through the illegal annexation of Crimea 
and military destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine by 
Russia did not however, directly follow from the 
integration dilemma concerning Ukraine.4 Clearly, the 
choice that was crucial in escalating the conlict was 
Russia’s and it could have been avoided. At the same 
time, the EU should have approached its policies 
and relations with Russia with more caution and 
foresight and it cannot, therefore, escape a certain 
share of responsibility for these tragic events either.
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In this short contribution we try to unpack the 
developments that resulted in the dramatic rupture 
of relations between the EU and Russia over Ukraine. 
We irst look at the overall development of relations 
between the two, suggesting that the growing mutual 
fatigue and disillusionment acted as an important 
backdrop; in efect, making the parties ripe for conlict. 
We then examine the key actors in turn, asking whether 
they could have taken steps to avoid the current 
situation. We end with some concluding observations 
and recommendations concerning the future.
 
tHE EvEryDAy rEALItIES oF tHE 
StrAtEGIc PArtnErSHIP HAD 
LEFt botH tHE Eu AnD ruSSIA 
IncrEASInGLy DISILLuSIonED
An important backdrop to the current conlict was the 
growing feeling on both sides that the practical co-
operation under the auspices of ‘strategic partnership’ 
had failed to live up to expectations or fully meet the 
interests of either party. Interpretations of this failure 
are diametrically opposed, with both parties seeing 
the fault mainly with the other. 
On the EU side, the usual refrain has been Russia’s 
unreliability as a partner. In the EU’s view mutual 
agreements have not been honoured by Russia 
and deliverables have largely been left undelivered. 
Perhaps the most prominent case has been the drawn 
out process concerning the phasing out of Siberian 
overflight fees, but in the EU’s view the problem 
has not been conined to isolated instances, it has 
become systemic. A powerful symbol of a growing 
displeasure with its relations with Russia has been the 
Commission’s continuously updated ‘Key Outstanding 
Issues’ document, an internal and conidential laundry 
list of problematic issues in EU-Russia relations. It is 
illustrative that the 2008 rendition of the document 
was already 87 pages long, with issues ranging from 
the quality of overall political dialogue to cooperation 
in education and science, and international security.5
Before the conflict escalated, the Russians could 
acknowledge this problem. Sergey Karaganov described 
the problems in EU–Russia relations in 2003:
“Whatever have been the failings of Europe, 
a considerable part of the problem in the EU-
Russian relationship should be placed at Russia’s 
doorstep. The most obvious failing is Russia’s 
economic backwardness. The country’s level 
of corruption and criminality, the frequently 
illegal intervention by the state in economic 
activity and the sorry state of its court system 
cannot but bale and infuriate the Europeans.”6 
Over time, this basic dynamic resulted in EU–Russia 
relations becoming increasingly dysfunctional despite 
the adoption of new common schemes, such as Four 
Common Spaces and Partnership(s) for Modernisation. 
In the view of the EU, the guilty party in the deterioration 
of mutual relations was Russia, in particular as far as 
the Ukraine crisis was concerned. Jose Manuel Barroso, 
before leaving oice, defended the EU’s enlargement 
policy towards the East by saying that without the EU 
enlargement, Russia’s appetite would not focus only on 
Ukraine, but on Bulgaria and the Baltic states.7 Donald 
Tusk, the President of the European Council defended 
broad sanctions against Russia by stating that : “the 
only efective answer to Putin’s clear and simple policy 
is pressure. [His policy is] simply to have enemies, to 
be stronger than them, to destroy them and to be 
in conlict”.8
In Russia, by contrast, the main complaint has been 
the EU and its inlexibility in particular. In the words of 
Ambassador Chizhov:  
“The internal transformation of the EU following 
the ‘big bang’ expansion of 2004 and the 
subsequent Lisbon Treaty reform, resulted in 
narrowing the lexibility of EU’s positions in the 
international arena. In other words, the price for 
‘speaking with one voice’ has been the lowest 
common denominator of the resulting message. 
On many topics of mutual importance, like crisis 
management, Russia was often confronted with 
a ‘take it or leave it’ approach that often seemed 
to negate our concerns and interests”.9
In addition, and particularly during the crisis in Ukraine, 
Russia has started to take issue with the EU’s motivations 
and objectives in the neighbourhood. To quote 
Chizhov again:
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“The inward-looking peace project has acquired 
a new somewhat messianic dimension – the EU 
now “seeks to advance in the wider world… 
principles which have inspired its own creation” 
(Art. 21 TEU). … These worrying trends have 
converged in Ukraine. May I remind you that 
back in May 2013 EU high oicials were making 
it clear that the Vilnius summit of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) later that year would be about 
‘winning Ukraine’ in a ‘geopolitical battle of 
Europe’. This was clearly a wrong approach”.10
The growing irritation and even suspicion between the 
two has thus been palpable. It was conducive to creating 
a political dynamic in which a key ingredient became 
what psychologists have called the fundamental 
attribution error (FAE). As a result of this error, actors 
perceive the hostile or otherwise problematic actions of 
others as emanating from the inherent dispositions or 
characteristics of others instead of merely relecting the 
situation one inds itself in.11 In other words, actors often 
perceive the actions of others stemming from negative 
intent, instead of simply relecting the happenstance 
of any given moment. As a consequence, the mutual 
disillusionment, even exasperation with relations acted 
as an important backdrop to the conlict, in efect 
‘priming’ both the EU and Russia to assume the worst 
from each other, a propensity that came to head over 
the EU’s growing role in the common neighbourhood 
to which we turn next.
tHE Eu’S PoLIcIES vIS-À-vIS tHE 
‘common nEIGHbourHooD’  WErE 
bASED on FALSE PrEmISES
The question of ‘eastern neighbourhood’ arrived in 
earnest on the EU agenda in the early 2000s. The 
driving force behind this was the EU’s own Eastern 
enlargement that increased both the direct exposure 
between the EU and Russia as well as creating a group 
of countries – the so-called ‘common neighbourhood’ in 
EU parlance – between the two. Since its inception the 
EU has treated the region through a logical continuation 
of its previous policies, seeking to continue to project 
stability, prosperity and security based on its own 
normative approach.
Yet in hindsight, one can argue that the EU’s approach 
was based on certain false premises. To begin with, in 
the aftermath of the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement of 2004 and 
2007 the EU was convinced that its own transformative 
power had been the key in turning the fortunes of the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries around. 
Although this played an important role, the real factor 
was the essential willingness and, more importantly, 
the ability of the accession candidates to engage in 
meaningful reforms.12 
In the early 2000s, the EU was operating in a stable 
geopolitical environment with no third party challenging 
its policies and strategic objectives, and it was actively 
supported and encouraged in this task by the global 
hegemon, the US. None of these crucial factors applied 
in the case of the ‘common neighbourhood’; the 
neighbours themselves were not reliable partners and 
agents of change, Russia increasingly acted as a regional 
challenger and even spoiler, and the US increasingly 
took a back seat in the East. None of these lessons 
were, however, appreciated or anticipated by the EU 
at the time of devising and developing the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
On the contrary, the EU approached its eastern 
neighbourhood as essentially uncontested and although 
it was not willing to extend its enlargement policy, it 
was ready to seek a continuation of its accession model 
by other means. With the ENP the EU was busy devising 
relations that, when taken together, would move Eastern 
Europe towards becoming part of a wider EU-centred 
order of prosperity, stability, and integration. The EU 
believed that democracy was a shared value that would 
contribute to stability and prosperity in the region and 
did not see that supporting a recount of votes after the 
2004 elections fraud in Ukraine, for example, would be 
against Russia’s real interests. 
Although the EU’s approach was rooted in geography, 
it was not geopolitical power projection project in 
the crude sense of the term. Indeed, the EU has been 
manifestly uninterested in pursuing spheres of inluence 
and has declined to frame its role in the East in this 
manner, thereby highlighting its own strategic thinking 
that shuns zero-sum conceptions of international 
relations. It has been seeking to defuse tensions with 
Russia, which has been a much more ‘traditional’ actor 
in this respect. Despite all the rhetoric of partnership, 
now largely silent, the underlying reality has been 
that the EU’s policies have lown in the face of Russia’s 
insistence on framing the EU’s role in the eastern 
neighbourhood in largely negative and competitive 
terms. As a consequence, the EU has been locked into 
an integration competition with Russia, despite being 
unwilling and ill-equipped to play that game. Carl Bildt, 
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the Foreign Minister of Sweden at the time when the 
crisis was developing stated that: 
“I think we should have reacted more strongly 
towards Russia when they started to misbehave 
in the summer of 2013. Clearly, when they 
started the sanctions against Ukraine, we 
didn’t see clearly the implications of that, and 
I remember that [former Polish Foreign Minister] 
Radek [Sikorski] and myself were trying to alert 
Brussels and Brussels was more or less asleep.”13
 
ruSSIA’S SynDromE oF HumILIAtIon 
AnD EncIrcLEmEnt
Russia’s policy towards the EU and the West in general 
started to change towards the end of Putin’s irst term as 
President of Russia. Arguably one clear reason was the 
Orange revolution in Ukraine in winter 2004–05, coupled 
with other disappointments and felt humiliations such as 
the way Russia’s plan to solve the Transnistrian question 
was torpedoed by the EU in November 2003. When 
the EU launched the EaP in 2009 and simultaneously 
NATO declared that Georgia and Ukraine would one 
day become its members, Russian leaders in Kremlin 
started to fear revolution at home and encirclement 
abroad. The war in Georgia was a result of these fears, 
but it did not derail EU–Russia relations, because the 
EU believed Saakashvili’s Georgia was also culpable for 
initiating the conlict with Russia. 
When Putin returned to Presidency in 2012, Moscow 
made further choices that aggravated latent tensions. 
Putin decided to make the economic and political 
integration of the post-Soviet space the lynchpin 
of his foreign policy, which manifested in the rapid 
development of the EEU. At the same time, Russia 
increasingly framed the EU’s role in the region in a zero-
sum manner, accusing the EU of seeking a sphere of 
inluence in the East and forcing a false choice between 
itself and Moscow onto the countries-in-between. At the 
same time, it was Russia’s own actions that aggravated 
the situation. The establishment of the Eurasian Customs 
Union (ECU) in particular was framed in a manner that 
constituted an either-or choice with regard to creating 
deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTAs) 
with the EU. The zero-sum view dominated Russia’s 
approach to political leadership questions in countries 
such as Ukraine and solving the frozen conlicts in the 
region. It used increasingly harsh methods of political 
and economic pressure and even coercion to achieve 
its aims.14
The sad element in Russia’s concerns was that the EU 
itself did not envisage any of these developments as 
a deliberate attempt to challenge the Russian political 
system and its leaders in the Kremlin. Neither was NATO’s 
expansion to Georgia or Ukraine an imminent danger, 
in light of the objections of Germany and France, and 
the change of leadership in Washington. Though it is 
possible to understand that Russia and its leaders had 
their own concerns, their behaviour was an overreaction 
and disproportionate compared to the situation. In 
Andrew Wilson’s view, “in the inal analysis Russia’s 
policy is driven by a victim syndrome and it has not 
been able to give credit to the chances that it has had 
but created a story where it has been mistreated and 
encircled by enemies instead”.15
 
couLD tHE uKrAInE conFLIct 
HAvE bEEn AvoIDED?
There are three basic perspectives to the question of 
whether the Ukraine conlict and particularly the wider 
confrontation in Russia’s relations with the West could 
have been avoided.  The irst is related to Russia, the 
second to the EU and the third to Ukraine itself. Was 
the key problem the EU’s geopolitical expansion, or 
the threat of it, Russia’s great power ambitions and 
domestic politics, or political developments in Ukraine 
independently of both the EU and Russia?
Starting with the EU, the ENP did not at irst appear to 
be a fundamental problem in EU–Russia relations. On 
the contrary, it seemed that initially Russia did not pay 
any attention to EU activities at all. The EaP initiative 
was more controversial. The fact that it coincided with 
the Georgian war, and that its content was enhanced 
in response to the war, created the false impression 
that it was meant to be an ambitious policy, seeking to 
challenge Russia in the neighbourhood. In hindsight, 
the EU would have probably been better served to wait 
awhile with these developments. At the same time, it is 
not clear whether a pause or ofering better access to 
negotiations and symbolic gestures towards Moscow 
would have been enough to prevent major problems. 
Also, it cannot be ruled out that Moscow might have 
been emboldened by the EU’s timidity and assumed 
that an implicit Russian droit de regard (right of access) 
had already been accepted by the West.
In any case, it cannot be argued that the EU was overly 
aggressive with its policies. At the Vilnius summit, where 
the Association Agreements (AAs) were to be signed 
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in November 2013, the EU clearly was not willing to 
drag Ukraine to an agreement at any price, though it 
was disappointed when Yanukovych turned it down. 
The EU supported Euromaidan, but the support was 
mainly verbal: for example Ashton issued a statement 
in Kyiv where she said she was “impressed by the 
determination of Ukrainians demonstrating for the 
European perspective of their country” and called for 
dialogue and negotiations.16 In a similar manner, even 
the fathers of the EaP, Carld Bildt and Radek Sikorski, 
who are often criticised as having been overly eager 
in pushing for their policy, stressed that even though 
the EU remained prepared to sign the agreement as 
soon as President Yanukovych was ready to do so, “we 
will not be drawn into a meaningless bidding war over 
Ukraine’s future”.17 In this respect, EU support may have 
encouraged people on the Maidan square, but it would 
be erroneous to argue that it caused it; the protests 
against the corrupt government would still have existed 
even without any major EU support. 
Turning to Russia, one could argue that the Ukraine crisis 
and the confrontation in EU–Russia relations could have 
been avoided if only Moscow had simply accepted the 
EaP and the conclusion of the AA between Ukraine and 
the EU, and not seen either as hostile acts or a threat 
to its key interests. Yet this is far too simplistic. As was 
already argued above, one of the key background 
factors to the conlict was Russia’s growing exasperation 
with being the junior partner in its relations with the 
West, and being forced to accept ‘diktats coming from 
that direction. Therefore, we have to ask why this was the 
case and whether Russia could have pursued another 
course of action. 
It appears that the direct economic disadvantages of 
Ukraine’s AA with the EU to Russia hardly constituted 
enough of a problem to justify jeopardising the beneits 
of a working EU–Russia relationship, not to mention the 
annexation of Crimea and the military destabilisation 
of Eastern Ukraine. The key problem was therefore 
related to Russia’s status, as it was protecting its zone 
of vital interests and building the EEU, and its fear of 
revolutionary spirit spreading from Ukraine to Russia, 
or the possibility that Ukraine would sooner or later join 
NATO and form a hostile base against Russia. 
Many Western scholars in addition to Russians 
themselves have supported these views. While it is 
undeniable that Russia’s identity and status that formed 
after the immediate period after the Cold War is not 
compatible with accepting a secondary position in 
the Brussels-centric European integration, the decision 
to annex Crimea or militarily support separatism in 
Eastern Ukraine were surely not determined on the 
basis of such identity. Russia’s leaders made conscious 
and risky choices, either not fully comprehending the 
response that would follow both in Ukraine as well as 
from the West, or in calculating the dangers of inaction 
extremely high. As a result of these actions, Russia is 
neither more secure, prosperous nor respected abroad 
than before; if anything the Kremlin’s domestic support 
has consolidated, but if the annexation of Crimea was 
the most rational way of achieving that we face a far 
bigger problem with Russia than if we suggest that the 
decision was based on miscalculation.
Finally, we may ask to what extent the conlict could 
have been avoided if Ukraine had been a more 
consolidated and politically well-functioning country. 
First of all, it was rather clear that before the conlict, 
the majority of Ukrainians did not want to choose 
between Russia and the EU.18 Part of the problem was 
that Ukraine was put in a position where it had to make 
choices one way or the other.19 The bigger problem, 
however, was the rampant corruption and the declining 
living standards in the country. A more legitimate and 
capable political leadership could have been able to 
postpone the choice and, in particular, prevent the 
protest movement from becoming a revolutionary 
force. To a certain extent, Russia was reacting to the 
revolutionary situation in Ukraine and wanted to seize 
the moment by seizing land. This would not have been 




We are faced with a genuine dilemma. As was already 
mentioned, the narratives concerning the past are 
diametrically opposite with both parties squarely 
blaming the other. The same applies also to the future, 
where the visions of future of relations, to the extent 
they have been put forward at all, remain largely 
incompatible. Therefore, although it would be easy 
to argue that the EU and the West in general need to 
reassure Russia that it is not aiming to cause ‘colour 
revolutions’ in Russia and that it can also support 
countries that choose to join the Russia-led EEU, it 
is hard to see how either of these assurances can be 
efective in the current atmosphere. 
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At the same time, the EU cannot simply accept the illegal 
annexation of Crimea by Russia, although it could, and 
probably will have to, compartmentalise the problem 
to stop it from poisoning relations indeinitely. In the 
future, some kind of a satisfactory international scheme 
will need to be found that gives normative legitimation 
to the transfer of the peninsula from Ukraine to Russia, 
but this can only take place once Kyiv and Moscow see 
eye-to-eye on the topic – a very di cult scenario to 
imagine for the time being. In the meantime, the EU 
and the West could concede that Ukraine remains in a 
category of its own, but this can happen only if Russia 
shows genuine steps towards stabilising the situation in 
Ukraine and refrains from using similar tactics elsewhere 
along its borders.
The improvement of ties requires restraint and 
reciprocity from both sides. Both parties should 
avoid attribution error and appreciate the fact that 
not all the negative actions are due to the adversary’s 
negative character, but should be attributed rather to 
situational factors. Russia in particular should relax its 
view that the EU and the West are ‘out to get it’, trying to 
inluence developments in the shared neighbourhood 
to Moscow’s permanent disadvantage. It should not 
exaggerate concrete problems to turn them into a zero-
sum game where all actions that it does not necessarily 
ind to be the best option taken by the West are targeted 
against it. 
By extension the EU, and indeed the West in general, 
will have to pay heed to Russia’s essential interests 
and viewpoints a lot better. Russia has made it clear 
that developments that do not take its interests 
into consideration will not fare well in the shared 
neighbourhood. This is a message that will need to 
be heard. At the same time, Russia will have to realise, 
and we believe over time it will, that it too cannot 
impose solutions on its neighbours: Russia will have 
to ind other ways to deal with these issues or face 
negative consequences.
A big leap in the form of a package deal that would 
magically restore relations and sweep all the problems 
away is not realistically possible. Therefore, both parties 
need to seek moderation in the short term and aim at 
taking baby steps to rebuild trust. The Iran nuclear deal 
and cooperation against terrorism in the Middle East 
constitute such areas where common ground can be 
found and trust built. The parties need to adopt the 
long-term strategic perspective and be ready to develop 
their relations and take bigger steps in recreating trust 
when the initial experiences have been suiciently 
encouraging. Over time both parties will come to 
realise that although it was easy to break relations, 
their rebuilding will take a lot of patience and time. 
Maybe there is a lesson for all of us to think about?
 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. A big leap in the form of a package deal that 
would magically restore the relations and 
sweep the problems away is not realistically 
possible. Restoration of ties will take time and 
patience. For that the EU and Russia can not 
only look at the future cooperation, but they 
also need to address the past.
2. The key challenge ahead is to take baby steps 
to rebuild trust. The Iran nuclear deal and 
cooperation against terrorism in the Middle 
East constitute such areas where common 
ground can be found and trust built. The 
parties need to adopt a long-term strategic 
perspective and be ready to develop their 
relations and take bigger steps in recreating 
trust when the irst experiences have been 
suiciently encouraging.
3. In the meantime, the improvement of ties 
requires restraint and reciprocity from both 
sides and readiness to take bold steps when 
the time is ripe.  Ŷ
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Russia and the EU:  
A New Future Requested
Fyodor Lukyanov
At the beginning of 2014 not many could envisage how quickly the entire relationship between russia and the Eu could be deconstructed and denounced. It is true that mutual frustration rose 
gradually since second half of 2000s, and the crisis of common vision and ideas was obvious after the 
Partnership for modernization (proclaimed during Dmitri medvedev’s strange intermezzo in russian 
politics) failed to produce anything new and concrete. nevertheless, the feeling was that, even in the 
absence of much progress, there was solid potential for cooperation which had been built up and 
accumulated in more than twenty years of interaction.
In January 2014, Vladimir Putin said at his press 
conference following the regular EU-Russia summit 
in Brussels:
“Our cooperation is of a large-scale and 
multi-faceted nature. However, we have to 
set ourselves targets that are more ambitious. 
One of them is to link the European and 
Eurasian integration processes. I am 
convinced that there are no contradictions 
between the two models: both are based 
on similar principles and norms of the World 
Trade Organisation; they could efectively 
complement each other and contribute to 
the growth of mutual trade turnover... We 
need to work together on building a new, 
uniied Europe.”1 
The president of the EU Commission Jose Manuel 
Barroso in the meantime believed “that this Summit 
was as useful as it was necessary. And I hope that we 
can achieve progress in the near future. In fact, I’m 
very much looking forward to our next meeting in 
Sochi, at the beginning of June”.2
The next meeting in Sochi, during the G8 session 
chaired by Russia, never took place as EU-Russia 
summits were suspended. Ukraine came as a shock 
and unleashed all the negative feelings vis-a-vis each 
other which had accumulated during 25 years of 
cooperation. What happened was not just a political 
crisis between two important players in Europe, it 
was foremost a sign of the decline, and most likely 
the end of, a model of a European future as invented 
and formulated in the wake of the big ideological 
confrontation of the 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War brought about the ‘Greater 
Europe’ concept, which had not only a geographical 
but also an ideological nature. It was designed 
to quickly overcome the geopolitical division of 
Europe, and create a single space of security and 
sustainable development modelled on the European 
Community/Union, with NATO playing a dominant 
role in providing security. 
The EU was substantiated through the 1992 
Maastricht treaty. It was intended to become the 
core of Greater Europe, and an example to follow 
for adjacent regions in the east and the south. The 
deepening of integration within the EU, accompanied 
by the extension of its rules and regulations to 
countries that previously were not its members, 
was supposed to create a powerful political and 
economic centre, an equal match for the main global 
actors – the US and rising China. A common European 
currency became an eloquent symbol of Greater 
Europe’s new ambitions and an attempt to create 
an alternative global reserve currency rivalling the 
US dollar.  
The Greater Europe project’s key feature is that it was 
intended to be EU-centric. This is its main distinction 
from ideas aired at the end of the 1980s and the 
1990s, when the Soviet Union was still around. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, who advocated the idea of a 
‘common European home’, hoped that it would be 
built by both sides on an equal basis. The theory 
of convergence of capitalism and socialism, irst 
proposed by Russian-American sociologist Pitirim 
Sorokin and later supported by Nobel Peace Prize 
winner and dissident Andrei Sakharov, was very 
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popular at that time. Had this idea been realised, it 
would have put a consensual end to the Cold War 
without formal or informal reference to its winners 
and losers.3    
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the situation 
dramatically, making equal participation in designing 
a new European order impossible. Instead it created 
a geopolitical and institutional vacuum, which began 
to be illed quite quickly by the winner. Russia was in 
socioeconomic chaos at that time, with pro-Western 
views prevailing in its policy. Moscow did not object to 
such a model of relations as it sought to it into Greater 
Europe. This approach in Russia-EU relations (with 
certain limitations, it can be also applied to NATO) was 
well described by then European Commission President 
Romano Prodi: integration with Russia to the point of 
“everything but institutions”.4 Beyond politically correct 
explanations, this did mean de facto that Moscow had 
to adopt EU rules and regulations without any chance 
to inluence them or manage the common space.  
Twenty-ive years after the signing of the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, one can say that Greater Europe 
was never built the way it was intended. Analysing why 
this didn’t happen would be an interesting academic 
exercise, and taking an unbiased look at that time would 
assist in the avoidance of such mistakes in the future. 
One thing is clear though: Europe is in a controversial 
situation now. Most of the institutions created during 
and after the Cold War still exist and formally function, 
but they increasingly fail to match reality. 
Instead of ‘Greater Europe’ there has emerged ‘Little 
Europe’ (similarly to ‘Little England’ syndrome after the 
disintegration of the British Empire).   
What are the main features of the Little 
Europe phenomenon? 
Firstly, it is the crisis of the two institutions that were 
intended to become the backbone of a new Europe – 
the EU and NATO. 
The EU is in deep and multifactor decline. Not only 
has it failed to become a major and independent 
international player, but it has also pursued an 
abortive policy with regard to its neighbours. The 
EaP is largely responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, 
and the Union for the Mediterranean was completely 
paralysed by the Arab Spring and ensuing events. The 
strategic partnership with Russia ended in a war of 
sanctions. Attempts to catch up with the US resulted 
in talks on the American-led Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The EU has fallen 
behind in adequately addressing major international 
issues. Economic stagnation goes on for years on 
end, and the ill-conceived introduction of the single 
currency created serious internal imbalances which, 
in turn, keep producing ever acute crises. The inlux 
of refugees has turned into a time bomb threatening 
socioeconomic stability, political systems and values in 
undivided Europe. In general one can argue that overall 
heterogeneity of European space included in Euro-
Atlantic institutions has increased to the point which 
profoundly shakes governability of the whole area. 
NATO seemed to be one of main beneiciaries of the 
end of the Cold War, but in fact it has never acquired 
a clear and distinct purpose after the Soviet Union’s 
breakup. The Ukraine crisis and Crimea’s incorporation 
into Russia gave the impression that the Cold War-era 
model, consolidation against an obvious enemy, the 
same one as before, could be revived. However, there 
was no monolithic unity among NATO members even 
at the height of the crisis in Ukraine. 
The Syrian crisis, and especially the latest escalation 
after the downing of a Russian bomber by the Turkish 
Air Force, raised more doubts about NATO’s internal 
coherence and revealed a diference from the Cold War 
times. In those years one could hardly imagine a NATO 
country taking strong military action without consulting 
its allies, as bloc solidarity was the reverse side of the 
bloc discipline. Now one can make a precipitous move 
at his own risk and then turn to allies for support even 
though they may interpret it diferently. Whenever 
NATO or its members opted to use force after the end 
of the Cold War, it was practically never politically 
successful. The absence of a common and obvious 
threat means that the alliance has been unable to 
set a clear purpose for itself. For almost two decades 
NATO was trying to solve its conceptual problems with 
mechanical enlargement, but the expansion of its zone 
of inluence eventually encountered Russia’s opposition. 
Secondly, the very term ‘European security’ as construed 
since the 1970s is in crisis.  Forty years on, it is quite 
obvious that discussing European security within the 
framework drawn by the bloc confrontation would 
be senseless. Blocs are gone in Europe and so is the 
logic that, for example, underpinned the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. There are 
military-political contradictions between Russia and 
NATO, but their context and nature are completely 
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diferent from those during the Cold War when the 
groundwork was laid for the security system in Europe. 
But most importantly, European security cannot 
be considered without taking into account new 
factors, namely the Middle East and Greater Eurasia, 
including China.    
Metaphorically speaking, events in the Middle East are 
a huge vortex that sucks in states, societies and people 
in the region, or the oriice of a volcano that spews out 
boiling lava. This part of the world, where the construct 
built in the twentieth century is being torn down, will 
produce all kinds of threats to European security in the 
coming years or maybe even decades. But neither NATO 
nor the OSCE is able to counter these threats efectively. 
Greater Eurasia is shaped by the new international 
positioning of China, and its partial redirection from 
East to West and towards Europe. China is facing ever 
growing pressure and resistance in East Asia from the 
US and its allies. This is one of the reasons for Beijing’s 
westward turn to Eurasia, making the region much 
more integral and interconnected.   
Thirdly, Russia’s development is not consistent with the 
Greater Europe concept. The failed post-communist 
transition has brought about deep disappointment 
with its underlying ideas. The identity crisis, which 
started with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
has not been overcome. Russia was not engaged in 
the European transformation processes after 1991 as 
an equal partner, at least that is the strong belief on the 
Russian side, and this generated inferiority feelings and 
the desire to establish its own place in the European 
system. The EU’s decline combined with the rise of 
China and the rest of Asia is inluencing Russia’s self-
determination and increasing its urge to it into Asian 
trends. This is happening slowly and inefectively, but 
there is no reason to expect this turn to stop. With the 
loss of inluence on Ukraine, the Eurasian integration 
project, which initially was only called Eurasian but 
essentially was an attempt to create a second pole of 
the ‘European world’, is acquiring truly Eurasian features. 
And this process will keep gaining momentum as China 
is stepping up its activity in Eurasia.5 
Peculiarities of Russia’s post-Soviet development have 
made military power (regained to some extent), and 
most importantly readiness to use it, the main instrument 
of the country’s positioning in the international arena. 
It has replaced the idea of ‘energy superpower’ that 
dominated in the 2000s, that is, the ability to solve 
international problems using energy resources. The 
commitment to military power is further strengthened 
by the growing number of conlicts in the world, 
together with domestic and interstate confrontations. 
This negates the EU’s basic theory that military power 
is losing its potency as an instrument of inluence and 
giving way to other methods of competition, primarily 
economic ones. However the developments of the last 
two years vividly show that, contrary to expectations, 
political motives outweigh economic considerations.
What happened after the Cold War demonstrated that 
ambition to create Greater Europe based on universal 
rules issued from one centre (Brussels+) has failed. But 
an attempt by Russia to shape an alternative gravitation 
centre dramatically failed as well. Now the whole process 
should be restarted while taking into account two 
new factors. 
First, the changed situation in Europe/Eurasia as 
described above.
Second, a diferent logic of international development, 
which is clearly moving towards fragmentation of the 
global environment into economic mega-blocks (with 
erosion of universal regulations) and situational ad hoc 
alliances in security area to address particular issues. 
The Trans-Paciic Partnership (TTP) is the irst prototype 
of such new structuring, and TTIP may become the 
next example. 
So far Greater Europe showed no capacity to build a 
consolidated entity to be an independent core in the 21st 
century. This scenario of further division of that area into 
at least two groups of states looks likely. One part will 
gravitate towards the Chinese ‘pole’ with various degrees 
of formal ailiation with China, another will be the 
current EU pole (possibly reduced and restructured) led 
by the US in the framework of TTIP. Relations between 
those two parts will never be purely confrontational due 
to economic interdependence, but will be marked by 
ongoing punitive and restrictive measures vis-à-vis each 
other as a way to adjust relations amidst the absence 
of generally agreed rules.6 
Although contradictions between Russia and the EU 
persist, and there is still no solution anywhere in sight 
in Ukraine, an acute phase of the crisis is over, and both 
sides display willingness to resume relations. It is hard 
to say what they will be like, but some key parameters 
can be named. It would be impossible and senseless 
to try to restore the ‘strategic partnership’ that existed 
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in the 1990s-2000s.  It was based on the ‘Greater Europe’ logic which is no longer relevant. This means that 
negotiations on a new major agreement, which were halfheartedly conducted since the end of the 2000s, 
will not be renewed in their previous form. Relations will no longer be comprehensive after the crisis but will 
focus on concrete practical issues. The topic of ‘common values’ will most likely go out of use, both because 
they are challenged by Russia and because the EU may overhaul them in view of the need to reconsider its 
integration model.
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. There are practical aspects which cannot be put aside within ‘Greater Europe’ regardless of political 
relations. These include energy (Russia and the EU are destined to remain interdependent for several 
more decades), the movement of people (which is a much more serious issue now because of the 
inlux of refugees), and the development of adjacent territories (cross-border cooperation). Intensive 
cooperation can be possible in each of these areas, but not in a bundle. 
2. Future economic development within ‘Greater Eurasia’ continues to be important. It cannot be decided 
by and between Russia and the EU alone, but requires a multilevel dialogue between the EU and the 
ECU, between Russia/EEU and China, between the EU and China, and between China, the EEU and the 
EU. The latter format would be the best for discussing what Moscow and Brussels debated before – a 
common economic space and harmonization of rules and regulations.  
3. The OSCE has limited potential for ensuring European security. Instead it should give priority to 
creating conditions for preventing conlicts between Russia and the EU on the fringes of the former 
Soviet Union. This is necessary because recent events show that these countries cannot be integrated 
into any project but need some acceptable alternative. As for broader security issues, including those 
concerning the Middle East, they will necessitate a broader dialogue involving European countries 
(including Russia), the US, and possibly China.   Ŷ
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Why the EU-Russia strategic partnership 
Could Not prevent a Confrontation  
over Ukraine
Tom Casier
For roughly a decade, the Eu and russia have been caught up in a logic of mounting competition around rivalling regional projects and diverging attitudes towards international governance structures. Fuelled by 
domestic developments, this logic stepwise produced mutual negative perceptions and made trust dwindle. 
Instead of the pragmatic cooperation intended in the Eu-russia Strategic Partnership, relations increasingly 
acquired characteristics of a struggle for power. the root causes for this evolution can be found in the collision 
of Eu and russian regional ambitions over ‘the countries in between’. but they also follow from an inherent 
tension within the Eu’s diplomacy, between the objective of privileged relations with EaP countries and the 
ambition to form an equal partnership with russia on the basis of a recognition of its interests.
The nature of EU-Russia competition radically changed 
with the Ukraine crisis. Up to that point the struggle 
for power was predominantly about institutional 
arrangements in the former Soviet space, EaP versus 
ECU, as well as about issues of identity (the capacity to 
recognise the true ‘Europeanness’ of a country). With 
the annexation of Crimea and developments in Eastern 
Ukraine, this has changed radically. Russia perceived the 
‘loss’ of Ukraine as a tragic geostrategic bereavement 
and opted for a strong counter reaction. This took the 
power struggle to a new level, away from institutional 
competition to ‘compulsory power’, aimed at gaining 
more control (as in the case of Crimea) and undermining 
control by the ‘West’ (destabilising Eastern Ukraine). 
Despite the suspension of the strategic partnership 
and the dominance of zero-sum images, the challenge 
lies in escaping the competition trap and rethinking 
the future of European structures, not least collective 
security provisions, in the long term.
rIvALLInG rEGIonAL ProJEctS
Exactly at a time when the most compelling strategic 
issues were on the table, the Strategic Partnership 
between the EU and Russia turned out to be of little 
value and collapsed. Its tragic death, however, was a 
death foretold. It followed years of painful struggling. 
Yet, it still came as a surprise that it ultimately died as 
the result of a fatal accident, the annexation of Crimea, 
and not of a natural cause. 
The current clash between the West and Russia can 
only be understood in the light of the choices which 
were made about Europe’s international order after the 
Iron Curtain had disappeared. The end of the Cold War 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union put several key 
questions on the agenda. What is the place of Russia 
in Europe? What to do with the old West-European 
structures of cooperation, in particular the EU and 
NATO? Two rivalling projects were on the table.1  
The Euro-Atlantic project of ‘wider Europe’ was a 
Brussels-centric project, providing for the extension 
of the EU and NATO. Originally Russia had only limited 
objections to the accession of former Soviet allies to the 
EU. Very diferently, NATO was seen from the beginning 
as a Cold War organisation that had lost its main reason 
of existence with the crumbling of the Soviet Union. 
With the irst wave of NATO enlargement in 1999, 
suspicion rose that the West was not taking Russian 
interests seriously. The United Kingdom (UK) and US 
Kosovo intervention acted as a catalyst, creating a 
broad consensus that Russia should defend its national 
interests more staunchly. Concerns over the EU’s policy 
in former Soviet countries increased with the launching 
of the EaP in 2009. This policy continued to pursue the 
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ENP’s objective to create privileged relations with the 
Union’s eastern neighbours, reinforcing stability on the 
EU’s eastern borders. Yet it was more ambitious in its 
attempt to produce a new generation of AAs, based 
on a DCFTA. 
The Russian project was a multipolar one, in which post-
Cold War Europe would be built around three poles: 
the EU, Russia and Turkey. Against this background 
Moscow sought to set up integration initiatives within 
the former Soviet Union. Originally this was done mainly 
through the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Returning to an old idea of Nazarbayev, Russia 
promoted the idea to set up the ECU. The organisation 
was established with Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010. It 
signalled a turn in Russia’s regional policy. The ambition 
was no longer to take all former Soviet states on board 
but was based on a ‘coalition of the willing’: a deeper 
form of integration, with those countries that wanted 
to be on board. The ECU was the irst organisation 
that created tangible integration among former Soviet 
states. It was relabelled the EEU in 2015 and joined by 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
The co-existence of the EU’s EaP and the ECU created 
geopolitical side efects that were likely not intended 
in the original set-up. Countries in between Russia 
and the EU, like Ukraine, were forced to make a 
choice, something they would have preferred to avoid 
altogether. While Ukraine was negotiating the AA with 
Brussels, it was equally under Russian pressure to join 
the ECU. A combination of both was incompatible, for 
simple legal reasons. If a country accepts the Common 
External Tarif of a Customs Union, it cannot negotiate 
a separate free trade arrangement with a third country. 
EaP countries were therefore forced to make choices. 
Of those negotiating an AA with the EU, Armenia 
was the irst to decide in September 2013 to join the 
ECU. The President of Ukraine, Yanukovych, followed 
with a much more publicised announcement that he 
would not sign the AA with the EU (though he did 
not conirm the intention to join the ECU). It was this 
decision that sparked the Euromaidan protests, which 
were in the irst place driven by anti-regime sentiments. 
Association with the EU was merely a symbol for the 
revolt. From there developments took an unexpected 
course, ultimately leading to the fall of Yanukovych, 
one day after an EU mediated agreement was signed 
about early presidential elections. 
StructurAL tEnSIonS  
In  Eu DIPLomAcy
If the collapse of the strategic partnership was a death 
foretold, it equally has to do with an inherent tension in 
the EU’s foreign policy towards its eastern neighbours. 
The Strategic Partnership with Russia and the EaP policy 
of privileged relations with other neighbours were in 
the longer term doomed to be incompatible. 
The tension between both policies resulted from a 
decoupling of the EU’s policies towards Russia and 
towards the rest of Eastern Europe. In the 1990s the 
EU had a largely monolithic policy towards the former 
Soviet states, with the exception of the Baltic states 
who became candidate member states. When it 
launched the ENP this one-dimensional diplomacy 
came to an end. Russia decided to stay out of the ENP, 
which it considered to be too EU-centric, and obtained 
separate recognition as strategic partner, a term that 
starts appearing from 1999 on. It resulted in the Four 
Common Spaces agreement, which formed a new 
basis for political cooperation. With other post-Soviet 
states the EU developed its ENP and later the EaP, aimed 
at developing privileged relations. This ‘decoupling’ 
of policies was not a strategic decision, but a rather 
accidental outcome of Moscow’s decision to stay out 
of the ENP. The implications of this split were probably 
a lot bigger than anticipated. Both policies developed 
in diferent directions and would ultimately collide. 
The reason for this clash is that they both represent 
fundamentally diverging types of diplomacy and have 
incompatible objectives.
The ENP/EaP was a policy which was strongly based 
on rule transfer and a normative agenda. It was a 
predominantly a form of ‘structural diplomacy’2 
aimed at long-term structural reform and reshaping 
neighbouring countries, like Ukraine, in the EU’s image. 
In practice it was a project of anchoring neighbours 
in the EU’s legal and economic sphere, which would 
extend beyond its actual borders. They would adopt 
a considerable part of the EU acquis and take over 
considerable parts of institutional practices and rules. 
An AA crowned this, with the creation of a DCFTA, but 
also providing for alignment on foreign policy issues. 
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Diplomatic relations with Russia went in a diferent 
direction. The agenda of norm promotion and rule 
transfer faded to the background and the leitmotiv 
became one of a pragmatic policy of constructive 
engagement and enlacement.3 Diplomacy was ‘strategic’ 
rather than ‘structural’, based on the recognition of 
Russia’s equality and importance and as part of a 
‘strategic vision’ of the EU’s global role.4 It aimed at 
cooperation on the basis of mutual interests generated 
by interdependence. 
Fundamentally, there was a deep structural tension 
inherent to this double track policy of the EU vis-à-vis 
Eastern Europe. While the EU declared it considered 
Russia as a strategic partner on the basis of a recognition 
of its interests, it simultaneously sought to (partially) 
integrate other post-Soviet countries into its legal and 
economic sphere. Yet, it was exactly in these countries 
that Russia considered it had crucial interests and was 
entitled to have inluence. In other words, it is at this 
point that the EU’s policy of ‘privileged relations’ with 
its neighbours clashed with Russia’s policy of ‘privileged 
interests’5 with the same countries. Close EU association 
with some EaP countries was structurally incompatible 
with a strategic partnership with a Russia that was 
concerned that growing EU inluence in precisely those 
countries went at its expense.
Tensions culminated over the technical and legal 
incompatibility between the AAs6 and Russia’s regional 
ambitions. They were fuelled by Russian domestic 
developments and an increasing geopolitical reading 
of events. The downward spiral was driven by a logic of 
competition, in which the EU (and even more some of 
its member states) and Russia developed increasingly 
negative images of each other. This can be referred to 
as ‘attributional bias’,7 a tendency to assume negative 
intent in the behaviour of the counterpart, while 
explaining one’s own behaviour as legitimate given 
external constraints. It made trust dwindle. The major 
clash came with the radical developments over Ukraine 
in late 2013 and early 2014: Yanukovych’s refusal to sign 
the AA, the Euromaidan protests, the regime change in 
Kyiv, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern 
Ukraine. As a result the strategic partnership with Russia 
was suspended and bilateral contacts largely limited to 
technical contacts. The US and EU imposed sanctions 
and Russia retaliated. EU-Russia relations had entered 
a fundamentally new stage of confrontation.
tAKInG tHE PoWEr StruGGLE 
to A nEW LEvEL
Often EU-Russia relations have been represented in terms 
of a clash between a norm-driven policy in Brussels and 
an interest-driven policy in Moscow. This is misleading. 
The EU’s policy of norm and rule transfer has deinitely 
power implications as well. It anchors countries into 
an EU legal and economic sphere extending across its 
borders. It creates comparative advantages for EU trade 
and policies, and the intertwinement makes it costly for 
states to leave. The prevalence of EU norms leads to what 
Haukkala has called ‘normative hegemony’,8 a consent 
that these norms are the ‘evident’ legitimate norms, 
the ones to follow. Many of the norms promoted are 
unrelated to democracy or human rights, but are about 
commercial and free market principles (liberalising 
energy markets, for example). 
In contrast with the claim by Pierre Vimont – Executive 
Secretary-General of the European External Action 
Service – that the EU “never had any clear warning” from 
Russia that a DCFTA with Ukraine “was unacceptable 
to them”,9 there have deinitely been many signals of 
disagreement in Moscow. These varied from Lavrov’s 
suggestion that the EaP was an attempt to build a sphere 
of inluence,10 to various restrictive trade measures 
against states negotiating an AA with Brussels. Signals 
were not picked up. Arguably the EU can be said to 
have been blinded by its own self-image as normative 
power, as non-geopolitical actor, not imposing policies 
on its neighbours – qualiications that were reiterated 
by EU diplomats. This is not to say that the Union had 
a secret grand strategy. Its policy should rather be 
understood as the result of technocratic step-by-step 
developments and fragile compromises in a complex 
institutional context where many diferent interests 
have to be balanced. However, this does not imply 
that its policy had no power implications. What the EU 
exactly failed to think through is how its policy would 
generate geopolitical tensions.
The radical developments over Ukraine can be seen 
as a shift of EU-Russia competition into a new type of 
power struggle. Until the end of 2013 tensions had been 
predominantly over institutional arrangements in the 
neighbourhood (AAs versus the ECU). They were also 
about identity politics, the capacity to deine genuine 
‘Europeanness’ of states and include or exclude them 
on this basis. When the Ukrainian Yanukovych regime 
collapsed, this all seemed lost for Moscow. In a strong 
geopolitical reading of events, Russia had major 
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strategic concerns. In the short term they concerned 
losing control over Sebastopol in Crimea, where its 
Black Sea leet is stationed. But there were also bigger, 
long-term concerns. In an interpretation reminiscent 
of Bzrezinski11, Moscow understood the perceived ‘loss’ 
of Ukraine as a major geostrategic blow that would 
weaken Russia and reinforce the West. In the longer 
term this risked to threaten Russia’s position as great 
power. In all likelihood its ambition was to compensate 
for that loss of control by an attempt to undermine 
and weaken Western inluence, through politics of 
territorial control, military presence, destabilisation 
and confusion. In doing so, it lifted the competition 
to a new stage of power struggle, one of ‘compulsory 
power’.12  Geopolitical interests and military threats are 
now openly on the table. Zero-sum images dominate 
on both sides. Coercive instruments play a central role, 
something mirrored – in a weaker way – in Western 
sanctions and Russian counter sanctions.
The annexation of Crimea clearly altered the rules of the 
game. It violated the European border regime and set 
a dangerous precedent. Yet, while Western sanctions 
were imposed on Russia, the annexation is seen in most 
diplomatic circles as a fait accompli. Ironically, it poses 
less of a ‘problem’ for a normalisation of relations than 
the conlict in Eastern Ukraine. Ultimately, the non-
recognition of Crimea as Russian territory does not stop 
countries from cooperation with Russia, in the same 
way as it did not stop countries from having regular 
diplomatic contacts with Israel after it annexed the 
Golan Heights. Much more problematic is the conlict 
in the Donbas region. It is complex in terms of the 
parties involved and its improbable that all of them 
are under control of Moscow or Kyiv. The two Minsk 
protocols sought to establish a ceaseire, but a durable 
solution of the conlict faces huge obstacles. Any form 
of concession is likely to be seen as a loss of face and 
to meet considerable domestic opposition, not least 
for Ukrainian president Poroshenko.  
 
FAILInG coLLEctIvE SEcurIty AnD 
tHE ExtEnSIon oF conFLIct
If the Ukraine crisis has proven one thing, it is the 
failure of an efective collective security mechanism 
in Europe. Despite the fact that relations with Russia 
were the most institutionalised of all EU partnerships, 
the density of contacts could not prevent a logic 
of competition from developing. In principle pan-
European collective security is the task of the OSCE. In 
practice the organisation did not get the room to play 
this role. In its security role it operated largely in the 
shadow of a military alliance like NATO. Russia itself 
had an ambiguous relation with the OSCE,13 which it 
reproached for having double standards. The collective 
security provision in wider Europe was thus largely 
deicient: an efective mechanism to contain the Ukraine 
crisis at a very early stage was lacking. Arguably it is one 
of the most important shortcomings of post-Cold War 
structures in Europe.
In the meantime, the international setting has also 
changed and is likely to impact on the confrontation 
over Ukraine. In October 2015 new developments 
occurred in the Syrian war. Russia decided to launch 
air strikes against anti-Assad groups and were clearly 
not only targeting Islamic State (IS). Russia also deployed 
troops on the ground, an important new development 
in the conlict. In contrast to the annexation of Crimea 
and the war in Eastern Ukraine, this was not done on 
the basis of a strategy of ‘denial’.14 The Russian military 
development was not only acknowledged, but also 
announced and its coverage in certain media clearly 
orchestrated. The interests at stake are clear. The 
Assad regime is Russia’s only ally in the Middle East. 
Syria is home to an important naval base, Tartous, of 
tremendous strategic importance as it gives Russia 
direct access to the Mediterranean without having to 
cross the narrow and NATO-controlled Bosporus strait. 
Moscow sees the Assad regime as the best guarantee 
for its interests and seeks a solution which keeps the 
current leaders in place. Its air strikes are clearly aimed 
at reinforcing the current regime. 
But clearly its military action in Syria also serves a 
bigger strategic and symbolic purpose. It is part of 
Russia’s challenge to American hegemony. It is a way 
of working itself into the conlict and force a diferent 
negotiation agenda: one in which the departure of 
Assad is no longer an a priori condition, as the West 
wanted. It is part of Moscow’s (neo-)revisionist agenda, 
seeking to get a fairer representation in structures of 
international governance.15 Arguably, it also serves 
domestic purposes, conveying a message of strong 
leadership and Russia as inevitable partner to the 
Russian population.
The result of Russia’s military involvement is that 
the complex and violent conlict has entered a new 
stage. Several great and regional powers are directly 
or indirectly involved in the war with agendas that 
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transcend Syria itself. They interact on the basis of 
perceived (im)balances of power. This includes the US 
and some of their allies, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, as well 
as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It goes without saying that 
it has all the ingredients for a potential escalation and 
incontrollable conlict. The war transcends borders and 
has ramiications in many countries, from Iraq to Russia 
itself (with former Chechnyan rebels ighting with IS).
The developments in the Syrian war may have 
implications for the conlict in Eastern Ukraine. Apart 
from practical side efects (such as diverting volunteers 
from Eastern Ukraine to Syria), Syria forms another zone 
of potential direct confrontation between the West and 
Russia. Both the US and Russia are militarily engaged, 
in the air and on the ground, and pursue diferent 
objectives – despite certain common interests. Most 
importantly, this involvement may link the solution 
of the war in Eastern Ukraine to the developments in 
Syria, with both seen as part of a bigger international 
struggle for power.
WHAt noW?
With the Ukraine crisis, the pragmatic competition that 
characterised the EU-Russia strategic partnership for a 
long time has derailed into direct confrontation. The 
current power struggle is understood in geopolitical 
zero-sum terms and relies on coercive instruments of 
control and destabilisation. The challenge is whether 
to go along in raising the bids in this power struggle. 
There is a real risk of getting into a competition trap 
from which it will be hard to escape, as positions become 
more entrenched and any action is likely to be met by 
retaliation. There is a painful dilemma here between the 
need to actively de-escalate and the view that Russian 
action, the annexation of Crimea in particular, cannot 
be swept under the carpet.
Therefore the road to better relations will be very long 
and winding. It will require a return to the basics of 
normalisation and trust building. Success will ultimately 
depend on domestic developments within Russia (away 
from the current polarising approach) and within the 
EU (building consensus among all member states). 
Equally, it will require critical relection on both sides 
about their foreign policies. Russia needs to reconsider 
its strong geopolitical understanding of international 
afairs. The EU needs to move away from it self-image 
as normative power, understanding the real power 
implications of its policies in Eastern Europe. All this 
will require a sea change in rhetoric as a basic condition 
for trust building. And increasingly it will depend on 
the international situation, with developments in Syria 
changing the setting of the conlict over Ukraine. 
In a context of normalising relations, still far of at the 
time of writing, rethinking relations across wider Europe 
in a structural way will be of key importance. Despite 
current uncertainties and against all odds, it would 
be wise to critically relect on the form this may take. 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS 
1. Pan-European cooperation needs to be 
rethought in terms of double concentric, 
but overlapping circles, one around the EU, 
one around Russia. Minimally this requires 
the compatibility of separate free trade 
arrangements, taking away a crucial reason  
for competition.
2. A trialogue between the EU, Russia and 
the countries in between is inevitable for 
a structural solution and would help to 
remedy the inherent tension in the EU’s policy 
towards its eastern neighbours (the strategic 
partnership with Russia and privileged 
relations with EaP countries). This trialogue 
should extend beyond trade to tackle security 
issues.
3. An efective pan-European collective security 
mechanism, that has the trust of all parties 
and helps to contain crises at an early stage, 
will be essential for European security. This 
is a better – but extremely challenging – 
alternative than the current polarisation and 
military build-up between NATO and Russia.
Most of this is inconceivable now and will require 
creative and courageous thinking in the long term, 
beyond current stalemates and possibly even beyond 
Putin’s presidency. Ultimately a structural solution for 
the current tensions will depend on the capacity to 
extend an integration model of increasingly irrelevant 
borders beyond the EU, to include former Soviet states. Ŷ
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security policy, geopolitics and 
International order in EU-Russia  
Relations during The Crisis
Roy Allison
there are long-standing diferences between the Eu and russia, which frustrated signiicant advances in security policy cooperation in earlier years. these have been signiicantly compounded by the ukraine 
crisis and a growing rift over fundamental principles for European security enshrined by the organization for 
Security and co-operation in Europe (oScE). the Eu has come to be viewed in moscow as a geopolitical rival 
only in recent years, once Putin staked his credibility on the rapid development of the integration processes 
under the EEu. Putin’s claim that ‘new rules’ for Europe are required, challenging the existing international 
order, is largely about russian entitlements in the cIS region and especially ukraine. to the extent there is 
a russian efort to re-write basic international legal principles, which are underpinned by broad consent in 
the international community, this has to be irmly and consistently rejected.
It is easy to attribute the current impasse in EU-Russia 
relations and collapse of the language of partnership just 
to deep diferences catalysed by events in and around 
Ukraine since autumn 2013. The assumption would be 
that, except for an unfortunate and unexpected chain of 
events since that time (the ‘contingency’ of history), one 
could expect common interests to reasonably sustain 
the basis for pragmatic cooperation between the EU, 
at least its major states, and Russia. This would have 
prevented a serious geopolitical polarisation between 
the integration processes centred on Brussels, e.g. the 
EaP, AAs, and those promoted by Russia among CIS 
states, the ECU, the EEU and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO). Beyond this, it might 
be surmised, various dimensions of security policy 
cooperation or co-ordination between the EU and 
Russia were perfectly feasible and indeed essential 
through patient diplomacy.
Taking a longer view, however, the evidence we note 
below shows that a full decade before the Maidan 
revolution, near the beginning of Putin’s second 
presidency, deep diferences in perceived interests, 
understanding about appropriate conduct (norms) 
and outlooks, already pervaded EU-Russia relations 
and failed to dissipate. These divergences simmered for 
years, reinforced by the ‘colour revolutions’, until they 
surfaced prominently and violently around what all 
along arguably was the most predictable geopolitical 
and normative flashpoint, Ukraine. They force an 
overdue recognition that the agenda of negotiable 
commonality between Brussels and Moscow in matters 
of security policy (which also risks intra-EU cohesion), 
is at best restricted and in some areas not realisable in 
at least the medium term.
The agenda is all the more challenging with the change 
in template since early 2014: underlying distinctions 
in interpreting basic principles of international order 
have sharply diverged and are leading to a deep chasm 
between Russia and most EU member states. Russia 
has shaken the pillars of earlier diplomacy through its 
demands for new ‘rules’, for a new form of interstate 
regulation, which Russia has some ‘equal’ role in deining, 
while rhetorically insisting on traditional principles 
of international law and simultaneously displaying a 
willingness to deploy traditional military power. This 
makes it di cult to be sure that any new agreements, 
including those regionally focused like the Minsk-II 
agreement, are perceived in Moscow as anything but 
transient, while old treaties (such as Russian-Ukrainian 
bilateral treaties, or on the wider Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty) are thrown into question.
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It is instructive to review briely the core obstacles 
constraining EU-Russia security policy ‘partnership’ 
already in 2004-5. Despite meetings between the parties 
at various levels in those years, as early as 2001 President 
Putin was keen on forming an EU-Russia Council as 
a permanently operating body to deal with security 
issues. However, the EU was unwilling to ofer Russia 
regular and institutionalised inluence over plans for 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a 
matter Brussels believed should be determined by 
member states not external partners, whatever their 
‘great power’ self-perception. This search by Moscow 
for leverage on decision-making which the EU felt was 
properly for members of its own club, in large measure 
explains why the common Space of Cooperation in 
the ield of External Security (with its ‘road map’ action 
proclaimed at an EU-Russia summit in May 2005) failed 
to make headway. This is relected in the ield of EU 
conlict prevention and crisis management operations; 
Russia sought an equal decision-making role in planning 
and implementing operations at all levels. On the other 
hand, beyond the Balkans in CIS regions Russia expected 
a format to allow it to retain a dominant position. Russia 
wished to shape ESDP as a model ensuring Russia an 
equal voice on all European security issues and as an 
instrument to create a ‘Greater Europe’, in place of an 
EU-centric Europe, in which Moscow would exist as a 
separate and competing pole of attraction for CIS states.
This vision was clearly at odds with EU thinking on 
‘preventive engagement’ to the east beyond the border 
of the enlarged EU, as crystallized in the ENP and later 
the EaP. Russia’s early dismissive view of the ENP, well 
before acrimony lared up over the Orange Revolution, 
seemed driven by worries over the EU’s potential to 
act as a revisionist force in its ’new neighbourhood’ at 
the expense of Russia, both normatively and perhaps 
through greater involvement in conlict resolution. 
Russian suspicions grew with the support of Poland 
and the Baltic States for an EU ‘Eastern Dimension’ 
and Ukraine’s interest in this. Indeed, with the Orange 
Revolution Moscow began to view Ukraine as an 
instrument in the strategic weakening of Russia and 
its distancing from the EU. Kyiv clearly prioritised its 
diplomatic eforts to persuade the EU to accept that 
Ukraine would be eligible for EU membership, once 
it had met the Copenhagen criteria, over the Russia 
promoted Single Economic Space. Kyiv considered 
the latter to be geopolitically as much as economically 
motivated.
Meanwhile, the conceptual foundations of a divided 
Europe, with Ukraine as the ‘swing state’ were aired in 
Moscow. Analysts close to the Kremlin, such as Gleb 
Pavlovsky, presented Russia in the ‘Euro-East’ as “the 
initiator of a new form of European unity”, arguing 
that Western democratic institutions “cannot be fully 
accepted in the Euro-East”. The nationalist ideologue 
Alexander Dugin presented a contest and choice for 
European and CIS states between orientations, indeed 
identity, of ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ and ‘Euro-continentalism’, 
with the latter characterised by ‘autonomy’ from US 
inluences. Dugin was outside inner Russian decision-
making circles and his style of Eurasianist thinking was 
one of various currents in Moscow. But it had some 
traction since it relected a broad current of concern 
about the consolidation of a group of countries on 
Russia’s western lank animated by a political and foreign 
policy philosophy contrary to that of Russia. Crudely, 
the concern was with the prospect of an anti-Russian 
cordon of Western-aligned states.
Official Russian policy insisted on Russia-centred 
integration processes in the CIS sphere of Greater 
Europe, but did not wish to appear wholly exclusionary. 
Therefore, in the second half of the 2000s Russia appeared 
ready to contemplate possible EU cooperation in 
managing ‘frozen’ conlicts. However, this was premised 
on the assumption that Russia would lead or co-lead 
potential crisis response operations in Transnistria 
or the South Caucasus. This model was not put into 
practice. The EU had a signiicant role in mediating and 
persuading Georgia to support the ceaseire agreement 
ending its short war with Russia in 2008. However, this 
outcome only reinforced Russia’s view of its entitlement 
to primacy in its immediate neighbourhood. Indeed, the 
EU’s approval for a settlement with Georgia that was far 
from satisfactory for Georgia for a while gave EU policy 
in the CIS region a somewhat benign lavour for Moscow. 
This was before the EaP process began to promise 
deeper transformation through far-reaching AAs, and 
crucially before Putin chose to place his political capital 
behind the emerging structures of the CIS (the Customs 
Union and the EEU), with the polarising efect this had.
Reviewing these aspects of EU-Russia relations a decade 
ago conirms that even before Russian suspicions about 
EU geopolitical intentions and the projection of EU 
norms in the ‘post-Soviet space’ became acute (though 
the shock of the Orange Revolution reverberated 
for years), there were deep diferences between the 
EU and Russia over the modalities and premises of 
security policy cooperation in Europe. It was telling that 
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Moscow sought equality with the EU in decision-making 
in conlict resolution and crisis management even 
outside the CIS region, while within that region Russia 
unambiguously expected that its core preferences 
should prevail, in crisis management as well as security 
policy interaction with the EU and NATO.
In short, looking beyond the immediate and critical 
management of the Ukraine crisis since 2014 towards 
EU-Russia security policy relations in the medium term, 
it is unrealistic to try to set aside these deeply indented 
differences about equality and rightful influence 
determined by spatially divided notions of Europe. 
Therefore the EU’s interest in “ending Russia’s pressure 
on EaP countries undermining their sovereign choice 
and securing a more constructive role with regards 
to protracted conlicts”1 really just reairms the core 
obstacle to EU-Russia security policy partnership that 
long predates the collapse of that notion of partnership 
in spring 2014.
Once Putin nailed his lag to the mast of the EEU the 
likelihood of a geopolitical standof in some form 
between this project and the EU vision of its eastern 
neighbourhood rose sharply. Moscow characterised the 
EU increasingly as intrusive, strategically driven and as a 
stalking horse for NATO. Putin opted to tie his domestic 
political standing with the EEU project, calling for its 
creation just at the time he became the ruling United 
Russia’s oicial candidate for re-election as president 
for a third term. His personal status and that of Russia 
were linked to a view of the future EEU as “a powerful 
supranational association capable of becoming one of 
the poles of the modern world’. 2 It was envisioned as 
the Moscow-centred coordinating structure in one half 
of ‘Greater Europe’. Russian oicials talked of matching 
two integration processes, the European and Eurasian.
All along, however, the accession of Ukraine into the 
EEU was the prize. Ukraine was the one CIS state with 
the trade and geopolitical weight to bring into such 
a constellation to create a meaningful pole and give 
substance to the ‘proper’ region sought by Putin. 
Bolstered by energy revenues, Moscow felt it had a 
realistic chance of persuading Yanukovych to steer 
Ukraine towards the EEU. More ambitiously, if less 
probably, Ukraine might be induced into the Russia-led 
CSTO as an exclusive alternative to deeper association 
with NATO. In spring 2010, President Medvedev was 
open about this hope, promising that “if Ukraine decides 
to join the CSTO in the future, we would be happy to 
open the door for you and welcome you into our ranks”.3
There was of course no inevitable track from these 
EU-Russia competitive dynamics to the extreme 
events around Ukraine in 2014. Rather the geopolitical 
environment (including controversy over NATO 
association, not discussed here) created increasingly 
unfavourable permissive conditions for a substantive 
EU-Russia security partnership. Russia sought to recast 
the Western-dominated security architecture in Europe, 
to change the workings of the OSCE and acquire more 
meaningful agency in shaping the principles governing 
security policy relations between states throughout the 
Greater Europe. However, before the crisis in 2014 eforts 
by Russia to change the ‘rules of the game’ in Moscow’s 
favour were presented as a matter for negotiation 
between and within international institutions, using 




It is true that contrary evidence had been ofered by 
much of the Russian rhetoric around its intervention 
in Georgia in 2008 and the perhaps hasty decision to 
recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia – for Russia 
the irst ‘legal’ dismembering of another CIS state. Yet 
by 2013 many in the EU had concluded that this was 
anomalous or exceptional in Russian policy. When 
Putin launched the EEU he described it as enabling 
Russia to “play a real role in decision-making, setting 
the rules and shaping the future”, helping Russia to 
establish itself within the global economy and trade 
system.4 He hoped the EEU would add to Russian clout 
in seeking changes through such bodies as the G20, 
but still as a responsible new World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) member, working through diplomacy, albeit 
veering towards coercive diplomacy in dealings with 
some CIS neighbours, rather than a resort to force. 
Rule-setting in security matters in Europe was similarly 
viewed as negotiable, although Medvedev’s proposals in 
2008-9 to develop a new pan-European security treaty 
failed to gain traction among Western states since it so 
transparently intended to displace NATO.
Despite this approach of ‘playing by the rules to revise 
the rules’ (if less convincingly so in the CIS region), 
for years Russian diplomatic discourse had been 
permeated with a sense of resentment over ‘who makes 
the rules’. Russia complained repeatedly that in the 
early 1990s the Western powers had taken advantage 
of its weakness when they recrafted the structure of 
European security. In the second half of the 2000s 
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Moscow found it increasingly unacceptable, despite 
sufering severely from the post- 2008 inancial crisis, 
that its greater structural power in the international 
system, alongside the other BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) was not much better relected in 
the workings of international organisations in Europe 
and the wider international system, in rule-making 
processes and in the shaping of customary international 
law. Russia also felt that its trump card, the veto 
power of UN Security Council membership, had been 
diluted and could once again be side-stepped by 
Western powers as in the past through the practice of 
liberal interventionism.
Moscow accused Western states, especially the US, 
of trying to carve out a new sphere of legitimacy 
with separate standards lying outside the working 
of customary or UN Charter-based international law, 
as expressed in the notion of  ‘democratic legitimacy’ 
(which qualiied the sovereignty of Russia and others 
states whose democratic credentials were called 
into question). At the same time, the aggrieved tone 
of this Russian discourse skated over Russia’s own 
interpretation of the sovereignty of neighbouring CIS 
states, of Russia’s entitlement to “privileged interests” 
(in Medvedev’s term shortly after the war with Georgia 
in 2008) among post-Soviet states and the exercise of 
various forms of coercion short of force to promote 
Russia-centred integration.5
The challenge to the international order from Russian 
actions in Ukraine in 2014 relects a position which steps 
well outside the scope of the claims and counterclaims 
sketched above. The Russian annexation of Crimea, 
as well as military intrusions into Eastern Ukraine, 
overthrow spectacularly the quite well-formulated line 
of attack Moscow had developed about the illegality of 
the Western use of force in those cases which lacked a 
credible case for individual or collective self-defence, or 
a UN Security Council Resolution acting under Chapter 
VII, in response to threats to international peace and 
security. Moscow resorted to justifying the territorial 
aggrandizement of the Russian state at the expense 
of a neighbour state through various moral, political 
and psychological claims, beside a clearly unfounded 
claim to self-defence.
The question arose whether Russia now sought to 
repudiate what it viewed as the ‘Western’ legal order 
and to project some alternative as a means of asserting 
Russian regional dominance and global inluence. In July 
2014 a senior Russian oicial called for the convention of 
a global conference to rewrite international law, taking 
account of the inluence of all major world powers, since 
“there are no agreed rules and the world may become 
an increasingly unruly place”.6 Putin also cast doubt on 
the basic ixed points in Russian-Ukrainian relations, 
by claiming that bilateral Russian-Ukrainian treaties 
were null and void since those had been concluded 
with the Ukrainian state, not the revolutionary entity 
that followed the Maidan uprising – a claim, however, 
that could hardly be continued after the election of 
President Poroshenko.
 
ruSSIA’S GoALS In uKrAInE
It is hardly realistic for Russia to expect major powers to 
come together to revise core principles of international 
law as a result of its challenge to legal principles in 
Ukraine. In the intricate web of interstate relations 
and intrastate arrangements with ethnic, religious and 
other minorities, major states have no wish to unpick 
the carefully formulated language and structure of 
international communication formed by international 
law at the behest of one large aggrieved power. Without 
the support of many other states, through state practice, 
or international judicial opinion (opinio juris), Russia 
cannot expect to propel any decisive shift in customary 
international law. Moscow might hope for at least 
tacit support from large states privileging sovereignty 
over democratic governance and stability over human 
justice. But it is notable that even Russia’s partners in 
the BRIC countries have not rushed to join the Russian 
chorus about the need to rally together to rewrite the 
international legal order.
The kind of principles that Putin would seek greater 
legal endorsement for are predictable and a far cry 
from the EU project: those helping to conirm Russian 
regional primacy in the CIS zone; those prioritising 
stable and strong state leadership, over democratic 
governance, to avert the spread of ‘extremism’ and 
‘anti-constitutional’ state uprisings (the narrative on 
‘colour revolutions’ which has become staple of Russian 
diplomatic addresses); those justifying the protection 
of Russian ethnic nationals, or perhaps even the loose 
notion of Russian compatriots – rather than civilians 
at large as assumed by the responsibility to protect 
principle  (R2P) discourse – beyond Russian borders. Yet 
with its multiple uncertainties of legal interpretation 
and obvious afronts to the post-Cold War evolution 
of international norms this agenda has no prospect 
of making headway in the wider community of states.
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Perhaps what Russia seeks instead, therefore, is more 
hard-headed and practical – to compel the codiication 
of a new European security dispensation, centred on but 
not conined to a resolution of the crisis around Ukraine. 
One Russian specialist has predicted that the new rules 
of the game sought by Moscow would require America 
to accept Russia’s “right to its own regional integration 
and security projects and full-ledged participation in 
international regulation”. Ukraine (less Crimea) “should 
build a state system that would rule out its turning into 
an anti-Russian state and integration with Western 
organisations that would guarantee its neutral status 
and ensure its close ties to Russia”. Notably, this would 
also “set a precedent for other nations that do not accept 
US leadership”, so that Washington (and presumably the 
EU) would have to recognise the right of global centres 
“to regional hegemony in a multipolar world, which is 
a norm for this international order”.7
This is a stark call for recognition of hard spheres of 
regional inluence, an updated version of the division 
of Europe agreed at the 1945 Yalta Conference, with 
the de facto zone of Russian (then Soviet) hegemony 
transferred geographically further east. Indeed, during 
the current crisis Russian oicials have praised the ‘Yalta 
principles’ of 1945 for relecting the balance of military 
power and keeping the peace in Europe.8  Putin has 
spoken approvingly of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, by which the Soviet Union and Germany carved 
up the territories of Eastern Europe. However, such 
praise for Realpolitik has been accompanied at times by 
loose claims that the Ukraine crisis has dealt a mortal 
blow to the post-Second World War Yalta-Potsdam 
system of international relations, and the international 
treaty understandings which underpinned it. These 
perspectives could point to Putin’s ideal outcome of the 
current crisis, beyond perhaps transient Minsk-II accords 
– some new Yalta-II agreement, recognising Russian 
special rights in Ukraine and the wider CIS region. 
But as a practical objective this seems hardly more 
realistic than to match Russia’s structural inluence on 
European security in 2015 with the far greater inluence 
it exercised in 1945. Neither the military stalemate in 
Eastern Ukraine, conirmed by the quiet abandonment 
by Moscow of its vision for Novorossiya, nor Russia’s 
deepening economic recession, provide Russia with 
the Realpolitik encouragement for its bolder ambitions 
for reworking the European security order. 
tHE Eu’S rESPonSE to ruSSIA 
The EU cannot engage separately with Russia on 
the larger issues of European order, but needs to 
seek a coordinated approach with other European 
organisations, NATO and the leading Western powers. 
There will be little appetite to enter into the vexed 
discussion of the legality of the use of force, where 
Western states see the violations over Ukraine as 
unambiguous.9 But thought is required on ways 
eventually to re-establish an accord between the West 
and Russia on the broader security rules for Europe. 
Germany, which assumes its chairmanship of the OSCE 
in 2016, will have a prominent role in this regard and 
the OSCE remains the best body for this task.
An immediate challenge is the need to avert the dangers 
of conlicts escalating, since the elaborate system of 
rules and signals to regulate competition and mitigate 
risks, which existed at the time the Cold War, no longer 
exists. Without implying that the severity of the former 
Cold War standof could return, EU states should accept 
that NATO will need to take the lead to form a military-
to-military dialogue with Russia to reduce the risk of 
accidents or miscalculation between armed forces. 
This can draw on previous understandings, such as 
the 1988 Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities 
agreement, and the OSCE’s 2011 Vienna Document 
on Conidence-and Security-Building Measures could 
be reviewed, for example to reduce the threshold for 
pre-notifying military exercises. 
The EU is poorly equipped in terms of mechanisms or 
culture to respond to potential dangerous escalations 
of military tension on its eastern periphery. This is 
especially so at a time when Russia contests core 
international legal principles, while supplementary 
rules and understandings to dampen down risks have 
not been formulated. Putin has opted to raise the stakes 
by conjuring up the image of a world where states “live 
without any rules at all”, where internal instability in 
states is all the more dangerous for “nations located at 
the intersection of major states geopolitical interests”.10
During the Cold War a variety of tacit codes of conduct 
were developed between the Soviet Union and Western 
states to try to regulate dangerous competition 
between their intermeshing interests in the Third 
World.11 Arguably, in the contemporary world it is the 
western CIS region where Russian and Western powers 
interests’ currently are luid and most closely intersect, 
yet no tacit understandings exist for this zone and 
Western leaders are even unsure if the Baltic States could 
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become more contested territory in the future. On the 
other hand, it is di cult to see how such codes from 
an earlier era might be redeveloped and internalised 
by Brussels. The EU commitment to its values agenda, 
to multilevel interaction with partners through the 
EaP and other programmes, and the sensitivities of 
the Baltic States and some east European EU members, 
will prevent acceptance of any Realpolitik tacit codes 
with Russia that could slide towards a Russian droit de 
regard over Ukraine or other CIS states.
The policies of the EU as well as its major states will 
continue to search for complementarities and elements 
of a shared agenda with Russia, beyond crisis diplomacy 
over Ukraine. But EU member states in NATO are likely 
to mix this reluctantly with elements of containment 
of Russian military grandstanding, even if EU sanctions 
are eased. Moreover, the notion of a realistic security 
policy partnership with Russia has collapsed for at least 
the medium term. Longstanding diferences between 
Russia and the EU about decision-making ‘equality’, 
about entitlements and the legitimacy of norm difusion 
in the shared neighbourhood, as discussed above, 
have deepened. However, all this is now eclipsed by 
irst order diferences over sovereignty, statehood, and 
the role of force. In a hierarchy of concerns, this gulf 
between Moscow and most EU states has to be greatly 
narrowed and core principles of interstate conduct 
reinstated before a dialogue on an EU-Russia strategic 
partnership can hope to acquire any strategic content. 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. Brussels should recognise that an EU-Russia 
dialogue on substantive security policy 
cooperation in the European theatre beyond 
the immediate management of the crisis  
around Ukraine has limited prospects for the 
medium-term.
2. However, EU leaders should continue to 
emphasise core European security principles, 
as codified by the OSCE, and seek Russian 
reairmation of them under the 2016 German 
presidency of the OSCE.
3. The EU should continue to resist Russian  
rhetoric on ‘changing the rules of the game’, to 
the extent this means new interpretations of 
customary international law (or even UN Charter 
principles) which are not shared in the wider 
international community.  Ŷ
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urope, make no mistake, is hard work”.1 Few looking at the Eu today would disagree with this. 
the Eu is facing a number of problems: the continuing inancial crisis, the refugee crisis, and 
terrorism. A more persistent problem than these, however, has been the question of what type of 
relationship to forge with russia. ukraine’s conlict has undoubtedly complicated the Eu-russia relationship, 
yet an unfortunate truth of that conlict is that it is in large part an outcome of the Eu and russia’s prior 
failure to reach an understanding about each other. this chapter considers two interrelated questions: 
should the Eu have a common approach towards russia? or should the member states develop bilateral 
relations with moscow? 
The short and simple answer to both these questions is 
‘yes’. Understandably, the individual EU member state’s 
relations with Russia are seen as constituting obstacles 
to the development of a single uniied EU policy towards 
Russia. It is true that diferent member states regard 
Russia from diferent perspectives, those the outcome 
of a number of factors, including geography, history, 
energy dependence and trade relations. However, the 
multiplicity of these individual bilateral relationships 
have the potential to contribute positively to the 
Brussels-Moscow relationship; cumulatively, the 28 
relationships mean a good deal is known about Russia. 
And as has been seen in relation to the Ukraine conlict, 
the 28 are capable of achieving consensus on how 
to respond to Russia and of maintaining solidarity of 
response. At the same time, Brussels cannot aford to be 
complacent about this show of solidarity to date. Events 
have an unhappy way of intervening and disrupting 
paths of action previously chosen.
The Ukrainian conlict has made relevant again the 
geopolitics of the EU-Russia relationship. In 2014 parts, 
but not all, of the EU experienced a shock from the 
east in the form of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 
further interventions in Ukraine. From other parts, 
arguments had long been made, especially following 
the 2008 hot war in Georgia, that Russia presented a 
military threat to its neighbours to the west. Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine mean those arguments can no 
longer be set aside. Others, however, have argued 
that the EU’s role in creating the conlict must also 
be taken into consideration, that it must now take 
seriously the idea that the deepening and extension 
of its regional trading arrangements is not seen by 
everyone as a benign process. There is some truth in 
this but in admitting some culpability, the EU must also 
remember that foreign policy actors are faced with a 
range of alternative responses, Russia included. It was 
therefore not a foregone conclusion that Russia would 
behave the way it has, however likely it was.
Hindsight has its beneits and it is clear now that Russia’s 
brief intervention in Georgia signalled that its talk of 
a sphere of inluence would turn to a defence of said 
sphere. In addition, the EU, under the leadership of 
the French presidency, under-estimated the capacity 
of the Kremlin to interpret a conciliatory approach as 
weakness. The third lesson of Georgia was that the EU 
member states need to demonstrate a united outward 
front and to conceal their disagreements to better efect. 
Anyone living in Britain in August and September 2008, 
for instance, listened to a quite diferent discourse 
about Russia’s actions in Georgia than their near 
neighbours in France. One of the major dangerous 
consequences of an obvious lack of solidarity is that 
Russia manipulates divisions to divide the EU member 
states even further. It took the annexation of Crimea and 
Putin’s acknowledged lie about the presence of Russian 
troops there for the EU member states to understand 
the importance of outward solidarity. In quick time (for 
the EU), and despite reservations on the part of many 
member states, a single united response emerged in 
the form of agreement to levy sanctions upon Russia. 
Credit should be given, less for understanding the 
34 |   LSE IDEAS - Dahrendorf Forum Special Report. March 2016
need to treat the unilateral changing of borders as 
the unacceptable breach of international law that it is, 
than for doing so in the context of another, arguably 
more destabilising, conlict that sharpened the threat 
perceptions of the southern EU member states more 
and earlier than other member states. Greece and Italy 
particularly have been of interest here. In addition to 
feeling the efects of the Syrian conlict in the form of 
the refugee crisis for far longer than most of its fellow 
member states, Greece has had the additional burden 
of its severe economic and political problems that 
have afected its relations with Germany particularly 
extremely negatively. Italy, meanwhile, has long had a 
close relationship with Russia, mysteriously so in some 
respects since this has not always been in the Italian 
national interest.2
However, the efects of Syria’s civil war have spilled 
even more visibly and even further beyond the state 
boundaries, as hundreds of thousands of people 
have been forced in search of a new home, making 
the refugee crisis an EU-wide problem. That same war 
has, if not spawned, at least strengthened the building 
of IS, which has wreaked terror attacks in numerous 
other states. It is the separate attacks on the people of 
Russia and France, however, that have capacity to pull 
apart the EU member states’ so far united position on 
Russia in relation to Ukraine. Before discussing potential 
spoilers, however, European foreign policy generally 
and the analysis thereof are considered. The second 
section examines some of the EU member states’ 
positions in respect of Russia’s actions in Ukraine with 
the aim of demonstrating the existence of difering 
viewpoints and vulnerabilities in relation to Russia. This 
is essential in order to understand in turn whether or not 
the solidarity we have seen so far in the EU’s response 
is of particular note. In other words, just how much of 
the national interest is set aside in pursuit of a higher 
order priority, that of the European good? It is essential 
also to establish for future purposes the circumstances 
under which solidarity of response can be achieved 
and the pressures that can and are brought to bear 
which shake the ground on which consensus has been 
built. The inal section therefore considers the potential 
spoilers; what might fracture and ultimately pull apart 
the consensus achieved to date?
SILvEr LInInGS: WrInGInG 
bEnEFItS From conFLIct
Any analysis of EU foreign policy must necessarily 
contend with the fact that it is made not only in Brussels 
but also in the national capitals of its member states. 
In turn, it is little wonder that the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) often evinces all too little 
sign of commonality, rather the reverse. All too often 
in the academic literature, the variety of interests, 
preferences and strategies of the various EU foreign 
policy actors are seen as obstacles to the emergence 
of a common foreign and security policy. It is certainly 
true that achieving consensus over how best to deal 
with Russia has long been a sticking point in EU foreign 
policy. Expectations of the EU’s foreign policy are overly 
high, however, and show a disregard for the diferences 
that exist in any single decision-making constituency, 
where we commonly see party-political diferences 
and even intra-party diferences on what constitutes 
sensible foreign policy. Thus, in many ways, the focus 
on the national foreign policies versus European foreign 
policy vis-à-vis Russia has been a distraction from 
larger issues.
That said, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty may have gone some 
way to resolving the problem of a lack of efective 
structures to support the formulation and pursuit of 
the CFSP, but EU-Russia relations have shown that not 
all the member states share the same view of external 
actors, even partners, while the Ukrainian conlict has 
opened the previously determinedly closed eyes of 
certain member states’ to the existence of a threat 
from the east. As per Art. 24 (3) of the Treaty, the EU 
member states must support that very Union policy to 
which they agreed within the European Council and/or 
Council itself. In other words, they are simply required 
to act in their national relationships in a manner that 
is consistent with what they have themselves deined 
as the CFSP in Brussels. It is to that extent that there is 
a European foreign policy. In addition, given that the 
CFSP, like other common policies, relects what has been 
deemed to constitute the general interests, there is the 
expectation that the member states will pursue in their 
national foreign policies what they agree to pursue in 
the EU multilateral policy. This, it is worth emphasising, 
relects an idea of states as rational actors, of course – a 
not unproblematic conceptualisation of foreign policy 
actors. Any actor’s foreign policy is, naturally a relection 
of its identity, its national interests and its geography. 
But what those are and precisely how they translate into 
foreign policy decision-making is far less self-evident, 
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for decision-making is also a relection of the actor’s 
perceptions of these, as well as their own and other’s 
capacities and their negotiating position in relation 
to them. It is for these reasons that the relections are 
sometimes distorted. Thus, as Northedge so amply 
made clear in his card game analogy, foreign policy is 
not simply about the cards one is dealt, it is about how 
each actor plays those cards in relation to the others.3 
One of the strengths in Putin’s dealings with the EU 
overall has been his accurate reading of how their 
foreign policy exchanges would proceed: until 2014 and 
the sanctions, that is. The EU might usefully consider 
the beneits of ‘wrongfooting’ in this foreign policy 
relationship. Too often it has been the EU and some of 
its members on the receiving end. That they managed to 
surprise Putin with their coordinated – and maintained – 
punitive response is worth dwelling on. Rather than seen 
largely as a hindrance, the fact of having 28+1 foreign 
policies might be more usefully manipulated to good 
efect for the Europeans. The Lisbon structures mean 
there is far greater scope for overall coordination, part of 
that coordination might mean agreeing to allow certain 
member states to take the lead in speciic foreign policy 
exchanges with Russia, acting, efectively, as ‘scouts’ and 
then relaying information to the larger ‘pack’. To return 
to the card game analogy, this has capacity to return 
more information about Russia’s hand and likely play 
than any one of the EU actors might ascertain and be 
able to interpret accurately on their own. In addition, 
a careful selection of scouts is likely to return varying 
accounts from which a more accurate account might be 
triangulated. The European Commission and particularly 
the Directorates General for Trade and Energy have so far 
had the greater dealing with the Russian delegation and 
ensured the necessary institutional memory and also 
protracted focus that sometimes escapes member states 
as a result of electoral and institutional restructuring 
processes. However, it is not at all uncommon when 
conducting elite interviewing within the Commission 
to ind that the interviewee has worked with successive 
Russian delegations, the personnel of which are changed 
regularly as a precaution against any possible socialising 
efects. The beneits of continuity usually experienced 
in civil service environments are therefore disrupted 
in the case of Brussels-Moscow relations, making the 
multiplier forces of the national capitals even more vital. 
These are important considerations given that the High 
Representative, Federica Mogherini, was tasked in the 
summer of 2015 with drafting a new EU Global Strategy 
and has already begun consultations. Mogherini is 
already focused on how to make the 28 plus one 
conundrum work more efectively:
“We have an opportunity to forge a stronger and 
more efective EU foreign policy bolstered by 
the full weight of 28 member states engaged 
at the highest level...member states and the 
wider foreign policy community are an essential 
ingredient of this process of strategic relection”.4
The work has begun in a favourable context of EU 
solidarity and it is to be hoped that the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) will be able to capitalise 
on this to better efect than Brussels has been able to 
achieve to date.
SoLIDArIty DESPItE DIFFErInG 
vuLnErAbILItIES
That the EU member states have difering perspectives 
on and relationships with Russia is relected in decision-
making in Brussels. The eastward enlargements of 
the EU particularly brought in some member states 
whose historical experiences with Russia and the Soviet 
Union made them cautious, even mistrustful, of Russia’s 
intentions. These voices have, until most recently, not 
been ampliied suiciently, partly because Western 
European perceptions have been coloured by a belief 
that these states have not managed to put aside their 
Cold War ‘hangover’ and embrace a changed Russia. 
The Baltic states and Poland particularly seem intent 
on ensuring that situation will not be repeated. There 
is insuicient space here to engage in an assessment 
of each member state’s position so what follows is a 
snapshot of a few of the member states rather than an 
exhaustive account. The various positions are set out in 
relation to the EU’s rhetoric and its sanctions regime, 
constituted of three stages, implemented in the period 
from March 2014 to February 2015.
Poland’s strong condemnation of Russian actions comes 
as no surprise given the turbulent history between 
these states, although it should not be forgotten 
either that Poland has played its part in trying to build 
better relations with Russia in the last decade and 
more. Nevertheless, the Poles have not been easily 
delected from their suspicions. In a speech in November 
2008, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, 
spoke of Russia “as one of the greatest challenges for 
the Transatlantic community”. Drawing on the lessons 
from the brief but hot war between Georgia and Russia 
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earlier that year, Sikorski went on to say:
“We should take the Russian leaders seriously 
because it seems that they mean what they 
say. In April, the previous Russian president, 
Vladimir Putin, speaking at the NATO-Russia 
Council in Bucharest, alluded to Ukraine as an 
artiicial creation with a large Russian-speaking 
minority on its territory. Should the Georgian 
scenario be emulated in Ukraine, we would 
have a large-scale European crisis. The security 
of Europe would be shattered”.5 
The prescience of such statements should result in the 
states of the so-called big bang enlargement being 
taken more seriously in CFSP terms in the longer term. 
This likelihood, incidentally, must surely be seen as a gift 
given by Russian foreign policy (making all the more 
curious the many media headlines in which Putin has 
been cast as the mastermind of the piece). Poland has 
been consistent in its attempts to ensure that Russia 
remains at the top of foreign policy agendas and is 
a state likely to remain unafected to any degree by 
any Russian attempts to exert soft power tactics. The 
same cannot be said for all the former Warsaw Pact 
states, however.
The Visegrad countries certainly responded initially in 
a united fashion, saying: 
“The Visegrad countries believe that the recent 
military actions by Russia are not only in violation 
of international law, but also create a dangerous 
new reality in Europe. The Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are appalled to 
witness a military intervention in 21st century 
Europe akin to their own experiences in 1956, 
1968 and 1981”.6
For varying reasons, including party politics, economic 
and political imperatives, energy dependency and 
Russia’s courting of political elites in those contexts, 
there is now blue water between the Visegrad countries. 
The Czechs and Hungarians are of particular concern, 
showing more susceptibility to the Russian message 
than the statement above would suggest is possible. 
While the EU is beginning to address Russian soft power 
and its efects, it will have to do more than try and 
counter Russian inluence and will have to consider ways 
to win these states back to a belief that EU membership 
ofers the economic and political security they need. 
 
Italy, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Austria and the 
Czech Republic are among the EU countries keenest 
to see the sanctions relaxed or scrapped. Greece has 
received most attention in respect of the Eurozone 
crisis. However, relatively little remarked upon has been 
the Greece-Russia relationship and the signiicance 
of that in the context of any possible Greek exit or 
expulsion from the Eurozone. Greek Prime Minister’ 
Alexis Tsipras’s visit to Putin in spring 2015 can be seen 
as politicking designed to deliver a small reminder of 
Greek options and the consequences for the EU, but 
it almost certainly also signals the fact that if forced 
out of the Eurozone, Greece would not continue to 
adhere to the sanctions regime. Greece’s negotiating 
position has been somewhat weakened by deteriorating 
relations between Turkey and Russia. Two gas pipelines 
–the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and 
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – are already under 
construction, boosting Greece’s potential to serve as 
a vital transit country. A possible competitor for TAP 
is the so-called ‘Turk Stream’, stretching from Russia to 
Greece and the Balkans - albeit via Turkey. While this 
obviously does not represent the most stable basis on 
which to build Greek economic security, it does give 
Greece bargaining power, again demonstrating the 
way in which Russia either directly or indirectly chips 
away at EU solidarity and in which the member states 
sometimes undermine the European interest.7
A contrasting and emerging CFSP force is Germany. 
This is simultaneously unusual and surprising; unusual 
because Germany has not traditionally taken the lead 
in a clear CFSP matter; surprising given the extent 
of Germany’s exposure to the Russian market. It is 
Germany’s determination to ensure that Russia is sent 
a clear message of disapproval that has reportedly 
most surprised Putin and provided a much-needed 
leadership example. That Germany would agree and 
continue to agree to the sanctions regime was not 
at all a foregone conclusion, and Merkel’s irm stance 
on this will have made it extremely di cult for France 
and the UK particularly not to stand with their fellows. 
While not as exposed in market terms as Germany, the 
French have sufered economic damage as a result of the 
sanctions. In the summer of 2014, most speculation in 
relation to the sanctions revolved around the question 
of whether France would sacriice its 1.2 billion euros 
contract to sell Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia or 
fulil its contractual obligations. Under pressure from 
a number of EU member states and the US, France 
ultimately did not deliver on its promise to Russia. For 
the UK, the City of London has been of most focus, with 
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fears that sanctions directed at Russia’s banking sector 
particularly would result in Russian banks directing 
their capital lows through other inancial markets to 
the detriment of London. However disappointing it 
may be that the UK has not acted as proactively and 
prominently as Germany throughout this crisis, the fact 
that it has stood irm on the sanctions is meaningful. 
Too often the larger member states are the focus of 
analysis, of course. Nevertheless, it is the case that 
the British, French and German examples have been 
important in terms of setting the tone for other EU 
member states, but also for demonstrating to Russia 
that they will make sacriices for the sake of principles. 
A more supranational CFSP would inevitably attract 
accusations that policy was imposed from Brussels 
rather than emerging from the national capitals. Even 
Russia’s often canny manipulation of media messaging 
has not been able to undo a year and more of the EU 
member states standing together in agreement that any 
damage to their own economies is worth the sacriice in 
order to ensure Russia understands certain behaviour 
will not go unremarked and unpunished.
SPoILErS AnD concLuDInG rEmArKS
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its subsequent, 
disputed, intervention in support of separatists in 
Eastern Ukraine has therefore served the purpose, for 
once, of uniting the member states and Brussels in 
condemnation of Russian actions and in agreeing the 
need to levy sanctions against Russia. As the conlict 
has continued, the EU has deepened and extended the 
sanctions regime and, despite a few worrying moments, 
witness Tsipras’s Moscow visit, to date the member 
states have remained irm. External events, however, 
have real potential to undo this good work.  
Russia’s ramping up of military intervention in Syria in 
the autumn of 2015 was a case in point. In the early 
days of this shift, Russia looked to have improved its 
negotiating position enormously by earning itself a 
seat at whichever Syrian peace talks table ultimately 
emerges. Early speculation concluded Russia would 
ensure the price of its cooperation in Syria would be 
the removal of sanctions in relation to Ukraine. This was 
not an inevitable development, Russia had continued 
to cooperate on Iran after all, yet with more at stake 
in Syria it would have been surprising if Putin had not 
played this particular bargaining chip. The bombing of 
the Russian Metrojet light 9268 and the subsequent 
terrorist attacks on Paris may yet result in a change of 
priorities. The EU states will need to remain focused in 
the longer term on the Ukrainian situation and make 
sure that it is not lost in the more immediate and severe 
threat presented by IS. It is imperative that a clear line of 
division is maintained between resolution of the conlict 
in Ukraine and resolution in that of Syria.
All too often in EU-Russia relations, it has been the 
pursuit of the national versus European interest that 
has allowed Russia to make gains. At times as well 
though, the Russia question has simply exposed a lack 
of sound strategic thought in many European capitals. 
That has been true in relation to both Ukraine and Syria, 
with both conlicts seemingly defeating the strategists 
and tacticians at the national and multilateral levels. 
It is also sometimes di cult to escape the impression 
that people think the EU should have resolved the 
Russia problem. We have seen with the US that no 
one state, no matter how powerful and how under-
exposed to the Russian market and Russian energy, 
can exert suicient pressure to remake Russia into the 
desired image. While the fact of 28 member states may 
lead to more disunity in respect of how to deal with 
Russia, that same disunity does also more often than 
not ensure that there is a constantly available conduit 
for negotiation and dialogue.
 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. Listen, as Sikorski says, more carefully to what 
Russia actually says. Overcome the tendency to 
see Russian foreign policy as inconsistent and 
unpredictable when, in fact, Russian foreign 
policy actions follow oicial rhetoric quite 
precisely. 
2. EU and CFSP analysts must do more to see 
the national foreign policy perspectives as 
resources upon which Brussels can draw. The 
problem is not that the 28 national foreign 
policies exist, but that they are not exploited 
to fullest and best efect.
3. The EU must ensure a consistently strong 
message is sent to Russia that cooperation in 
Syria cannot buy a way out of the sanctions 
levied in relation to Ukraine. Here the EEAS 
is positioned to provide an arena in which 
internal debate can be had and a negotiating 
position, including red lines, established so 
that all member states understand what can 
be conceded and what cannot. Ŷ
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EU-Russia Relations  
in the Context of the  
Eastern Neighbourhood 
Elena Korosteleva
this chapter briely examines Eu-russia relations in the context of the eastern neighbourhood. It contends that the Eu and russia’s ambitions for the eastern region have evolved into two competing region-
building projects underpinned by difering strategies, norms, instruments, and actors. Although projecting 
competing rationalities, the two projects, until recently, had peacefully co-existed, working around conlicting 
issues of political norms and economic convergence, which were not necessarily seen as insurmountable 
for furthering regional cooperation. their subsequent politicisation and securitisation, as a consequence of 
events in ukraine, have rendered regional partnership currently incompatible, revealing a profound lack of 
understanding of the region by both the Eu and russia and the Eu’s inability to work jointly with the EEu 
(and russia) vis-a-vis the region.  this chapter contends that the Eu must make an efort to acknowledge 
and engage with the above actors in the region, in order to develop cooperative strategies based on 
shared interests, international norms and compatible instruments for the advancement of economic and 
political convergence. 
 
SEttInG tHE ScEnE: DE FActo 
comPEtInG, DE JurE conFLIctInG 
rEGIonAL ProJEctS? 
With the articulation of its ‘proximity policy’ in 2002, the 
EU registered its explicit interest towards the eastern 
region, but had no particular strategy or vision to 
support its intentions.  The initial policy resembled more 
of a generalist security-predicated aid package, primarily 
intending to safeguard EU borders.1 Its subsequent 
reformulation into a ENP rendered it a ‘wider-European’ 
focus with an overarching responsibility over the region 
underpinned by an ‘enlargement-light’ strategy.2 
However, with the launch of the EaP in 2009, the 
policy gradually acquired a more pronounced (and 
contested) region-building narrative.3 At its core was 
the promotion of low-key technocratic strategies of 
engagement to codify an EU-centred agenda into a 
series of roadmaps and AAs’ requirements, with some 
profound implications for the wider region.    
The policy’s ‘regional’ framing was predicated on two 
fundamental principles of EU efective multilateral 
regionalism – externalisation of EU governance and the 
promotion of ‘European cohesiveness’, thus naturally 
prioritising the EU legal and economic acquis to “irst 
and foremost…ensure that the beneits of the single 
European market based on free movements of goods 
and services, labour and capital, were as widely spread 
as possible”.4 As far as the European neighbourhood 
was concerned, as the Commission further argued, 
“the EU [speciically] wished to promote key concepts 
of EU regional policy such as open markets, respect 
for environment, participative democracy and 
partnership in the conception and implementation of 
its development policy”.5
Having encountered much criticism from its own 
institutions and the region itself, by 2012 the ENP/EaP 
was reduced to ‘a set of instruments’ to further promote 
the eastern region’s internalisation of EU norms and 
regulations, supported by a complex machinery of 
inancial tools, inclusive of all levels of society. The 
instruments in particular evolved to relect the EU’s 
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manifold aspects of economic and legal acquis, as 
transcribed in individualised roadmaps and, more 
recently, the AAs now signed with Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia.6 The anticipated impact of these agreements, 
as claimed, was to develop “capacity of third countries 
to set strategies and prioritise convergence of their 
regional policies with those of the EU”.7 The overall aim, 
as initially conceived, was to bolster the formation of a 
Neighbourhood Economic Community as part of the 
EU-centred inter-regionalist strategies.8 
As a region-building project, the policy by deinition 
entailed inclusion and exclusion,9 favouring conformity 
and isolating resistance. This also extends to Russia, who 
had originally refused to be part of the EU’s ENP, and thus 
set out to pursue a region-building strategy of its own. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent regional integration tendencies, especially 
in economic and humanitarian ields, in 2007 Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, at the latter’s initiative, 
inaugurated the ECU, a (alternative) Russian-led, region-
building project in the post-Soviet space (Eurasian 
Economic Commission 2013).10 The construction of the 
ECU and the recently launched EEU emulates the EU’s 
supranational structures11 and has progressed quickly 
from signing the initial treaty on the ECU Commission 
and Common Territory (2007), to establishing the ECU 
in 2011 and the new Eurasian Economic Commission 
in 2011, and a single economic space (SES) in 2012. 
The launch of the EEU took place in January 2015, with 
further expansion of its membership to Kyrgyzstan 
(August 2015), and possibly Tajikistan, Turkey and Iran in 
the future.  Noting this fast-lowing regional integration, 
Vladimir Putin commented: 
“It took Europe 40 years to move from the 
European Coal and Steel Community to the 
full European Union. The establishment of the 
Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space is proceeding at a much faster pace 
because we could draw on the experience of 
the EU and other regional associations. We see 
their strengths and weaknesses. And this is our 
obvious advantage since it means we are in a 
position to avoid mistakes and unnecessary 
bureaucratic superstructures”.12 (October 2011).  
The key features of this alternative regional integration 
project include market harmonisation, and interest-
driven multilateral partnerships often led by Russia, with 
the consent of other signatories. Since its launch this 
regional project has not received adequate international 
recognition. At the same time, as Dragneva and 
Wolczuk contend, 
“unlike previous integration regimes, the  
ECU and SES provision have developed 
alongside Russia’s accession to the WTO in 
2012…in future agreements to comply with 
the WTO regime, even in the case of non-WTO 
members, and for WTO law to prevail over any 
conlicting ECU provision”.13  
Russia’s special interests in fostering closer cooperation 
with its ‘near abroad’ have been de jure stipulated in 
its foreign policy strategies of 1993 and 1998, and 
reinforced further by pre-existing and increasing 
cooperation across the region. Hence, the signing of 
AAs by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, indicating closer 
political, economic and legal integration with the EU, 
has led to an adverse reaction by Russia, resulting in 
politicisation of two competing, but not yet conlicting 
or incompatible, region-building projects in the 
neighbourhood.
The EaP and EEU region-building projects, by their 
design and objectives, do not seem dissimilar . At the 
same time, their development creates tacit competition, 
given recent articulations of the incompatibility of their 
respective economic components. This sense of rivalry 
between the two regional powers in the neighbourhood 
has been registered by public opinion as ‘alarming’ and 
unconducive to the future sustainability of the region. 
As events in Ukraine illustrate, this rivalry has created 
long-term instability and conlict in the neighbourhood, 
as well as the disruption of the global order.
 
WHAt ArE tHE SEEmInG 
commonALItIES AnD DIFFErEncES 
bEtWEEn tHE ProJEctS, AnD 
couLD tHEy co-ExISt?
First, both projects efectively target an overlapping 
zone of interest, the eastern neighbourhood, which, 
however, is framed in somewhat conlicting terms by 
the EU and Russia. In particular, the former refers to the 
region as ‘shared neighbourhood’, de facto extending 
the EU governance bias towards the region. Conversely, 
Russia, from the early 2000s has been methodically 
depicting the region as ‘common’ rather than ‘shared’, a 
subtle but crucial diference which invokes an alternative 
meaning – of a no-man’s land – for the same region. 
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More importantly, these terms of reference have been 
signiicantly politicised in the Russian media, adversely 
afecting perceptions as well as prospects for future 
cooperation across the region.
Second, both the EU and Russia claim to have an 
overlapping ‘grand vision’ for the region, especially 
in terms of their prospective inter-regional economic 
cooperation. The Commission, for example, contends 
that: “Our vision is that these agreements should 
contribute in the long term to the eventual creation of 
a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, 
based on the WTO rules”.14 In a similar manner, at the 
inception of the EEU Vladimir Putin, the then Prime 
Minister, insisted that 
“we suggest a powerful supranational 
association capable of becoming one of the 
poles in the modern world and serving as 
an eicient bridge between Europe and the 
dynamic Asia-Paciic region…Alongside other 
key players and regional structures, such as 
the European Union, the United States, China 
and the Asia-Paciic Economic Cooperation  
(APEC), the EEU will help ensure global 
sustainable development”.15  
This overlapping ‘grand rhetoric’ of the EU and 
Russia, however, falls short when it comes to its 
implementation, resembling more a tug-of-war than 
partnership for regional modernisation. While the 
EU demands convergence with its acquis, which is 
claimed to be incompatible with the ECU standards, 
Russia conversely, although envisaging a prospective 
application of the WTO rules to the EEU, operates more 
through compulsion and dependency – methods 
bearing the mark of the Soviet times. 
Finally, both the EU and Russia clearly recognise each 
other’s presence and interests in the region, often 
stipulated in their respective oicial discourses. At 
the same time, in this acknowledgement of interests, 
they fail to understand, let alone to facilitate, the 
need for interface and trialogue over and with the 
region. Instead, they continue their advancement 
of overlapping but disjoined projects in the region 
which in 2013, owing to their highly politicised focus 
on economic integration, led to the eruption of conlict 
in Ukraine. While recognising the region’s historical 
complexity, the EU eforts in particular fall short of 
discernment and resemble more of an ‘ostrich’ approach 
in a blinkered pursuit of its technocratic governance. 
Even in 2013, in the midst of the emerging tensions in 
the wider region, the EU approach remained unaltered; 
while negotiating a divisive DCFTA as part of the AA with 
Ukraine, the EU also had separate talks with Russia on a 
‘new’ Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to 
belatedly consider “provisions for greater convergence 
of the regulatory framework between the EU and 
Russia”, which however did not aim to defuse regional 
tensions caused by the alleged ‘incompatibility’ of the 
two economic projects, but rather “to generate stability 
and predictability for both Russian and EU companies”.16 
The decision to inally triangulate the EU and Russia’s 
intentions with Ukraine came rather late in 2014, as a 
consequence of war and the negotiated ceaseire in 
Ukraine, whereby implementation of the DCFTA was 
delayed by six months, in line with Russian demands.17 
Furthermore, the Commission also proposed to 
establish oicial contacts with the EEU and to start 
negotiations on harmonisation of respective free trade 
agreements (FTAs) between the EU and the EEU, still 
widely contested amongst the main EU institutions 
and Member States. While allowing Ukraine to stabilise 
in the interim period, the new rhetoric of postponement 
and prospective FTA discussions cannot by itself 
reconcile more pressing issues of competition and 




tHE bAttLE oF DIScourSES: From com-
PEtItIon to conFLIct
This section ofers an illustration of how inlammable 
the unresolved discourses of competing and allegedly 
incompatible regional projects are, and how easily 
they can shift from their politicisation to the level of 
securitisation and war. The reverse process, that the 
region presently requires, is far more di cult. 
Rhetorical pronouncements of major players could 
de facto form real action, which may disrupt or 
reinforce stability. Consequently by declaring essential 
aspects of their respective regional projects (trade 
agreements – DCFTA and EEU codes) incompatible, 
relations between the EU and Russia immediately 
became politicised. This was initiated with the EU’s 
moderate but miscalculated campaign to accelerate or 
arguably compel Ukraine’sdecision over the AA at the 
then forthcoming EaP summit in the autumn 2013: “It is 
crucial to deine a vision for the coexistence and mutual 
enrichment of the regional projects as not to end up 
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with two diferent sets of rules in the European Union 
economic space and in the Customs Union”.18 Russia’s 
authorities followed suit immediately by pressing the 
alternative choice on Presidents Yanukovych of Ukraine 
and Sargsyan of Armenia. 
The EU’s politicisation campaign intensified in 
the autumn 2013 in response to Russia’s growing 
pressure on the neighbourhood. The two regional 
projects were declared fully dichotomous and the 
expression of ‘choice’ and ‘allegiances’ was required from 
partner countries.  
The consequences have been debilitating for the region 
and the status quo of the global order. While Ukraine 
refused to sign a deal with the EU at the Vilnius summit, 
it lost control over its own population, resulting in 
the Euromaidan protests and the ousting of President 
Yanukovych. From that moment, EU-Russia relations 
became fully securitised, following Russia’s invasion 
and annexation of Crimea, and its continued threat of 
intervention into Eastern Ukraine. Securitisation also 
left the EU and the international system incapacitated. 
While drafting NATO troops to Ukraine’s western 
borders, with Russian troops stationed on high alert 
on Ukraine’s eastern border, global actors lost control 
over a common strategy vis-à-vis Russia. Two years 
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, highly securitised 
discourse between the EU and Russia continues 
to dominate the EaP landscape, while the region 
desperately awaits reconciliation. 
In light of the above developments, one would question 
the grand vision of the EU and Russia vis-à-vis their 
respective regional projects in the neighbourhood. Two 
particular manifestations become apparent. 
First, in their self-centred projections both the EU and 
Russia have explicitly disregarded each other’s rationales 
concerning the contested region. In particular, the EU 
focused on the default assumption that the exposure of 
Ukraine and others to the future beneits of the EU, and 
the promise of a ‘well-governed ring of friends’ (centred 
on the EU) would enable recipients to unequivocally 
legitimise the European course. This was clearly an 
error of judgement, not only in terms of timing but also 
more essentially, in failing to factor Russia into the EU’s 
expansionist normative modus operandi. 
 
 
Second, and most signiicantly, both powers evidently 
failed to understand the region itself and its historical 
urge for complementary rather than dichotomous 
relations with the rest of Europe. Instead of mobilising 
binary loyalties, both power’s offers hold similar 
appeal in the eastern neighbourhood: in 2013/14 
a healthy plurality (40 percent on average) of the 
polled respondents across Belarus19 and Moldova20 
indicated the attractiveness of both regional projects. 
Furthermore, a temporal cross-regional comparison 
reveals that both powers appeal to the residents of 
the region in their own complementary way: while the 
EEU is seen as important for energy security and trade, 
the EaP and the EU have stronger clout in promoting 
functional government and efective sector-speciic 
cooperation. Enforcing a dichotomous choice on the 
region, not yet ready for making these commitments 
through their internalised norms of behaviour, testiies 
to the profound lack of understanding the ‘Other’ – 
the partner countries – including their needs and 
aspirations. The error of judgement by the EU and 
the loss of control by Russia are, in an equal measure, 
the causalities of a decision-making process which 
occurred in the vacuum of correlated knowledge, 
resulting in unnecessary politicisation and subsequent 
securitisation of the contestable narratives, as the case 
of Ukraine has lately demonstrated. 
The bigger question here, however, is whether and 
how the EU and Russia’s discourses could be defused 
and de-securitised rhetorically, to return to a zone of 
peaceful coexistence. As our comparative research 
indings indicate, the normative framing of discourses 
continues to conlict in a profound way but they are 
not necessarily insurmountable. Both powers profess 
and are associated with difering sets of values, which 
in turn support and engineer diferent behavioural 
patterns and expectations. Notably, the EU is clearly 
identiied as a liberal democratic model, premised 
on the values of democracy, human rights, market 
economic, and the lack of corruption; and the spatial 
analysis of 2009 and 2014 public associations indicated 
a relative endurance of this model in people’s mind-sets. 
At the same time, the EEU and Russia, in the respondents’ 
eyes ofer a mix of qualities, a hybrid case, which could 
be referred to as a social democratic model, but which 
could potentially approximate the EU especially along 
the values of market economy, stability, economic 
prosperity, and security, but at the same time retain 
its cultural uniqueness. 
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toWArDS ‘DEPoLItIcISAtIon’ oF DIScourSES In Eu-
ruSSIA rELAtIonS ovEr tHE nEIGHbourHooD
In light of the above discussion, the following conclusion becomes apparent. The framing of political narratives 
(including ‘planting the lag’ over the region) is a sensitive matter, which requires sound analytical grounding and 
further contextualisation. Transmission of narratives, as has been illustrated on Ukraine, can be either disruptive 
or peace-making, paving the way either towards ‘frozen’ conlicts or conversely, to prospective normalisation 
and cooperation. It remains to be seen how the new negotiations over respective regional FTAs will proceed 
in defusing tensions between the EU and Russia over and across the region. At least what could be ensured for 
now is the needed focus on framing new discourses and a search for new forums to foster mutual cooperation, 
where the compatibility of both economic projects would be irmly on the agenda.
 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS 
1. First, a study of the EU modus operandi in the areas of mutual recognition and market harmonisation 
and its possible extension to the EEU, in recognition of its regional presence would be timely and 
advisable. The EU has developed an extensive experience of operating Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(MRAs) across its own territory and with third countries, which aim to beneit businesses by providing 
easier access to conformity assessment regulated by independent and mutually appointed bodies. 
Discussing potential MRAs applications with EaP and EEU members would assure reciprocation and 
recognition of regional geopolitical sensitivity for individual parties. Furthermore, the EU should also 
draw lessons from its ongoing negotiations with Kazakhstan, an ECU member, on developing a new PCA.  
2. Second, a study which does not only explain the beneits of the DCFTAs but also those of EEU membership, 
and more importantly, that explores pathways towards developing more synergies and prospective 
cooperation between the respective unions, would enable third parties to rationalise their own choice 
and articulate commitment to the project(s) as necessary. 
3. Finally, a more discerning approach to EaP partner countries is required from the EU, to understand 
their needs and prospective di culties, and to send the right signal to the eastern neighbourhood, 
which seeks complementarity rather competition between respective regional projects. Rather than 
competition, there has to be cooperation between these projects, if the ‘grand vision’ of the greater 
neighbours – for a pan-European single market, premised on WTO rules – is to be achieved.  Ŷ
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Russia’s Foreign policy towards  
the post-soviet space since 2000
Alexey Gromyko
russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet space since 2000 has seen manifold approaches and been exposed to numerous internal and external factors. the key goal has been to preserve as much of the 
integrity of the space as possible in order to provide russia with a stable and friendly neighbourhood. the 
strategic approach to this region emerged only in the second half of the last decade. In the course of time, 
the post-Soviet space, not just rhetorically but in essence, has emerged as a top priority for moscow in the 
international arena. 
In the 1990s the implementation of this task was 
neither consistent, nor pursued in a systemic way. 
In fact, Russia’s approaches towards the region were 
chaotic and mostly tactical, in many ways a function 
of subjective factors. The main achievement was the 
institutionalisation of relations within the post-Soviet 
space through the signing of basic agreements and 
treaties. The framework made up by these relations 
was developed, but in the absence of comprehensive 
policies it was inluenced more by circumstances rather 
than by any meaningful strategy. It was as though the 
idea of free market forces was implanted in the post-
Soviet political domain, prioritising ‘self-regulation’, 
while marginalising the role of the state and strategy. 
Conceptually there was no clear vision of what Russia 
expected from the region or of whether the CIS should 
be considered as merely a convenient mechanism of 
the Soviet Union’s ‘political divorce’. 
Moreover, there was a widespread view at that time 
in the Kremlin, inherited from Leninist revolutionary 
tactics, which argued that ‘at irst we should separate 
before we can reunite’. Many politicians of the old guard 
were under the impression that the other republics of 
the former Soviet Union, except Baltic states, sooner 
or later would return to the fold of Russia. As a result 
of such thinking and expectations of history moving 
on auto-pilot, private or semi-state economic actors 
became the main foreign policy players with sometimes 
corrosive consequences for bilateral relations.
Until the beginning of the 2000s the Russian political 
leadership was either paying more attention to seemingly 
more important issues in international relations in the 
Far Abroad or was busy with internal problems related 
to Russia’s development. As a result, centrifugal forces in 
the CIS space were gaining momentum and the region 
itself became looser and more porous. Several initial 
attempts to launch substantial integration projects in 
the post-Soviet space, apart from the CIS, failed or gave 
birth to weak organisations. 
At the start of the new century, the rationale of economic 
primacy was introduced in relations between Russia 
and other post-Soviet states. Economic diplomacy 
was supposed to phase out uncertainty, clientelism, 
and the potential for free riding by Russian partners 
when price-setting mechanisms for Russian natural 
resources were open to arbitrary use in accordance with 
a current state of political bilateral afairs – usually for 
the beneit of Russia’s neighbours’ political elites without 
symmetric reciprocity. This type of behaviour remained 
marginal if certain natural resources had clear values on 
international markets and their costs were regulated by 
transparent rules, but for example in the case of natural 
gas, the political factor could play a signiicant role. In 
the absence of a consistent foreign policy strategy in 
Moscow towards the post-Soviet space in the 1990s, 
apart from the illusion that diferent parts of this space 
were bound to come together again, those resource 
beneits did not usually serve Russia’s national interests. 
47Avoiding A New ‘Cold War’: The Future of EU-Russia Relations in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis  |
Consequently in the 2000s market mechanisms were 
to replace political contingency or expedience but, 
this time, under Russian state supervision. The results 
of the new approach were ambiguous. While the state 
was rational in trying to use its economic leverage in 
international relations, the lack of a comprehensive 
strategy in the Near Abroad still impaired Moscow’s 
attempts to conduct an efective foreign policy in the 
region. This began to change when the traditional, but 
for a long time hollow, priority of the Near Abroad as the 
irst and most important ‘circle’ of the Russia’s foreign 
policy started to ill with genuine content.
Simultaneously, by the mid 2000s illusions of Russia 
joining traditional Euro-Atlantic organisations, like NATO 
or the EU, evaporated. The disastrous neoconservative 
period in US foreign policy convinced Russia that the 
Western part of the Far Abroad was not only a source 
of investments and technologies, but also of risks and 
challenges. The Kremlin saw the conlict in Georgia in 
2008 as a direct consequence of NATO expansion, which 
motivated Saakashvili, the loose cannon of Washington, 
to assault Tshinval, including Russian peacekeepers. 
As for the EU, the failure of the European constitution 
and the inability of the Union to acquire autonomous 
political power or build upon its economic might, 
made it in the eyes of Moscow a second-class player in 
international relations. Two symbols of this period were 
the termination soon after 2003 of ‘big three’ summits 
(Russia, France, Germany) after the political departure 
of Chirac and Schröder, and the eastern neighbourhood 
policy of the EU, which in 2014 contributed so much to 
the crisis in Ukraine (if not to say helped to generate it).
In the past 15 years, the regions neighbouring Russia 
have been increasingly unstable, be it the Middle East, 
Transcaucasia, or the ‘soft underbelly’ in Afghanistan 
and adjacent territories. A chain of ‘colour revolutions’ 
was seen in Moscow at best as an attempt to promote 
democracy at the expense of stability, or at worst as an 
attempt by the West to encroach upon Russia’s spheres 
of existential interests. The main outcome of that was 
a conclusion arrived at by the Russian leadership that 
without genuine eforts to consolidate the post-Soviet 
space, the aspirations of the country to play a major 
role in the polycentric world would stay a pipe dream. 
Another factor stimulating Moscow to develop a 
much more pro-active stance in the post-Soviet space 
has been the rapid rise of China on the regional and 
global stage, with all its positive and ambiguous efects 
in the Russian strategic calculations. The objective 
fact of China’s economic expansion in Central Asia 
was problematic in terms of Moscow’s intention to 
secure its place as a core of the Eurasian integration. 
 
At the same time, the relative success of the EU’s 
integration policy did not stay unnoticed in Russia. 
Especially remarkable was the rise of Germany 
as an economic and political leader of the Union. 
This happened not in contradiction, but in accordance 
with the fact that Berlin, as all other member states, had 
to delegate part of their national sovereignty upwards. 
In reaction to that and also to the inluence of the 
Russian academic community specialising in European 
studies, the Kremlin understood that the notion of 
‘sovereign foreign policy’ could be reconciled with 
the pattern of regional integration under which a ‘core 
country’ takes part in a ‘pool of sovereignty’. 
Moscow was spurred to conduct a more robust approach 
towards the Near Abroad also by the actions of other 
regional and global actors: i.e. the EU, the US, China, 
Turkey – all of which were getting more and more active 
in promoting their own political, economic, military or 
cultural interests in the region. For example, Russia was 
trailing most of them in the application of soft power. 
Rossotrudnichestvo, the federal state agency in charge 
of developing cooperation with Russian compatriots, 
or Russkiy Mir Foundation, the public body designed to 
support Russian language and culture set up in 2007, 
became real players in this domain later than their 
counterparts from other major countries. The massive 
criticism in the West of Vladimir Putin’s declaration that 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical 
disaster of the twentieth century was largely misguided. 
He actually referred to the plight of millions of Russians 
who had to adapt to life in the new-born sovereign 
post-Soviet republics, many of which were characterised 
by ethnocentric policies, especially in Baltic states; his 
critics understood the statement as an illusionary plot 
from Russia to resurrect the Soviet empire. 
Nevertheless, the increasingly overdue systemic 
approach to the Near Abroad started to bear fruit by 
the end of the last decade. The union with Belarus, often 
messy in public but solid in its essence, deepening 
relations with most Central Asia countries (especially 
with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), strategic 
cooperation with Armenia and mostly good working 
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relations with Azerbaijan were clear manifestations 
that Russia was serious in its aspirations to forge an 
efective regional integration project. The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the CSTO, and the 
ECU were gaining more weight. The EEU, born on 1 
January 2015 encompassing Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is the most serious attempt so 
far to introduce a multi-speed approach in Moscow’s 
strategy towards the post-Soviet space. In this, as well 
as in many aspects of this design, including a certain 
‘pool of sovereignty’, Russia is a selective follower of 
the EU’s best practices.
 
In PurSuInG tHIS courSE oF 
DEvELoPmEnt, ruSSIA HAS bEEn tryInG 
to SoLvE SEvErAL ProbLEmS At oncE
First, Russia has to ensure a stable neighbourhood, 
especially taking into consideration that several 
countries in the region will face a leadership transition 
challenge in the foreseeable future. For Russia the priority 
has not been the nature of a given political regime, but 
the notion of stability. Failed states are the last thing 
the Kremlin wishes to see on its doorstep. Second, to 
strengthen economic ties with these countries in order 
to limit the tendency of their economic divergence 
from Moscow. Third, the challenge of international 
terrorism, which is impossible to manage without deep 
interstate co-operation. 
Fourth, in geostrategic terms, in the face of NATO 
expansion and the EU’s ambitions to create a kind of 
a Eurosphere, Russia wants to preserve or reconstruct 
a ‘belt of friendly states’, or at least neutral states, 
in military-political terms. Moreover, Moscow is 
adamant to see the Baltic states as the last example 
of neighbouring countries participating in military 
organizations – i.e. NATO (which Russia is not a member 
of ). Fifth, to ensure that the rights of Russian minorities 
are upheld according to the European and international 
norms. Sixth, to manage a huge migration problem on 
a Eurasian scale. Few Western specialists, very busy with 
the migration crisis in the EU, pay enough attention to 
the fact that Russia for many years has been one of the 
biggest recipients of migrants in the world.  
 
 
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 became red 
lines for Russia, which it was not to allow its Western 
partners to cross. Interestingly, in both cases events were 
imposed on Moscow and not designed by it. It was not 
Moscow which made it possible for Saakashvili to revert 
to military means to settle his scores with separatists, 
and again it was not Moscow which manipulated 
widespread anti-government sentiments on the Maidan 
square to take the ugly form of a violent overthrow 
of the government. In the irst instance, it took the 
shape of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ independence, 
in the second  the reuniication of Crimea with Russia 
and support for the Donbas as a way to persuade Kyiv 
to conduct decentralisation reforms in the country in 
order  to restore its legitimacy in the eyes of Moscow.
Overall, the predominant aim of Russia in the post-
Soviet space is to prevent its shaky security situation 
unravelling. Status quo here is preferred to any kind 
of hasty political reform and intrusion of regional and 
international actors, which unlike Russia are not so 
exposed or not exposed at all to potential negative 
consequences of such unravelling. The Achilles heel of 
the region lies in ethnic, religious or cultural diferences 
and grievances. Ukraine is a conspicuous example of 
how these diferences can get out of hand with the 
speed of light. 
It should be kept in mind that Russia itself is a federation, 
which includes several dozen national republics, and 
many of them, especially in the Northern Caucasus, 
have uneasy relations with one another. A serious 
destabilisation on their outer borders may have a spill-
over efect detrimental for Russia’s territorial integrity. 
In Russia people, are well aware that the main reason 
for the break-up of the Soviet Union was the genie of 
nationalism set free. 
The simmering animosity between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, the precarious state of afairs in Transnistria, 
the conlict in Donbas, the threat of terrorism and 
extremism looming over Central Asia, tensions among 
Central Asian republics themselves, and the balancing 
act with China are only a few of the region’s burning 
problems. This is a huge challenge which Russia is going 
to handle with a set of regional integration projects and 
with its active foreign policy in pursuit of polycentrism 
in international relations.
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PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. It would signiicantly contribute to stability in the post-Soviet space and to the wellbeing of peoples who 
live there if Russia’s Western partners stop indiscriminately labelling Eurasian integration as a ‘restoration 
of the Soviet Union’ and start treating it as a method for the economic and political modernisation of 
this region. Those diehards who oppose it on the basis of Cold War mentality are either ignorant, or at 
best biased, towards this regional integration which is in fact in many respects modelled on the best 
practices of the EU.
2. All European states and organisations would be wise to design and pursue their policies in such a way 
that regional integration projects in Europe from the Atlantic to the Paciic are made to be complimentary 
and compatible instead of being focused on rivalry and zero-sum game. It is high time for the EU and 
the EEU to launch an oicial dialogue.
3. Policymakers on all sides would live up to their electorates’ expectations if they concentrate on risks 
and threats common both for the post-Soviet space and for other parts of Europe, not on what divides 
them. Wider Europe divided is the best recipe for migration, terrorism, social inequality, poor governance, 
economic stagnation and other pan-European challenges to make further headway over the heads of 
quarrelling politicians.  Ŷ 
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going Forward:  
The Eurasian Economic Union,  
The European Union And The others
David Lane
the consequences of nAto and Eu enlargement have discouraged Eurasian political elites from using the EEu as a stepping-stone to the neo-liberal world economic system. their economic and geopolitical 
interests have been infringed by Western policies as illustrated by the conlict in ukraine. the EEu has 
reacted by turning inward and eastward and an alternative geo-political bloc is in formation. It is likely to 
form a nationally based administratively coordinated form of capitalism, which in turn might lead to greater 
international conlict. the West should practise democracy between states to secure international stability 
rather than promoting democracy within states. A more pluralistic multi-speed Eu, with less ambitious goals 
and taking into account external interests, could become a complimentary partner to the EEu and enhance 
peace and well-being.
“Periods of crisis are common in history. The 
characteristic feature of the [twenty year] crisis … was 
the abrupt descent from the visionary hopes of the 
irst decade to the grim despair of the second, from a 
utopia which took little account of reality to a reality 
from which every element of utopia was rigorously 
excluded1”. Here E.H. Carr was referring to the years 
between 1919 and 1939 and wrote these words just 
before Great Britain plunged into war with Germany, 
and consequently the Second World War engulfed the 
whole of Europe. Is history likely to repeat itself? 
Following the dismantling of the Soviet European 
economic and political bloc in the early 1990s, politics 
promised utopian futures for both the winners and 
the losers of the Cold War. In the West, pundits and 
politicians echoed the rhetoric of Fukuyama’s ‘end of 
history’ discourse. In the post-socialist states, leaders 
and publics envisaged a return to Western values, 
a democratic peace and an advance to Western 
consumerism. By the end of the second decade, in the 
West the global inancial crisis and the rise of austerity 
regimes, and in the East the widespread disenchantment 
with the political and economic settlement of the 
transition to capitalism, signalled the end of the post- 
communist utopias.
The vision for the decade after 2010 is one of greater 
tension and conlict epitomised by the confrontation 
in Eastern Ukraine. The reality is the advance of NATO 
and the EU to the borders of the Russian Federation, 
which it considers is a security threat. 
The EU, once predicated on the goal of promotion of 
peace, has degenerated into a competitive trading 
bloc with an unquenchable appetite for enlargement. 
The cumulative effect of expansion into a supra-
national state has outgrown the original conception 
and has reached imperial dimensions. As European 
Commissioner Jose Manuel Barroso put it in 2007: 
“We are a very special construction unique in 
the history of mankind. Sometimes I like to 
compare the EU as a creation to the organisation 
of empire. We have the dimension of empire. 
What we have is the irst non-imperial empire. 
We have 27 countries that fully decided to work 
together and to pool their sovereignty. I believe 
it is a great construction and we should be 
proud of it”.2  
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Here he raises the spectre of the EU as an empire which 
exerts cultural, political, and economic hegemony.
Enlargement is predicated not on preserving the 
stability of the international order, but on the economic 
beneits to the EU of a larger market based on the 
values of the Washington consensus and a superior 
geopolitical position for NATO. 
tHE EurASIAn EconomIc unIon
Most commentators trace the rise of the EEU to the 
failure of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood politics on 
the one side, and the incapacity of the CIS to create a 
common economic and political space on the other. The 
formation of the EEU is not just the extension of Russian 
foreign policy, but is favoured by the governments of 
Belarus and Kazakhstan; notably, President Nazarbaev 
irst proposed the formation of a Eurasian Union in 1994.
Ironically, in its reaction to the development of the 
EU, the EEU has been guided by the EU’s experience 
and likens itself to it. The EEU seeks the advantages 
of economies of scale provided by a larger market. It 
aspires to the EU’s aims of the free movement within its 
territory of labour, capital, goods and services; it respects 
the free trade market principles of the WTO.  It considers 
itself to be an area promoting peace and prosperity. This 
approach has found resonance in the writing of Western 
writers like Bjorn Hettne who have promoted the idea 
of a ‘new regionalism’, and envisage the development 
of economic and political blocs (like the EU) which can 
harmonise with the current hegemonic powers in the 
world economic system.  
Diferent interpretations are placed on the EEU. Like 
the EU, underlying the formation of the EEU has been a 
wider political and geopolitical agenda which uneasily 
coexists with its free market economic principles. 
The policy of the Russian Federation under Putin 
and Medvedev entailed a major change towards the 
West which challenged some established Western 
assumptions.   In the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept 
Russia’s objectives were to preserve the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the country. It noted critically “a 
growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar 
structure of the world with the economic and political 
domination of the United States”. 
Moreover,  it identiied: 
“attempts to create an international relations 
structure based on domination by developed 
Western countries in the international 
community, under US leadership and designed 
for unilateral solutions (including the use of 
military force) to key issues in world politics 
in circumvention of the fundamental rules of 
international law”.3
The longer term intention of some Eurasianists is to 
further a quite diferent form of political organisation to 
that of the current neo-liberal world political economic 
order. It is a movement which is opposed to Western 
hegemony in a reactive rather than an aggressive sense. 
There is a tension between a more neo-liberal approach 
in line with the current free market EU model and a 
Eurasian notion of state sovereignty, endorsed by the 
leadership of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Western 
policy inluences internal political dynamics in support 
of one or the other. These standpoints underpin two 
alternative theoretical political and economic paths: 
irst, a region within the hegemonic Western framework 
and second, the rise of a bipolar region.
tHE EEu AS A rEGIon oF tHE 
nEo-LIbErAL WorLD SyStEm
President Putin, basing his argument on common 
membership of the WTO, has contended that both the 
EU and EEU would be able forge a wider pan-European 
association to mutual advantage. As Sergei Lavrov, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, has declared it: “We must 
work for a union of unions, an alliance of the EU and 
the Eurasian Union”.4 This line of thinking would enable 
forms of collaboration from “the Atlantic to the Paciic 
Ocean”.5 The EEU would be built on the laws of the 
market and, most important of all, would be part of a 
Greater Europe. The EEU would become “one of the poles 
of the modern world and be an efective link between 
Europe and the Asian-Paciic region”.6 
These statements highlight one major dimension of 
EEU policy . The implementation of such policies would 
constitute a ‘stepping stone’ for the EEU to become 
a member of the existing international system. One 
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possibility for future relations between the EU and 
EEU would be the acceptance of a multipolar Europe 
involving overlapping areas of autonomy, both within 
the EU (along lines suggested by critics, such as David 
Cameron), and with other regional associations, such as 
the Eurasian Economic Community. Such a multi-stage 
and multi-pace EU would be conducive to internal 
cohesion as well as contributing to peace with the non-
EU post-socialist states. The EEU would complement 
rather than threaten the hegemonic Western powers.
Neo-liberalism is like putty and can be manipulated 
into diferent forms; the EEU in subscribing to freedom 
of markets for the factors of production would present 
another association of neo-liberal states. It would 
moreover be shielded by its own boundaries, at least 
initially, from more powerful economic forces in the EU. 
However, critics point out that markets have their 
own logic and would drive the EEU into the Western 
dominated neo-liberal world system. Even if regional 
associations start out as economic free trade areas, 
such as the European Free Trade Area, the economic 
dynamics lead to further integration. American foreign 
policy according to Peter Katzenstein “made regionalism 
a central feature of world politics”7; regionalisation 
supports rather than threatens American hegemony. 
The EEU would become “primarily [a zone] of economic 
activity in the world system and in that sense driven 
by markets rather than states”.8  There would be a 
convergence to the norms of the hegemonic powers.
This scenario is perhaps a visionary utopia for the 
coming decade as it would require the reversal of 
many current EU policies. The EU would have to temper 
its expansionist propensities to accommodate other 
regional interests and overlapping associations. The EU’s 
democratic scope would have to shift from democracy 
promotion within states to pursue democracy between 
states (including those in its neighbourhood). This 
means making compromises with other states.
Eu EnLArGEmEnt: LESSonS 
From uKrAInE 
The EU has been uncompromising in its attitude to 
Russia. Consider EU enlargement in relation to Ukraine. 
The DCFTA presented Ukraine with a choice (either the 
EU or the Eurasian course) as it was contended that 
two sets of rules could not operate in the EU economic 
space.9  Agreements with partners include the institution 
of laws compatible with the single market afecting 
state subsidies and insist on freedom of competition. 
The objective is to realise the neo-liberal goals of the 
EU – the free movement of capital, commodities and 
people under conditions of market competition. The 
consequences of the agreements are intended to 
inluence the political and economic arrangements of 
the neighbourhood states to make them compatible 
with the economic, political and legal norms of the EU. 
Potential beneits to partners come at considerable 
costs to other countries, particularly to former trading 
countries, in the east. 
The efects of Ukraine’s participation in the EU as 
proposed in the AA (drafted in March 2012) would 
have resulted in major disruptions of Ukraine-Russia 
trade. Regulations afecting production and service 
provision would also be brought in line with EU 
standards. Moreover, Ukrainian-EU agreements would 
have repercussions on relations with the ECU, which 
would nullify Ukraine’s favourable links with Russia. Not 
only would Ukraine, when subjected to the EU market, 
experience more de-industrialisation, it would also have 
signiicant efects on Russia which has been Ukraine’s 
most important single country trading partner. 
As we see from Figure 1, in 2010 and 2012, Russia’s 
exports to and imports from Ukraine were greater 
than all the EU countries combined and Russia-Ukraine 
trade was rising whereas with the EU it was declining. 
By far the most important trading partners are to be 
found in developing economies and the CIS – not the 
EU. While the long-term prospects are portrayed by 
the EU as favourable, in the short term there would 
be considerable dislocation, as adjustments to EU 
standards and open competition with EU companies 
would certainly lead to the demise of many Ukrainian 
irms. It would also grossly undermine previous partners 
in Russia who would lose business with repercussions 
for employment and well-being. 































Figure 1. Ukraine’s Trading Partners: 2006-2012
It is true that a country cannot be a member 
concurrently of two free trade areas. There are however 
other possibilities of increasing levels of trade between 
the EU and Ukraine without the disruption of Ukraine-
Russia commerce. The response of Russia has been to 
try to ind some middle way to allow Ukraine to have 
economic trade relations with both blocs. Putin in 
November 2010 proposed the formation of associations 
which would promote a ‘greater Europe’ from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok.10 As recently as January 2014, Russia 
suggested to Brussels the establishment of a Free Trade 
Area between the EU and the EEU.11 While in the West 
such suggestions have either been ignored or rejected, 
they have some merit. If adopted, they might lead to 
something like the relationship of the European Free 
Trade Area to the EU. Negotiations between the EU 
and the USA over the TTIP are another example of 
how cooperation is possible between two commercial 
blocs (whether this agreement is desirable or not is a 
separate issue). Such negotiations include bilateral 
and multilateral agreements on tarifs and public 
procurement, cooperation on regulatory rules and 
the enhancement of bilateral trade. Clearly there are 
real possibilities for cooperation between trading blocs.
Russian proposals have been dismissed by the EU and 
NATO. Both organisations have adamantly championed 
conditions which would not preclude membership of 
Ukraine in their respective associations at some future 
time. Consequently the Russian leadership is no longer 
inclined to accept the terms ofered by the West, which 
it believes further the EU’s hegemonic power. Policy 
then moves away from a complimentary ‘stepping 
stone’ towards a more autonomous bloc. The absence 
of a negotiated settlement enabling the entry of the 
EEU on acceptable terms into the dominant economic 
core, prompts the rise of an alternative and competing 
geopolitical alliance. 
Source:  IMF Direction of World Trade Data Base, 
accessed via UKDS Stat, 30 July 2014. 
Total value in US millions of dollars.
Ukraine Exports
Ukraine Imports
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EurASIAn unIon AS PArt oF An 
ALtErnAtIvE GEo-PoLItIcAL bLoc
Since the Ukrainian conlict, the Russian leadership 
has paid more attention to linkages with the Asian-
Paciic area and to strengthening ties with groupings 
such as the SCO and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) countries. The West’s trade 
sanctions exercised against Russia and its retaliatory 
responses have had the effect of reinforcing the 
rise of a geopolitical bloc based on the EEU and the 
BRICS, especially China. While there is no challenge to 
American hegemony, these countries claim respect 
and recognition in the world community. Relations 
between the EEU and the EU will be overshadowed 
by the EEU’s growing links to the east. As reported in 
2015 at the SCO summit, the EEU had secured bilateral 
free trade areas with Vietnam, Egypt, India, Israel, South 
Korea and Chile. The SCO also envisages enlargement 
with the addition of India and Pakistan. 
For countries in the semi-core of the world system, 
regionalism need not entail adopting the principles of 
neo-liberal globalisation. China, Russia, India, Brazil and 
Venezuela and constituents of regional groups – SCO, 
the ECU, MERCOSUR, and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) – can strengthen their position 
against hegemonic powers.  
I have used the term semi-core as it better captures 
the economic and political status of countries like 
Russia, China, India, and Brazil. Semi-core countries 
have their own transnational corporations, are hosts 
to foreign corporations and concurrently have their 
own national companies.  The BRICS formed a New 
Development Bank in 2007 which is at least potentially 
an alternative to the World Bank. The growing power 
of their economic base gives such countries political 
inluence and military power. While not matching the 
strength of the US, when combined these countries have 
considerable military power. Russia has been pushed 
further into the formation of a non-Western association 
of states. Many of these, though state-led and autocratic, 
provide a fundamental social and political stability in 
the countries concerned. 
Internationally, one can detect a growing alternative 
political consensus. Consider for example the 
condemnation of Russia’s incorporation of Crimea 
within its borders following the seizure of power by 
insurgents usurping President Yanukovych. The UN 
general assembly resolution 68/262 adopted on 27 
March 2014 on the ‘territorial integrity of Ukraine’ 
airmed the General Assembly’s commitment to its 
internationally recognised borders. One hundred voted 
in favour and only 11 voted against (Armenia, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, Sudan, 
Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe).  
This voting is widely interpreted as an overwhelming 
victory for the West against an isolated and aggressive 
Russia. What is not considered are the 58 countries 
which abstained and the 24 which absented themselves. 
The abstentions accounted for 58 per cent of the world 
population, 34 per cent of those voting and 30 per 
cent of the membership of the UN.  They included 
China, most of the CIS states, the BRICS and many 
Latin American and African states.12  The signiicance 
of their abstention and non-voting is a clear indication 
of sympathy with Russia in its dealings with the West.
GoInG ForWArD
The future relationship between the EU and the EEU 
is clouded by the contradictory values and interests 
within both geo-political blocs.  As in the EU, the elites in 
member states of the EEU have diferent priorities. The 
EEU is a movement which is reactive – it is opposed to 
Western hegemony and seeks an equal and respected, 
rather than a dominant, place in the world community. 
It lacks any grounding in a political theory (comparable 
to Marxist class interest) to legitimate its superiority 
and, outside the area of Eurasia, it is not expansionary 
in vision. The ideology of Eurasianism is conservative 
and legitimates a capitalist framework. What kind of 
capitalism is yet to be established?
Eurasianism, as advocated by President Putin and his 
associates, is highly ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
EEU is considered to be an institution modelled on the 
EU with its concern for the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labour. On the other hand, many 
of its advocates consider it to be a shift away from 
the hegemony of competitive markets to a state-led 
economy exerting signiicant degrees of control. 
In its least radical form it would be a ‘stepping stone’ 
towards the existing neo-liberal global system, another 
regional neo-liberal bloc. While China as well as the 
Eurasian states are less exposed to global capitalist 
concerns and have a potential for internally state-led 
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economic development, there are also neo-liberal 
interests derived from companies seeking proits from 
Western markets as well as politicians and intellectuals 
driven by liberal ideology. Russian writers, such as E. 
Vinokurov and T. Tsukarev, envisage the EEU’s long 
term economic cooperation to lie with the EU and 
China13 – they see Russia standing on the ‘two legs’ of 
the EU and China.  
The EEU alone cannot mount a very serious economic 
challenge to the European part of the hegemonic 
core. Enlargement to include other former countries 
of the Soviet Union is limited politically and (excluding 
Ukraine) would not signiicantly enhance its power. Its 
share of global gross domestic product (GDP) is only 3.2 
per cent; it has very few global companies to compete 
with those in the economic core. A political realist would 
hope to join the latter rather than compete with it. An 
acceptance of neo-liberal market relationships would 
move the project towards inclusion in the present 
global system constituting a complimentary regional 
bloc to the EU. 
But there is by no means a consensus, either within 
or between the countries forming the EEU, on the 
desirability of such a regional development. The tensions 
between the Russian leadership (particularly under 
President Putin) and leading Western trading nations 
are underpinned by signiicant diferences of interest 
between Russia and the West. To preserve a stable 
international order, the hegemonic Western powers will 
need to be more pluralistic and accommodating to the 
positions of others by adopting a more realist and less 
liberal internationalist political position. The EU political 
and economic elites who beneit most have to share 
their power with those who beneit least. Politically, 
the West has pursued a policy of promoting electoral 
democracy within states, rather than encouraging 
democracy between states. The EEU’s option to join 
the world system as a component part based on neo-
liberal economic principles has been efectively closed 
of by Western policies. 
Thus many among Eurasian political and economic 
elites look to an alternative, to a state-led economy set 
to become a political and economic counterpoint to the 
West. Such views are strengthened by the damaging 
political and social consequences of the enlargement 
of the EU, the debacle of the Eurozone and the crisis 
in Greece currently making the EU less of a body to be 
emulated by outsiders. Moreover, the history of post-
Soviet economic development modelled on markets 
has led many to question the underlying principles 
of a market-led approach. They point out that the 
post-socialist states are at the lower end of economic 
value-added chains beneiting the West; research 
and development and the manufacturing base have 
declined. Such critics contend that future participation 
in markets to the east may present greater opportunities 
for economic progress. All these arguments fuel the 
more radical Eurasianist perspective.
The EEU is more likely to evolve as a ‘counterpoint’, 
relying on greater state coordination and regulation 
economically and a top-down political system. Returning 
to Vinokurov and Tsukarev’s analogy, the Chinese leg 
might well provide one irm base but the EEU will have 
to learn to stand more irmly on its own other leg. 
To build any signiicant alternative to the neo-liberal 
global order, the EEU will ind it necessary to combine 
with semi-core countries, particularly the SCO and the 
BRICS. Such an economic alternative might prioritise 
economic development through administrative forms 
of collective economic coordination. It could provide 
the basis for a more pluralist and multi-polar world. 
E.H. Carr’s rather pessimistic conclusion cited at the 
beginning of this chapter might be replaced not by 
another utopia but an alternative bloc resting on an 
organised form of national capitalism. As following the 
twenty-year crisis, the danger here is that political and 
economic competition, if unrestrained, may lead to war.
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. The West should recognise that the EEU is 
not aggressive but reactive and has sought 
accommodation with the neo-liberal order.
2. The West should refrain from seeking hegemony 
over post-Soviet space and should move towards 
multi-polarity.
3. To secure the EU’s aims of peace and security 
requires less democracy promotion within states 
and more democracy between states. Ŷ
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Russia’s policy towards the Black sea 
Region and EU-Russia Relations
Sergii Glebov
the strength of Eu-russia relations is currently being tested for solidity both regionally and globally. current relations between russia and Eu, which are going through a period of a direct clash of principles 
and interests on all systemic levels, can be best described not as going beyond a usual crisis, and more as 
a pervasive conlict.  the multi-layered nature of the conlict makes problems in bilateral relations more 
di cult to mitigate than it would seem at irst sight. this initial reading suggests the Eu giving up ukraine 
in exchange for a ‘practical’ partnership with russia, but the situation is complex, with russia and the Eu 
willing to take salient risks. this logic of gambling so far has not worked in the Eu-ukraine-russia triangle, 
not only because 22 out of 28 Eu members are also nAto member countries, but also for several other 
reasons to be discussed in this chapter. 
At the heart of the sharpest confrontation since the 
Cold War between the West and the East is what can 
be identiied nowadays as the Ukraine crisis. In this 
respect, the Black Sea sub-region is a salient space of 
the post-bipolar geopolitics, which presents a series key 
features of this crisis. With the expansion towards CEE, 
the EU became involved in the Black Sea region,1 or even 
an integral part of it. In 2014 the annexation of Crimea 
by Moscow became the top priority on the regional 
agenda, together with Russia’s hybrid war Eastern 
Ukraine. In this context the chapter contends that the 
Black Sea region is the last geopolitical playground 
where EU-Russia collaboration will again be possible 
in the future. 
 
crImEA AS A SnAG In Eu-
ruSSIA rELAtIonS
The oicial positions of Ukraine and Russia in relation to 
the annexation of Crimea present two very diferent and 
contrasting narratives. The EU’s position has been clearly 
articulated. On 13 March 2014 the European Parliament 
irmly condemned “Russia’s act of aggression in invading 
Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and 
recognised as such by the Russian Federation and 
by the international community…”, and called “for 
the immediate de-escalation of the crisis, with the 
immediate withdrawal of all military forces present 
illegally on Ukrainian territory”.2 
Later on 20-21 March 2014 the European Council 
meeting conirmed that the EU “remains committed 
to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine”, does not recognise “the illegal referendum 
in Crimea, which is in clear violation of the Ukrainian 
Constitution…[and] strongly condemns the illegal 
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian 
Federation and will not recognise it”.3 This diplomatic and 
political rhetoric soon resulted in real sanctions against 
Russia that the EU, alongside the US, enacted. The little 
green man invasion transformed the crisis in EU-Russia 
relations into an asymmetric conlict. Moscow openly 
expressed its political will and made it clear to the EU 
and the rest of the West that Russia was ready to defend 
its national interests by using military instruments in 
foreign policy.   
The case of the annexation of Crimea emphasises not 
only diferent strategies, but also the range resources 
used by the EU and Russia in order to pursue their goals 
and interests. While the EU as a normative power has 
preferred soft instruments of inluence over hard power, 
with economic sanctions as the most conlictual tools, 
the Russian Federation did not perceive international 
law and treaties as a constraint on the use of military 
force. Moreover, by employing it directly against 
Ukraine, Russia showed no reverence for the EU and 
the international community.
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tHE bLAcK SEA rEGIon AnD 
tHE nAto SynDromE
NATO plays a key role in the Black Sea region. It was 
introduced into the Wider Black Sea region as an internal 
actor from its inception(with Turkey and Greece as key 
members) and strengthened its presence in Bulgaria 
and Romania since 2004.  According to the 2008 Foreign 
Policy Concept of The Russian Federation, the Kremlin 
has a 
“negative attitude towards the expansion 
of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting 
Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in 
the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO 
military infrastructure closer to the Russian 
borders on the whole…”4 
The so-called ‘NATO syndrome’ played a key role  in 
the Black Sea region during the Ukraine crisis, as the 
annexation of Crimea was partly justiied by Russian 
President Putin by framing  NATO enlargement as a 
direct threat and motivation to act:
 “If we don’t do anything, Ukraine will be drawn 
into NATO sometime in the future. We’ll be told: 
‘This doesn’t concern you’, and NATO ships 
will dock in Sevastopol, the city of Russia’s 
naval glory…if NATO troops walk in, they will 
immediately deploy these forces there. Such a 
move would be geopolitically sensitive for us 
because, in this case, Russia would be practically 
ousted from the Black Sea area. We’d be left 
with just a small coastline of 450 or 600km, 
and that’s it!”5
However, NATO never spoke of its intention to station 
military bases in Crimea or in the rest of Ukraine.6 
Without a doubt, this did not primarily concern the 
Kremlin, which is not naive and is well aware of the 
low potential of a NATO threat in Sevastopol, as it was 
the main Russian Black Sea Fleet navy base for many 
years. In this respect, more important is that Russia, 
according to its current 2014 Military Doctrine, directly 
suspects NATO of aggressive intentions. These could 
arise from the Black Sea region as far as NATO’s zone 
of responsibility stretches towards this region “near the 
borders of the Russian Federation”.7 There is a fear that 
Russia is considering Crimea as the bridgehead against 
NATO. Recent drills which took place on 26-27 October 
2015 in the Crimean Opuk training area with ships 
and aircrafts of the Russian Black Sea Fleet practicing 
repelling an air attack against the Crimean peninsula, 
delivering a missile strike against potential  enemy ships, 
and engaging in an artillery battle with a naval strike 
force made Reuters conclude that the “latest military 
exercises provide a vivid demonstration that Russia can, 
and will, protect its new territory, despite the protests”.8 
tHE bLAcK SEA rEGIon AnD tHE Eu-
uS-ruSSIA SEcurIty trIAnGLE 
The US has always been active in the post-Cold War 
period in the Black Sea region, a presence which 
continued during the Ukraine crisis. Both Brussels and 
Moscow are concerned by the American factor and to 
some extent are interested in minimising the impact of 
the US on their bilateral relations. Being the only global 
superpower, the US has been doomed to be part of the 
Black Sea ambivalent security system, not only due to 
close bilateral relations with all Black Sea littoral states, 
the role of NATO, or energy interests. 
From the point of US interests, when discussing the 
global security outcomes of the Ukraine crisis, the 
issue of nuclear safety and the non-proliferation regime 
should be given primacy.  Having in mind the aggressive 
policy of Russia towards nuclear objects in Crimea9 one 
should not underestimate the threat of the ongoing 
nuclear rivalry in the Black Sea region. A Russian trend 
towards the nuclearisation of Crimea is becoming more 
and more noticeable. This efort is just prolonging 
a strategy to build in Crimea not just conventional 
‘Russian impregnable fortress’, but also nuclear one. As 
Mikhail Ulyanov, the head of the Foreign Ministry’s non-
proliferation department, said in March 2015 “Russia can 
deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea as the peninsula is 
part of its territory”.10
Yet in November 2014 NATO’s top commander U.S. 
General Philip Breedlo warned that Russian forces 
with nuclear capability were moved to the Crimean 
Peninsula, even though NATO didn’t know if nuclear 
weapons were actually in place.11 It has been reported, 
that “Russia plans to station state-of-the art missiles 
in its westernmost Baltic exclave” and deploy long-
range, nuclear-capable supersonic Tu-22M3 bombers 
to Crimea as “part of massive war games to showcase 
its resurgent military power amid bitter tensions with 
the West over Ukraine”.12 As conirmed in March 2015 
by the Russian Defence Minister, the stationing of the 
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Tu-22M3 and operational-tactical Iskander-M systems 
on the peninsula is the next step to consolidate the 
Russian presence in the Black Sea region.
The Ukraine crisis initiated long-term and far going 
implications in the global nuclear competition, as a 
call for a new nuclear arms race was initiated exactly 
from the Black Sea region. One should not forget that 
this is an act of direct aggression by one of the parties 
of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum’s on Security 
Assurances signatory. There Russia conirmed, that 
in exchange for Kyiv giving up nuclear weapons, it 
would “respect the independence and sovereignty and 
the existing borders of Ukraine” and “refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of Ukraine, and that none 
of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine”.13 
This is a clear signal that Moscow is ready to wage 
hybrid wars and launch pre-emptive hybrid attacks 
against any country which dares to express its security 
needs in opposition to Russia’s expectations. In this 
respect, Russia has cleverly used the scarecrow of 
NATO to hide its real imperial needs. Not only Ukraine, 
but also Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, 
and Bulgaria are under potential threat from Moscow 
as long as their membership in NATO is understood 
to constitute strengthening of NATO’s eastern lank. 
Such a scenario would be also considered in Moscow 
as bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer 
to the Russian borders and requiring respective 
counter measures.   
tHE uKrAInE crISIS, tHE turKISH-
ruSSIAn rEGIonAL Knot 
AnD tHE SyrIAn EFFEct
Turkish-Russian relations in the Black Sea region since 
1991 have experienced diferent stages and agendas. 
Relations have slightly changed after annexation of 
Crimea, but not as dramatically as after Russia entered 
the war in Syria as an independent actor. 
Turkey expressed “full support of Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity” and assured that Ankara “will never recognise 
the illegal annexation of the Crimea”.14 Turkey has been 
concerned also with the issue of Crimean Tatars in 
the annexed Crimea and that their rights are being 
violated.15 At the same time, Turkey took a rather 
passive position in practice to oppose Russian military 
demarche in the Black Sea region. Being treated as one 
of the two regional centres of power in the Black Sea 
political system together with Russia since 1991, Ankara 
appeared to be not that active in counterbalancing 
Russia’s attempts to rearrange the regional order. 
The main question is whether it had the potential or 
geopolitical will to act as a centre-power actor.
On the surface, there are two main observations. Firstly, 
the conventional power of Turkish forces, including 
the navy, cannot counter Russian nuclear potential in 
the Black Sea region. Secondly, Turkey was not eager 
to give up its economic plans and lose energy ties 
with Russia as a response to the Ukraine crisis.  It was 
only in connection to the Syria crisis when Russian 
forces entered the equation, a year and a half after 
the Ukraine crisis began, that Turkey realised all the 
possible negative consequences for its homeland 
security and national interests stretching from the 
Middle East and Black Sea-Caspian region. The rhetoric 
of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has 
changed dramatically after Russia’s air strikes in support 
of the Assad regime, as well as incursions by Russian 
jets into Turkish airspace in October 2015. Ankara has 
responded furiously because “Moscow is believed to 
oppose Turkey’s idea of creating a bufer zone or safe 
haven inside Syria where refugees and some rebels 
could be protected”.16 
At the same time, having Russia as their largest natural 
gas supplier, and being the second-largest consumer 
of Russian natural gas after Germany, there are doubts 
as to the potential of Turkey to confront Russia. As far 
as Turkey imports Russian gas primarily through two 
pipelines, one passing through the north western region 
of Thrace, the other entering Turkey from under the 
Black Sea, “Erdogan’s statements on gas are not realistic 
at all. Turkey is dependent on Russia in the short and 
medium term”.17  
Turkey did not pass test of regional ‘greatpowerness’ 
during the Ukraine crisis. Since 2014 Turkey has almost 
no potential to assert centre-power status in the Black 
Sea system, leaving Russia alone with this status. 
As far as this case can be seen as an application of 
theoretical frameworks of centre-power competition 
in the international system, the conclusion is that the 
capacity of a non-nuclear power to act as a centre-power 
is limited in the case when another actor with the ability 
to act as a centre-power is a nuclear state. They may 
imitate equality in the system only until their clashes of 
interests become subjects for potential military conlict. 
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Recent tensions between Turkey and Russia could 
change the geo-economic landscape of the Black 
Sea region by damaging relations to the point where 
bilateral plans in the energy ield are postponed or 
even discarded. Despite having several projects in the 
energy ield with Russia whose future is now unclear, 
Turkey has asserted its national interest to defend the 
inviolability of its state borders both in the air and on 
land. Ensuring the security of Turkish sovereign territory 
and managing neighbouring zones of conlict became 
more important than economic partnership with Russia 
or the Ukraine crisis. 
On the other hand, recent developments in the Middle 
East and in the Black Sea region also show clearly the 
diference between Russian and Turkish capacities to 
inluence the regional system of international relations 
as regional centre-powers. Contrary to Russia, which 
demonstrated its ability to conduct regional policy 
without any limits and obligations despite possible 
negative outcomes from inevitable clashes of interests, 
Turkey demonstrated an inability to act accordingly. 
In other words, while Russia as a state may pursue 
any strategy it inds appropriate, Turkey cannot. By 
strengthening its geopolitical positions in the Black Sea 
region, Russia casts doubt on the strategic capabilities of 
Turkey to maintain its status as a regional centre-power 
and one of two regional leaders. 
The future of Turkey’s role in the region vis-à-vis Russia 
and other security challenges in the Black Sea region, 
could be seen as just a supplementary part of NATO 
strategy. Turkey’s ambitions of leadership in the region 
and in the energy ield have been curtailed if not totally 
restrained. If the situation persists, we will witness the 
development of new regional dividing lines, with a 
‘Water wall’ between two opposing sides establishing 
a bipolar system of regional relations.   
Most likely, both Ankara and Moscow will ind an 
appropriate model of bilateral co-existence in the 
new security environment both in the Middle East and 
the Black Sea region, although the recent threatening 
rhetoric both from Presidents Erdogan and Putin will 
obviously prolong the current period of stalemate. 
concLuSIonS
Conlict is an appropriate term to describe the current 
state of relations between the EU and Russia. One 
may or may not accept the term annexation, but 
it is more important in our context to focus on the 
EU’s interpretation which strongly criticises Russian 
aggression. This means that having Crimea as the 
focus of conlict between the EU and Russia, Brussels 
is doomed to have it in mind and on the table in any 
negotiations with Russia. 
President Putin’s rhetoric, which clumsily attempts to 
hide annexation as a key feature of conlict, reduces 
hopes for a resumption of meaningful dialogue 
between the EU and Russia on the basis of common 
understanding of bilateral problems. If there is no 
common ground for understanding, there can be no 
bilateral solutions, only compromises and dangerous 
concessions - leading to a zero-sum game which 
excludes a win-win result. It is obvious that both the 
EU and Russia are heading now to a loss-loss outcome.
These challenges will inevitably draw all Black Sea 
littoral states into inter-regional confrontation and 
arms race. Further escalation of tensions between the 
West (including NATO, the EU, and the US) and Russia 
may trigger the unfreezing of conlicts in Transnistria 
and the South Caucasus, namely on the territory of 
Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
Instead of the idealistic scenario which was on the 
regional table in the 1990s to have the Black Sea basin 
demilitarised in order to achieve more easily the main 
regional goal stated in the irst Istanbul Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Declaration of June 25, 
1992, “to ensure that the Black Sea becomes a sea of 
peace, stability and prosperity, striving to promote 
friendly and good-neighbourly relations”,18 we are 
witnessing a new regional arms race trend which is 
initiating global confrontation.  
This is an alarming situation as far as the regional 
scenario is developing in the frame of the classical 
political realism school of international relations, 
based on the egoistic interests of a state and defence 
of national interests. 
61Avoiding A New ‘Cold War’: The Future of EU-Russia Relations in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis  |
Is the EU ready to pursue a diferent policy in the Black 
Sea region vis-à-vis Russia than US and NATO under 
such circumstances? This question remains open. 
Following the 13/11 attacks on Paris, French President 
François Hollande seems to favour an independent EU 
policy of rapprochement with Russia on the common 
ground of combating terrorism.  
There is an urgent need to investigate if Russia is 
serious when talking about the possible deployment 
of Russian nuclear weapons in Crimea, which could 
ruin the existing balance of nuclear power as well as 
the whole system of non-proliferation. 
So far there are just statements on both sides but 
taking into account current Russian involvement into 
Syria, ongoing clashes with NATO, the EU, and the US 
strategies, and outspoken Russian plans for further 
nuclearisation of Crimea, things could become more 




There are two possible scenarios for the EU and Russia 
being able to rebuild their relations in a short period.
1. The EU acknowledges Crimea as part of Russia, 
recognises the right of Moscow to provide 
legally annex the territory, and cancels 
sanctions with the condition of stopping the 
war in Donbas. EU countries vote against any 
military activity in the Black Sea region and on 
NATO’s eastern lank.  
2. The EU does not recognise Crimea as part of 
Russia oicially, but urges Moscow to stop 
supporting separatists in Donbas.
3. Both these options require from the EU a full 
rejection of basic principles it has been built 
on and seem not very practical. At the same 
time, there is some room for cooperation in 
such spheres as combating terrorism, energy, 
and regional cooperation, but not fully-ledged 
cooperation between two equal partners. Ŷ
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The Crisis of 2014-2015 and perspectives  
on European-Russian Relations in  
the Energy security sphere
Andrei Kazantsev
the conlict in ukraine has caused in 2014-2015 a serious aggravation of the long-term complex conlict between the Eu and russia in the energy security sphere. this conlict includes, at least, three dimensions: 
the situation on European energy markets, the situation in ukraine as a transit state, and the crisis in the 
russian energy industry. the most desirable outcome of this conlict is a stable compromise that is acceptable 
for all sides. However, the most probable outcome is prolonged conlict in the style of ‘neither war nor peace’, 
in which no side can inally win. In order to avoid a serious aggravation of the conlict and start accumulating 
mutual trust both sides should, at least, engage in a series of conidence-building measures.
IntroDuctIon: EuroPEAn-ruSSIAn 
rELAtIonS In EnErGy SEcurIty SPHErE  
As a result of the war in Ukraine mutual trust between 
the EU and Russia has been completely lost. From 
the European side this complete loss of trust is best 
demonstrated by the radical change of position of 
Germany’s political elite, which earlier had one of 
the friendliest attitudes towards the oicial Russian 
leadership inside Europe. Not only the intentions, but 
even the very rationality of the Russian leadership 
are now doubted by the EU; for example German 
Chancellor Merkel argued that Putin is living in ‘another 
world’.1 From the Russian perspective this loss of trust 
is demonstrated by a wave of anti-European and anti-
Western propaganda within state-controlled mass-
media, as well as in the multiple public anti-Western 
judgments of the representatives of Russian political 
and economic elite. All these words have also turned 
into actions since Russia and the EU enacted a series 
of economic sanctions directed against each other. 
However, some elements of cooperation still exist. This 
situation had been best described in 1918 by Leo Trotsky 
in his famous formula ‘neither war, nor peace’ describing 
relations between Soviet Russia and Imperial Germany.
The conlict between Russia and the EU is deeply rooted, 
very complex and has three dimensions:
t The European dimension focuses on the 
geopolitical and legal aspects of the import of 
Russian energy such as: Russian political inluence 
in CEE or the issue of adaptation of Russian 
energy companies to the existing European 
legal framework. 
t The Russian dimension particularly emphasises 
European investments in the Russian energy 
sector and other forms of cooperation between 
Russian and European energy companies on 
Russian territory. 
t The transit countries dimension (like Ukraine 
and Belarus) focuses particularly on the issue of 
economic and political conditions of transit of 
Russian gas and oil.
Each dimension of European-Russian energy security 
relations is characterised by a speciic set of internal 
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The European dimension consists of a series of 
contradictions. On the one hand, Russia is presumed 
to use energy as an instrument of political or geopolitical 
(or even export of corruption) inluence, especially in 
CEE. On the other hand, we ind institutional conlict 
produced by the current European legal framework. This 
involves the Third Energy Package, mostly, due to its 
principle of unbundling of ownership – i.e. the separation 
of the production of gas and its transportation, which 
contradicts the structure of Gazprom – and the interests 
of Russian monopolies. The EU adopted in 2007 the so-
called ‘reciprocity clause’, or Gazprom clause, according 
to which any company from a third country will have to 
comply with the same requirements as EU companies. 
Another side of this contradiction is the link between 
European economic interests in Russian oil or gas and 
the interests of Russian companies in selling energy 
on European markets. Hence, here we have politics 
and law on one side, and economics on the other side 
of a contradiction. 
In Russia, one side of contradiction consists of elements 
such as the absence of efective legal institutions, lack of 
transparency, or even corruption, and monopolisation 
of state-controlled giant companies in the energy 
sphere (e.g. Gazprom and Rosneft).  Another side of 
the contradiction is the objective interest of Russian 
companies in European investments and technologies. 
Here again we ind a tension between the economic 
interests of the country and those of private companies. 
The tension between politics and economics is also 
present in the case of transit countries. On the one hand 
there is a high degree of mutual economic dependency 
between the seller, the transit country and the buyer, 
while on the other hand we see diferent attempts to 
exploit this dependency by various actors to maximise 
their interests.
The crisis in European-Russian energy security relations 
is even more complex because there are not only many 
diferent types of actors, but also diferent logics of 
behaviour. The logic of behaviour of energy companies is 
deined by proit-seeking, purely informed by economic 
thinking. The logic of action of political and geopolitical 
actors can be boiled down to their struggle for power. 
Moreover, issues such as corruption, or conlicts of 
values, can also have negative spill-over efects on 
energy security issues, and make the crisis in energy 
relations even more acute. 
In the context of these contradictions, how will the 
conclusion of ‘neither peace nor war’ look like? From 
the point of view of neorealism it can look like a stable 
balance of forces and equal agreements. This is closer 
to the Kremlin’s vision. From the point of view of 
neoliberalism, peace will entail the consolidation of the 
institutional structure of the international regime. This 
is closer to EU vision, since the EU is a normative power.
However, the long term results of the European-Russian 
conlict in the energy security sphere could unfold into 
one of the following diferent scenarios:
1. The triumph of the interests, vision and values of 
Europe. This would include Russia’s recognition 
of the Energy Charter Treaty or signing other 
similar agreements, the Europeanisation of 
transit countries, liberal political and economic 
reforms in Russia and sincere compliance of 
Gazprom with the principles of the Third energy 
package of EU.
2. The triumph of the interests, vision and values 
of the Kremlin. This would include increasing 
the Kremlin’s political and economic inluence 
in transit states (for example, throughout their 
membership in the EEU), the adaptation of the 
European legal framework (the Third Energy 
Package) to the interests of Russian energy 
companies and, probably, even the adaptation  
of other European policies (like foreign 
and security policy) to Russia’s political and 
geopolitical interests.
3. What constitutes the triumph of interests, vision 
and values of the transit states is much more 
vague, and it demands speciic analysis, but in 
any case it includes the maximization of their 
diferent interests in relations with both Russia 
and EU. More probable from this point of view 
is the triumph of two groups of actors over 
one group: e.g. of the interests and vision of 
Europe and Ukraine against the Kremlin’s interest  
and vision.
4. An agreement that includes a sort of compromise 
between all involved groups of actors (European, 
Russian, those of transit countries). This 
compromise would permit actors to set aside 
diferent conlicts and to maximise the purely 
economic potential of mutual cooperation.
5. Unending conlict in the long term, with no 
victorious sides and suboptimal result for all 
groups of actors.
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The irst four scenarios propose the formation of eicient 
international regimes as the inal result. The only 
diference is that scenarios 1-3 describe the situations 
of one-sided gains, while scenario 4 proposes a win-
win scenario. However, scenario 5 depicts a situation of 
mutual losses as the result of prolongation of conlict 
and absence of efective formation of international 
regimes as a result of the conlict.
The danger of the current situation is that the actors 
arrogantly ighting for full realisation of scenarios 
1-3 can in reality only create favourable conditions 
for scenario 5. It would mean long-term conlict, for 
example, in the form of a New Cold War in the energy 
security sphere. Moreover, the very complexity 
of the situation that I have described, makes very 
problematic potential one-sided victories in this energy 
security conlict. 
For example, what I have described as the scenario of full 
victory of Europe (scenario 1) would demand signiicant 
changes in the Russian political, economic and social 
life, in the political economic and social life of transit 
countries and even the international environment of 
the post-Soviet space. One can doubt that Europe (and 
even the West) has enough instruments to realise this 
scenario. Moreover, some of the EU’s instruments are 
virtually infective: e.g. all-out war, which would quickly 
turn nuclear. Another inefective instrument is large-
scale Western economic assistance for reforms in post-
Soviet countries, including Ukraine and, potentially, 
even Russia (if it engages on a path of deep political 
and economic reforms). CEE countries were granted 
EU membership as a inal payment for their reforms. 
However, Western assistance to reform in post-Soviet 
states, for many diferent reasons, was not realised even 
in the more favourable conditions of the early 1990s. 
Now the EU has even less money and willingness to 
decisively assist with the reforms in the Post-Soviet 
countries. The EU’s ability to impose an international 
regime in the energy security sphere (that would fully 
correspond to its interests and values in the post-Soviet 
space) is rather weak as it lacks both a really strong 
stick (all-out war) and really strong carrots (meaningful 
economic assistance for reforms).  
If European abilities to realise scenario 1 are very limited, 
Russia has even fewer resources to realise scenario 2, 
irst of all, due to the poor state of Russian economy. 
In general, the degree of interdependence between 
Russia and EU in the energy sphere is so high that it is 
hard to think that any side can adopt a conlictual stance 
without harming itself. In 2013, just before Ukrainian 
crisis, Russia supplied 33.5 percent of the EU-28’s imports 
of crude oil, 39.0 percent of imports of natural gas 
and 28.8 percent  of imports of solid fuels. However, 
dependency on Russian energy varies widely across EU 
countries, with some CEE countries such as the Baltic 
states and Poland exclusively relying on Russia. Russia’s 
dependency on selling its energy to EU is also exclusive. 
Andrey Movchan of Moscow Carnegie Center argues 
that although statistically “the share of hydrocarbon 
production in the country’s GDP has not exceeded 
26.5 percent for 25 years and the share of oil and gas 
export has not risen above 14.5 percent of GDP”,  up to 
67—70 percent of Russia’s GDP depends on oil and gas 
export revenues.2 A lion’s share of Russian oil and gas 
exports goes to EU. So if Russia has, in some respects, a 
monopoly position on European energy market, Europe 
has an even more important monopsonic position 
towards Russia. 
As for the transit states, their resources are not even 
comparable to Russian and European ones, so scenario 
3 is even less probable than scenarios 1 and 2. 
These arguments indicate that the most probable 
real choice is now between compromise (scenario 4) 
and protracted conlict (scenario 5) with the chances 
for protracted conlict, unfortunately, being much 
higher today due to the very complexity of described 
energy security conlict. At the same time scenario 4 is 
theoretically the most preferable and I personally as an 
expert would strongly recommend policymakers to do 
their best to realise it. At least, they should try. However, 
the shortcoming of this recommendation is that in the 
current situation a potential general compromise is 
unforeseeable, and moreover compromise practically is 
impossible in the absence of trust between the actors. 
So, mutual trust-building measures should precede 
the realisation of this optimum scenario. Realisation 
of diferent trust-building measures can also in time 
deine the general outline of a mutually acceptable 
international regime. 
Finally, this is a very theoretical assessment, hence 
empirical analysis of current tendencies in diferent 
aspects of European-Russian energy relations during 
the crisis of 2014-2016 is needed to shed new light on 
the situation and give us, at least, a list of the necessary 
trust-building measures. 
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DEVELOPMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN 
ENERGY MARKETS IN 2014-2015 AND 
THE EUROPEAN-RUSSIAN CONFLICT 
IN THE ENERGY SECURITY SPHERE 
The most important political event afecting European 
energy markets during the crisis of 2014-2015 was 
Russia’s suspension of ‘South Stream’ pipeline. This 
project was from the European Commission’s point of 
view in clear contradiction with the principles of the 
‘Third energy package’. Political tensions regarding the 
construction of South Stream on Bulgarian territory also 
appeared. As a result in December 2014 Putin declared 
the inal cessation of the project. A part of the South 
stream was already constructed on which the Russian 
side spent 4.66 billion US dollars (about 50 percent of 
planned investment).3 Gazprom also compensated the 
shares of its European partners (the Italian company Eni 
had 20 percent in the project, French company EDF and 
the German company Wintershall each had 15 percent), 
which amounted to about 1 billion US dollars,4 making 
Russia’s losses signiicant (no less than 5.66 billion US 
dollars). Among European nations the biggest cost was 
incurred by Bulgaria. If the project would have been 
realised, the country could have received in taxes, transit 
fees, etc. around 400 million euros per year, which is 
about 1.5 percent of Bulgaria is GDP.5
Since Russia has already invested signiicant resources 
in the construction of the parts of South Stream and the 
EU is still the main destination of Russian gas, Moscow 
decided to redirect South Stream gas to Turkey and to 
turn this country, which is not part of EU and therefore 
not bound by the Third Energy Package, into the main 
hub for redistributing Russian gas in Europe. Around 
660 km of this new route coincides with the old South 
Stream route, so it would help to minimise Russia’s losses 
from abandoning South Stream. The memorandum on 
the construction of the Turkish Stream was signed in 
December 2014, although as of late September 2015 
there was still some uncertainty about the realisation 
of this project. 
The cessation of South Stream also was one of the 
reasons behind a new plan to construct North Stream 
2. An agreement on this was signed during the Eastern 
Economic Forum in Vladivostok on 3–5 September 
2015. The consortium consists of German companies 
BASF and E.ON, French Electricity Company Engie, 
Austrian oil and gas irm OMV, and British-Dutch Royal 
Dutch Shell. Gazprom would own 51 percent of the 
shares in the project, with the other partners holding 
a 10 percent stake (except for Engie, which will own 
9 percent). As Judy Dempsey of European Carnegie 
Center wrote on this: 
“So even though Europe is diversifying its 
energy sources and the European Commission 
is insisting that Gazprom play by the EU’s 
competition rules, sanctions or not, Europe is 
too lucrative for Russia to ignore. So much for 
the nationalist rhetoric to the contrary from 
the Kremlin. And sanctions or not, Russia’s 
underdeveloped gas ields are too lucrative 
for Europe’s energy companies to ignore”.6 
However, there are still signiicant problems for this 
project to be fully realised. First of all, in the context 
of sanctions Gazprom can simply not ind enough 
money to inance the project, as Fitch Ratings argues.7 
Second, there are strong politically motivated objections 
against this project from, for example, Ukraine and 
Slovakia which would lose their transit fees if Russia 
fully withdraws from using the old Soviet pipelines 
going through their territory. 
Another important development from the point of 
view of legal conditions for Russian companies on 
the European energy market was the continuation of 
the YUKOS afair in European courts. It is no wonder 
that the most important legal issue in European-
Russian disagreements on the future international 
energy regime, namely the Energy Charter Treaty, is at 
the centre of these proceedings. The shareholders of 
YUKOS referenced the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
demanding more than 100 billion US dollars in 
compensation. The legal basis of this lawsuit was 
that although Russia had originally signed the Energy 
Charter Treaty, Moscow never ratiied it. The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration on 18 July 2014 requested Russia 
to pay 50.1 billion US dollars to the other parties. Russia 
appealed to a district court in The Hague, so legal 
proceedings are continuing. In the summer of 2014, 
Russia also lost a similar case on the YUKOS afair in 
the European Court of Human Rights. All these court 
decisions were perceived by Russian political elites as 
‘judicial attacks’ against Russian energy security, and a 
form of pressure motivated by the interests of the West 
in the Ukraine crisis.  
It should be noted that in 2014 and the irst half of 
2015 Gazprom sold less gas on European and Turkish 
markets than usual. In the irst half of 2015, the volume 
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of Gazprom’s gas sold declined by 8 percent compared 
to the previous year.8 This was caused by the fact that 
Gazprom traditionally attaches its gas price to the price 
of oil on the world markets with 6-9 months’ time-lag 
(and oil prices were quickly falling at the time). Another 
reason of falling gas exports was the warm winter. 
However, many experts believe Gazprom’s gas exports in 
2016-2017 based on purely economic and technological 
factors will be stable irrespective of political factors 
such as EU’s diversiication policy.9 According to the 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, natural gas from 
Russia will be highly competitive until 2030, compared 
with both the pipeline gas from the other countries and 
Liqueied natural gas (LNG) – including American shale 
gas.10 Some experts believe that it is not American shale 
gas, but gas from the European part of the Arctic which 
may in the long term become a real rival to Russian 
gas.11 However, this gas is extracted mostly by Western 
energy companies who have very good relations with 
Gazprom, Rosneft and, inally, the Kremlin.
As for Russia, it also continued in 2014-15 its policy of 
diversiication towards Asia and away from EU markets. 
In 2014 “Russia has sent more than 30 percent of its oil 
exports—more than 1.2 million barrels a day, the most 
ever—to Asia...Around a ifth of Russia’s oil exports went 
to Asia Paciic in 2012”, according to the International 
Energy Agency.12  Also, during a visit to Beijing in 
November 2014, Putin reached a preliminary agreement 
for Gazprom to supply China’s state oil company CNPC 
with 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year from the 
Altai region of western Siberia. However, most of the 
details – including the price of the gas – are still to be 
worked out.13 
 
DEvELoPmEntS In uKrAInE AnD ruSSIA
In Ukraine, energy security during the crisis has been 
characterised by unending disputes between Gazprom 
and Naftohaz. In their disputes both sides appealed to 
The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce; its ruling is expected in 2016. Gas supplies 
to Ukraine, but not transit supplies to Europe, were 
stopped in summers 2014 and 2015, but fortunately 
not during winter as in the crises of 2005 and 2009. 
In October 2014 an agreement between Russia and 
Ukraine on gas purchases by Ukraine and gas transit 
through Ukraine was signed with the participation of the 
EU. As a result, de facto we already see the emergence of 
an international trilateral regime regulating gas transit 
through Ukraine with the participation of Kyiv, Russia 
and the EU (for now this is based on the agreement 
of 2014 and preliminarily ad hoc agreement of 
September 2015). 
In Russia the most important issue from the point of 
view of energy security during the crisis of 2014-2015 
was the combination of low oil prices’ impact on the 
Russian economy and the degradation of the energy 
industry by potentially long-term Western sanctions 
due to deicit of capital and technologies. In some 
respects, it resembled the situation in Iran’s economy 
under long-term sanctions. 
The issue of technology is crucial. The dependence of 
the Russian energy sector on Western technologies 
and equipment is 60 to 80 percent.14  Many Western 
experts believe that Russia would need more than 10 
years to overcome this dependency using less efective 
Asian technologies. Some Russian experts are more 
optimistic believing that it is possible to quickly diminish 
dependency on Western technologies and equipment 
down to 40 percent.15 
As for investments, according to Russian energy minister 
Alexander Novak investments in the Russian oil and 
gas industry in 2014 amounted to 36 billion US dollars. 
The industry would need about 400 billion US dollars 
by 2020 in investments according to some experts’ 
assessments.16 The main state controlled monopoly 
Rosneft alone would need to invest about 21 billion 
US dollars yearly until 2017 in development of new 
deposits and modernisation of oil reineries.17 
Sanctions in the inancial sector are the most efective 
Western sanctions. They have already efectively cut 
of Russian companies, including energy ones, from 
foreign credit (de facto even banks from third countries, 
such as Chinese ones, are afraid of giving loans to 
Russian companies now). Russian energy companies 
have huge foreign debts which they currently ind very 
hard to repay. There was, however, an attempt to inance 
Rosneft’s investment program through government 
reserve funds. Rosneft received from the government 
two loans of 11.4 billion and 6.1 billion of US dollars 
to repay its foreign debts. The company converted 
this money, originally received in Russian roubles, to 
US dollars which caused a quick devaluation of the 
rouble in late 2014-early of 2015. This solution cannot 
be sustainable in the long term as the government’s 
reserve funds are close to depletion. Since the revenues 
of the state budget signiicantly depend on oil and gas 
exports, diminishing oil prices mean falling state budget 
revenues. The Russian government, as has become clear 
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during discussion of 2016 state budget, is going to 
signiicantly increase taxation of energy companies in 
order to control the growing state budget deicit. Energy 
companies have already warned the government that it 
will signiicantly afect their investment plans. Problems 
with investments in Russia have become acute, also 
due to capital light. In 2014 capital light according 
to international assessments was about 151billion US 
Dollars18 (oicial Russian Central Bank’s assessment – 
21,7 billion US Dollars).19
A long-term critic of Russia’s energy policy, former 
deputy energy minister Vladimir Milov, warned in 
August of 2015 that Russian energy companies already 
have problems with the volume of oil extraction. Daily 
oil extraction in August of 2015 was 100,000 barrels 
lower than it was in May 2015.  According to him, 
“this situation resembles the end of 1980-s and the 
threat of serious collapse in Soviet oil extraction due 
to accumulated structural problems (state ‘champions’ 
have captured all main assets, but they cannot develop 
them due to their inefectiveness)”.20 Most importantly, 
Russian oil and gas deposits are quickly depleting. 
Hence, in order to maintain the level of oil and gas 
extraction in the long term, Russia needs substantial 
investments in the exploitation of new deposits.  
As  previously mentioned, the efect of sanctions is 
multiplied by falling oil prices. However, in such a 
short time period as 2014-2015 it is hard to discern 
the inluence of purely economic factors (such as falling 
oil prices) and purely political factors (such as sanctions 
and the consequences of geopolitical conlicts) on the 
Russian energy sector. The majority of new projects in 
the Russian Arctic become unproitable if the oil price 
is lower than 60 US dollars per barrel.21 Low oil prices, 
in general, exacerbate traditional Russian problems 
of high costs of energy extraction in Siberia and the 
Arctic compared to the deserts of Saudi Arabia or Iran. 
The potential long-term efect of sanctions on the 
Russian energy industry is extensively discussed 
by experts today. According to the assessments of 
American consulting company HIS, oil production could 
fall to 7.6 million barrels a day.22 The prediction of The 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies agrees, predicting 
oil production in Russia will diminish about 2 percent 
a year up to 2025. However, these negative scenarios 
are based on the assumption that Western oil and gas 
companies would stop investing in Russia, something 
they really cannot aford to do. Historically, Western 
attempts to organise economic blockades on Russia 
were not particularly successful, both in the 1920s and 
even during the Cold War. Russia is much bigger and 
in many respects stronger than Iran, where sanctions 
were only partially successful.
Following sanctions, many Western companies have 
withdrawn from ongoing projects in Russia. However, 
despite the change in political and economic conditions 
in 2014, the majority of foreign oil and gas companies 
are continuing to invest in Russia. Due to the nature of 
production cycles in the oil and gas sector, companies 
cannot drastically change their plans under the 
inluence of political events and return capital, which is 
concentrated in large projects. For example, in the Yamal 
LNG project, the share of Total and CNP constitutes up 
to 20 percent. 
The situation is similar in other oil and gas projects in the 
Russian Federation with foreign corporate participation. 
According to analysts’ assessments, these projects could 
be suspended or postponed, but not totally closed.23 
Moreover, a new important agreement on asset swaps 
has been recently signed during the Eastern Economic 
Forum in Vladivostok on 3–5 September. It involves 
Austrian OMV, who would acquire a 24.8 percent stake in 
the Urengoy oil and gas ields in exchange for Gazprom 
obtaining some of OMV’s assets. In this regard, the 
situation resembles energy relations before the EU 
imposed sanctions on Russia in 2014.  
nEW tEnDEncIES At tHE EnD oF 
2015 AnD tHE bEGInnInG oF 2016
There is a very high degree of uncertainty in Russian-
European energy security relations due to the very 
volatile political and economic situation.  This section 
highlights the most recent tendencies from when the 
bulk of the chapter was written (October 2015) up to 
the time of the publication of this report. 
1. Oil prices were quickly falling at the end of 
2015-beginning of 2016. As a result of this many 
investment projects in the energy sphere have 
been frozen. This concerns not only Russian 
investors, but also European investors that had 
diferent projects in the Russian energy sphere. 
As a result of this, the inluence of low oil prices 
on potential fall of Russian oil production is much 
higher than the inluence of sanctions. Replacing 
old oil depleted deposits with the new ones, in 
Siberia and the Arctic, demands sophisticated 
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Western technologies unafordable in the context 
of low oil prices. Nevertheless, in 2015 Russia still 
produced a record volume of oil, which makes 
falling oil production a future rather than a 
present concern. 
2. Falling oil prices also afected the Russian state 
budget, given its high dependence on oil revenues. 
Experts suggest inancial reserves accumulated by 
the government in the period of high oil prices 
would be spent in a year or, at best, two years. This 
means that the general economic crisis in Russia 
could further deteriorate, with 2015 highlighting 
clear sings of decline. However, a bad economic 
situation does not automatically mean that the 
Russian leadership would be ready to make 
concessions in disputes, energy security related 
or otherwise, with the West.  
3. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war has caused 
a quick deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations. 
After Turkey shot down a Russian warplane, 
Moscow introduced serious economic sanctions 
against Ankara. As a result, the ‘Turkish stream’ 
project is now frozen. Hence, billions of US dollars 
already spent on the physical infrastructure of the 
‘South stream’ that Moscow wanted to convert into 
the ‘Turkish stream’ project are, most probably, lost.
4. Russian-Chinese trade is also decreasing. This is a 
result of both Russian and Chinese economic crises. 
In 2015, Chinese exports to Russia decreased by 35 
percent, and Chinese imports from Russia were 20 
percent less than in 2014. In 2015, Russia was only 
the 18th largest trade partner for China having 
been the 10th largest in 2014. Falling oil prices 
also inluence Russian-Chinese cooperation in the 
energy sphere, for example, it is one of the reasons 
why construction of the gas pipeline ‘Strength of 
Siberia’ is behind schedule. Strategically, it means 
that the plans to divert Russian energy export 
from European direction to the Chinese direction 
cannot be fulilled in the shot term. Consequently, 
the European direction of Russian energy exports 
will remain in the foreseeable future the most 
important one, and even some of the members 
of the Russian government cautiously support 
this view. 
5. The Russian-Ukrainian dispute in the energy security 
sphere still continues. Ukraine stopped purchasing 
Russian gas in November 2015. Although the 
Ukrainian government has proclaimed that it is 
now independent from Russian gas, this is not very 
accurate. Ukraine is still purchasing Gazprom’s gas 
in Eastern Europe using reverse schemes. This is 
creating additional tensions between Russia, the 
EU and Ukraine because Gazprom strongly objects 
to such schemes and argues that its contracts 
with the countries like Slovakia and Poland do 
not permit reversing gas lows. In 2016, Ukraine 
signiicantly increased the price for transit of 
Russian gas through its territory making it, the 
Russian side argues, the highest in the world. This 
happened irrespective of falling oil prices (and 
the price of Russian gas is directly attached to 
oil price). Some Russian experts believe that this 
Ukrainian policy is designed to pressure Russia into 
acquiescing to reverse gas purchases in Eastern 
Europe. The potential emergence of a new stable 
international regime regulating Russian-European-
Ukrainian energy relations is now even one step 
further away than it was in October 2015.
6. Discussions on ‘North Stream 2’ still continue in 
Europe. Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as 
Ukraine, strongly object to it mostly on political 
grounds, while in Germany, France and Italy there 
are proponents of the project who support it 
purely for economic reasons. There is also high a 
high probability of Brussels becoming involved in 
this issue, as the European Commission plans to 
propose new rules for preliminary coordination of 
new deals in the energy sphere and many experts 
in Russia believe that one of the aims of this new 
rule would be to limit energy deals with Russia.
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PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS 
The chapter indicates that in order to create at least 
preliminary conditions for cooperative relations, where 
trust can be gradually built once again, a series of trust-
building measures should irst be implemented within 
the three respective spheres afected by the European-
Russian energy conlict. These measures should concern 
areas where compromise between the EU and Russia 
is already visible:
1. European  markets: European-Russian dialogue 
about North stream 2 and Turkish stream (to the 
degree in which Turkish stream afects European 
markets) should be continued. Both sides should 
avoid confrontation on other issues not directly 
related to energy security in order to avoid negative 
spill over in the energy security area. 
2. Transit states. Talks directed at stabilising the 
situation in the Donbas according to the Misnk-2 
agreement should be continued in order to avoid 
negative spill over efects in energy security area. 
An effective international regime regulating 
Russian gas transit to the EU through Ukraine 
should be developed through the continuation of 
trilateral talks between the EU, Russia and Ukraine.
3. Russia: Cooperation between Russian and 
European energy companies on long-term projects 
that European companies either cannot or do not 
want to abandon despite Western sanctions should 
be continued. The Kremlin continues to maintain 
key elements of a free-market economy as a 
condition for the efective functioning of European 
energy companies in Russia; asset swaps should 
be also continued as an instrument of integration 
of Russian energy companies into the global 
business environment. Ŷ
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Economic Relations  
Between the EU and Russia:  
sanctioning Failure?
Christopher Hartwell
the story of trade relations between the Eu and russia has been one of fragility and diverging interests for over 20 years. the ukrainian crisis has exposed the inherent rift between the two trade powers, but has 
not caused the underlying crisis. With sanctions simultaneously and paradoxically inefective yet damaging 
to broader Eu-russian relations, this chapter examines the way forward after the russian invasion of the 
Donbas. not surprisingly, trade relations hinge on russia’s cessation of hostilities. the Eu does not escape 
blame, however, and must rethink its economic strategy in the EaP countries to be more efective. 
In the early 2000s, relations between the EU and Russia 
were on an upward trajectory. With Russia’s incipient 
recovery from its ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, completing 
its transformational recession away from communism 
and the inal wringing out of poor macroeconomic 
policies via the rouble crisis in 1998, Moscow became 
a ‘normal’ economic actor and a partner with the EU. 
Hopes were high that Russia’s abundant energy reserves 
and surfeit of natural resources could now be harnessed 
to work for the good of Europe, rather than against it, 
as it had been used for 70 years during the Cold War. To 
help with Russia’s economic transition, the EU provided 
substantial assistance via the Technical Assistance to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States program, 
disbursing 2.7 euros billion from 1991 to 2006 for 1,500 
projects across the Russian Federation.1
By the middle of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
second term, however, the optimism about the EU-
Russian partnership started to look misplaced. The 
global inancial crisis of 2007-09 shook Russia’s economy 
to its core, and precipitated a rapid concentration of 
the Russian economy in commodities, in particular 
oil and gas. Politically, following his own predilection 
for delecting economic pain via adventures abroad, 
Putin presided (behind the scenes) over a conlict with 
neighbouring Georgia and promoted his own political 
and economic alternative to the EU, the EEU. Coupled 
with Russia’s stridently anti-EU position in Moldova and 
Ukraine, the deteriorating relationship between the EU 
and Russia has exposed a wide political rift between the 
economic partners. The Ukrainian Maidan revolution 
in February 2014 and the light of ousted leader Viktor 
Yanukovych to Russia appeared to be the breaking point 
for the two trade powers.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine, from an 
economic standpoint, the evolution of EU-Russian 
relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union and, in 
particular, over the past ive years. How has the Ukraine 
crisis impacted economic relations between the EU and 
Russia? Is there a way back from the brink? And is such 
a resumption of economic relations even desirable from 
the point of view of either Russia or the EU?
tHE Eu AnD ruSSIA: From HoPE 
to InDIFFErEncE to rELIAncE
The first mistake that commentators make when 
surveying the current landscape of EU-Russian relations 
is to assume that they once were actually quite robust 
but have only recently become problematic. While 
certain members of the EU (mainly Germany and Italy) 
conducted trade with the Soviet Union during the 1980s, 
often receiving energy in exchange for high-technology 
and industrial machinery, it wasn’t until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union that trade relations blossomed. 
From the outset, however, political considerations 
have been a part of the trade relationship between 
the newly established Russian Federation and the EU. 
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For example, the EU concluded a PCA with Russia in 
1994 that took an unexpectedly long two years to 
conclude, especially since the EU had entered into a 
trade and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union 
in December 1989. The negotiations dragged on mainly 
due to Russian objections to political conditionality, 
which the EU believed was crucial, as well as Russia’s 
insistence on making the PCA a stepping stone to a 
free trade area.2 From the EU side, the PCA only entered 
into force in 1997, due to European disapproval over 
the irst Chechen war.3  
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, there still 
remained some harmony in the EU-Russian approach 
to trade policy, and, building on the PCA, the two 
devised a series of four ‘Common Spaces’ to guide 
the next decade of trade-building and integration 
(including a space on ‘economic afairs’).4 Negotiations 
began in 2005 to replace the PCA, which had become 
increasingly outdated,5 and road-maps towards realising 
the common space in economic afairs were beginning 
to be constructed. However, continued resistance on 
issues of conditionality led to political tension and 
little progress in negotiating the new agreement. Eerily 
similar to the PCA negotiations over a decade earlier, 
the EU continued to use the rhetoric of common values 
as a tactic of political conditionality, an approach which 
Russian negotiators steadfastly refused to accept.6  The 
pushback by the Russians dovetailed with additional 
“conceptual and technical disagreements [which] 
dogged negotiations”, while political issues external 
to the trade realm contributed to “a wider deterioration 
of EU–Russia relations”.7 These political disagreements, 
including increasing political centralisation in Moscow 
and the Russian response to the ‘colour revolutions’ 
throughout the ex-Soviet space, inevitably  rebounded 
to the detriment of the trade negotiations.8
It is the policymaker’s fallacy to believe that trade 
only occurs because of delicate negotiations (and 
not comparative advantage), and even without an 
overarching trade agreement, trade between the 
EU and Russia increased over this period, right up to 
the global inancial crisis (Figure 1). But the headline 
trade numbers miss the reality that trade between the 
two partners has always lacked diversiication, with 
energy dominating the EU’s imports from Russia and 
machinery dominating the exports. These trends have 
been constant throughout the history of EU-Russian 



































































































































































































Source:  Based on data from Eurostat
Figure 1. EU-27 Trade with Russia, 1999-2013
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approximately 33 percent of the EU’s oil and an average 
of 35 percent of its natural gas.9 In fact, the EU’s reliance 
on Russia fuels has increased over time, making up 
approximately 80 percent of all imports from Russia at 
its peak (Figure 2). Indeed, since 2008, Russia has been, 
for the EU and in US Senator John McCain’s memorable 
words, “a gas station masquerading as a country”.10
With the advent of the global inancial crisis of 2007-
09, trade around the world plummeted, but especially 
in regards to the EU-Russian relationship. The global 
financial crisis, followed closely by the ongoing 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, has kept growth low 
and demand muted in both Russia and the EU. The 
EU-27’s total consumption expenditure as of Q2 2014 
was a mere 18 percent higher than it was in Q1 2006, 
and imports from Russia in 2014 by value were at the 
same level as they were in 2007 (when, incidentally, 
the Euro was much stronger). Similarly, EU exports 
grew overall by 36 percent over the same time span 
(2006-2014), but were stagnant with Russia, peaking 
in 2011 and returning to their 2008 levels by 2014.11 
Consumption in Russia had a bit better run, buoyed by 
high oil prices, but expressed in constant US dollars, it 
had only increased by 25 percent from 2007 to 2014, 
meaning less of an appetite for imports; additionally, 
given the stagnant investment climate in Russia over 
this same timeframe (investment as a percentage of GDP 
is consistently in the 20 percent range), this translated 
to less demand for machinery, the number one export 
from the EU to Russia.  
In tandem with the economic slowdown in both 
regions, Russia’s own institutional and economic 
evolution continued to disappoint. In particular, WTO 
accession did not restructure Russia as planned, as it 
was accompanied by many caveats, qualiications, and 
hedging against the policy adjustments needed. This 
lack of exposure to true liberalisation meant that the 
Russian economy has not had to adjust to competitive 
forces, and instead has become more reliant on the 
government to protect its markets. This was a recipe for 
stagnation even before the imposition of sanctions, and 
has been compounded by Russia’s continuing use of 
trade as a political weapon. Russian policymakers have 
spoken openly of using trade policy in the service of 
political, rather than economic goals. Indeed, Vladimir 
Putin’s ‘Kandidat in Economic Sciences’ dissertation from 
the St Petersburg Mining Academy in 1997 outlines an 





























































































































































































































































Figure 2. Mineral Fuel Imports from Russia, as Percentage of all Imports from Russia
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use their market share to disadvantage foreigners while 
retaining low and subsidised prices for the Russian 
market.12 With such an underlying philosophy, tenets of 
free trade have no sustainability and have been regularly 
abandoned in pursuit of short-term political gain.
Finally, there may have been a growing realisation of 
the lack of compatibility of Russia and the EU during 
the crisis years, as these institutional issues have been 
compounded by both the EU and Russia’s economic 
interests being focused elsewhere over the past decade. 
The continued rise of China on Russia’s borders and 
its interest in fostering the so-called BRICS grouping 
has re-oriented its gaze towards emerging markets, 
a trend which has accelerated since 2013. Similarly, 
the EU has also struck out beyond Europe to conclude 
trade agreements with Mexico, Chile, Singapore, Peru, 
Colombia, and South Korea, to name a few, over the past 
ive years. Moreover, the EU’s focus in trade agreements 
has also shifted towards ‘WTO-plus’ arrangements, 
which encompass more than merely trade preferences 
but also cover intellectual property, trade in services, 
and environmental or labour standards.13
The divergence between the EU and Russia on the 
conduct of trade policy, present since the beginning of 
their relations, coupled with the increasingly diminished 
perception of the importance of the other in future 
trade, meant that the relationship was always quite 
fragile. In such an atmosphere, it would not take 
much to expose a rift between the two trade powers. 
uKrAInE: tHE brEAKInG PoInt
The catalyst that did expose this rift was of course 
Ukraine, the primary reason for the current abysmal 
state of Russian-EU economic relations. Since 2010, 
Russia had accelerated eforts to develop the EEU, 
implicitly as a counterbalance to the EU and the US, 
irst via the establishment of the ECU, eventually to 
become a SES. This Union, whose existence was not 
wholly supported by economic need, also forced smaller 
ex-Soviet countries to choose a side either with or 
against the Kremlin, as membership in the EAEU and 
the EU accession track appeared incompatible.14 Ukraine 
was the prize in this struggle, as numerous economic 
analyses of the EEU’s viability by the organs of the Union 
itself concluded that Ukraine’s entry would be incredibly 
beneicial for trade with Russia and Kazakhstan, even if 
Ukraine itself did not see much beneit.15
Given the interest of the EEU in Ukraine becoming a 
member, and the equally serious intent of the EU to sign 
an AA, former Ukrainian President Yanukovych played a 
dangerous game in courting both suitors. With a summit 
planned in November 2013 in Lithuania to sign the AAs 
with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, Yanukovych made 
an abrupt volte face towards the EEU, leading to street 
protests throughout the country and his eventual ouster. 
His replacement with a solidly pro-EU government, 
committed to signing the AA, was seen as a political defeat 
for the Kremlin. Putin immediately set about rectifying this 
perceived injustice with a swift invasion and annexation of 
Crimea and military iniltration in the east of the country. 
This conlict continues to this day, with the entire Donbas 
area frozen in an odd and violent limbo.
The events of 2014 in Ukraine have had a substantial efect 
on EU-Russian trade relations across the entire spectrum of 
economic issues; in the irst instance, the ongoing conlict 
disrupted (and continues to disrupt) commerce in the 
region writ large, as typiied in the downing of Malaysian 
Flight 17 by Russians or Russian-backed separatists in 
July 2014, with trade infrastructure centred on Eastern 
Ukraine all but destroyed. But more importantly, hoping 
to punish Russia for its louting of international law, the 
EU imposed an array of sanctions on Russia beginning in 
March 2014. Starting as a series of travel bans and asset 
freezes against speciic members of Russia’s political 
class, the sanctions expanded to encompass prohibitions 
on inancial dealings with Russian state-owned banks, 
import and export of dual-use technology, and sales 
of energy-related equipment or services necessary for 
energy exploration.16 
The sanctions marked a deinite shift in the EU’s trade 
policies towards Russia; after two decades of ofering 
trade carrots to Russia in the hopes of consolidating 
democratic gains, the EU shifted to using trade sticks 
for the same reason. But while sounding impressive, in 
reality the sanctions regime that the EU (and the US) 
has imposed on Russia is rather milquetoast, especially 
if used as an enticement for democratic change. One 
of the key di culties for the EU, as on so many issues, 
has been the need to get 28 disparate actors on board, 
in this case especially on the purpose of sanctions but 
also their scope. This lack of unanimity has led to ‘lowest 
common denominator’ sanctions, enough to disrupt 
normal commerce but not enough to actually shift Russian 
behaviour. With German and French businesses lobbying 
heavily against more stringent measures, some in the EU 
have been searching for a way out of even these mild 
sanctions ever since the Minsk ‘peace’ plan.17   
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One a more fundamental level, however, the lack of 
understanding of an end game for sanctions has been 
the underlying problem for the EU: is the EU trying to 
force a regime change in Russia? Is it trying to push 
Russian troops out of Eastern Ukraine? Is the EU applying 
economic leverage so that Russia gives back Crimea? If 
any of these have been the purpose of sanctions, the 
current regime has been a failure, as Russia remains 
entrenched in Crimea and Russian troops move about 
with impunity in the Donbas, while Vladimir Putin 
has consolidated his own power base and steadily 
eliminated opposition (witness the murder of Boris 
Nemtsov in February 2015). The question thus becomes, 
at what point does the EU declare that sanctions have 
been a ‘success’ and end them? If used just to punish 
Russia for its behaviour, but without actually seeking 
to alter that behaviour, the sanctions end up being an 
unjustiied government intervention in free commerce. 
More importantly, if it comes down to which trade bloc 
can use trade more efectively as a weapon, the EU is 
outmatched and outclassed, as Putin has been doing 
this for years.
Perhaps I am being too negative here, for sanctions have 
had a demonstrable impact on the Russian economy, 
which was already sliding into recession as of 2013. 
Sanctions have accelerated Russia’s dependence on gas 
and oil as primary export earners, as these are the only 
products still in demand in the EU (and over 50 percent 
of Russia’s oil and gas earnings come from its European 
market). Other industries in the country, including 
the high-tech industry, have been loundering due 
to sanctions and the repressive political atmosphere, 
which clashes with the free-wheeling entrepreneurial 
atmosphere of most tech start-ups.18 This concentration 
of Russia’s economy in the volatile world of commodities 
does not bode well for the country’s economic or 
political stability, as can be evidenced by the rapid 
decline of the ruble in end-2014 and early-2015 in 
response to oil price changes (Figure 3). Indeed, it 
has been the precipitous decline in oil prices, not the 
combined weight of sanctions, which has done the 
most damage to Russia in the past year. If the sanctions 
regime expands to encompass inancial access (as 
in throwing Russia of the SWIFT system), there is a 
likelihood of more economic pain, but for the moment, 
Moscow’s greatest trade threats come from Russia.
 
concLuSIon AnD PoLIcy 
rEcommEnDAtIonS
Asking ‘how can we improve EU-Russian trade relations’ 
is, in some sense, a false question, as the EU could 
improve trade relations immediately by dropping 
all sanctions and accepting what Russia has done in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, as well as stopping their 
quixotic demands for conditionality in any new trade 
agreement. This is near-impossible, however, as the 
events in Ukraine have been more than the garden-
variety economic disagreements that have emerged 
over the years between Moscow and the EU; indeed, 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was and continues to be 
explicitly anti-EU. Ukraine made a turn away from the 
EEU and towards the EU, a step which was not allowed 
in Moscow, and thus intervention had to follow to 
drag Ukraine at the very least out of the EU (if not into 
the EEU). For the EU to accept this state of afairs as a 
fait accompli and perhaps acknowledge that Moscow 
has untrammelled inluence over the economics of its 
neighbours is to acquiesce in another Yalta agreement. 
Moreover, such an approach is likely to see little trade 
gain for the EU in the long term.
A more salient question is, however, is the EU-Russian 
trade partnership even worth saving? Both parties were 
already drifting apart from each other and had little 
inclination to come back to the negotiating table. In 
one sense, the EU has already made its decision on the 
desirability of future EU-Russian trade. From Ukraine’s 
point of view, its deinitive turn to the west was always 
in its best interests, even with the Russian invasion. 
Ukraine will beneit immensely from duty-free access 
to the EU market, in terms of increasing competition, 
forcing restructuring within the economy, and enabling 
producers a whole new arena for sales. While quality 
standards remain a problem for Ukrainian exporters, the 
allure of the EU market should help to improve those 
standards, as would the promised technical assistance 
from the EU in helping to harmonise standards and 
quality infrastructure. This state of play is the direct 
opposite of the scenario where Ukraine accedes to the 
EEU, as economic modelling showed EEU members 
gaining hugely but Ukraine failing to beneit; instead, 
the EU’s gains from freer trade with Ukraine will be 
muted at irst, given the somewhat sclerotic nature of 
the Ukrainian economy, with the biggest gains likely 
to come from Ukraine’s proicient agriculture sector. 
On balance, however, slow gains from agriculture are 
unlikely to compensate for the loss of Russian energy 
combined with the huge technical costs in bringing 
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Ukraine up to European standards. The fact that the EU 
has continued its sanctions regime and gone through 
with the AA, even in the face of these considerations, 
means that it has cast in its lots with Ukraine over 
Russia. 
Similarly, Russia has given up trying to please the EU, 
and Russian policymakers have loudly proclaimed a 
pivot away from the EU and an attempt to expand 
Russian markets in emerging economies.19 Expanding 
the EEU to the Caucasus and even into Southeast 
Asia, away from the EU’s disapproving glare, may 
help Russia to compete in the areas that it does have 
a comparative advantage, although once again the 
political repressiveness in the country has not been 
conducive to spurring exports. So long as Putin’s 
idea of national champions and industrial policy run 
for the political class has deep roots in Russia, the 
country’s economic prospects will lounder. In the 
same vein, if the EEU continues its move towards 
becoming ‘Fortress Eurasia’ rather than a true conduit 
for liberalisation, it will be much harder for the EU 
to trade with Russia, sanctions or no sanctions. And 
it is highly unlikely that trade will diversify anytime 
soon, remaining concentrated in commodities and 
especially energy; this likelihood is all the more 
possible given the dire iscal straits Russia inds itself 
in, and given its foreign adventure in Syria, which 
will increase reliance on energy exports to fund the 
budget. 
As a consequence of Russia’s faltering economy and 
political moves, there is no easy way out for the EU 
from the mess it inds itself in vis-a-vis its economic 
relations with Russia, as so much of it depends on the 
politics. For the foreseeable future, the EU will still be 
dependent on Russian energy, as the steps taken since 
the advent of the crisis to reduce this dependency 
have been inefective. The preferable solution is, of 
course, for Russia to withdraw its troops from Eastern 
Ukraine and end all support for the Russian separatists 
in the Donbas at a minimum; in an ideal world, the 
annexation of Crimea would also be reversed. Given 
that this is not likely to become reality soon, the EU 
thus faces a limited space for policy action. In the 
short term, the only way forward is:
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Figure 3. US dollar/Ruble Exchange Rates versus the Price of Oil, 2014-15
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1. The EU should decide the goal of its sanctions on Russia and re-structure them accordingly: either more 
stringent or more lax. Only in this manner can success be deined.
2. The EU should rethink its strategy connected with the EaP countries, with a focus on trade liberalisation 
and economic reforms. In this manner, the EU could recapture the mantle of free trade that it has lost 
somewhat over the past two decades.
3. Continued energy diversiication, including a move to shale gas exploration, could reduce the EU’s 
energy dependence on Russia and make the trade relationship less one-sided. With a more equal 
partnership, it is likely that trade can proceed along comparative advantage rather than political lines, 
reaching a ‘natural’ equilibrium. Ŷ
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Russia and the EU:  
The global Cooperation Agenda 
Alexander Titov
two factors are important for efective cooperation with russia in the wider world. First, the Eu needs to develop a downgraded, ‘values-light’ agenda focused on solving concrete challenges. Second, to achieve 
the irst point, a common minimum set of shared principles needs to be agreed upon. the need for such 
change is underscored by structural barriers for constructing an international community based on general 
solidarity of interests and values held central to the Eu. 
There is a growing awareness of the limits to the EU’s 
solidarist or normative approach to international 
relations, particularly evident in the Middle East, East 
Asia and even Europe, as exempliied in the Ukraine 
crisis.1 The opposition to the EU’s normative approach 
is usually expressed in the concept of a multipolar 
world or pluralist international society, favoured by 
Russia among others.2 At the same time, there are 
challenges in security and other areas that demand a 
shared response from international actors who do not 
necessarily agree on all normative principles. 
In dealing with Russia on global issues the EU should, 
therefore, develop a reduced agenda of short to 
medium-term aims, which are achievable without 
insistence on Moscow subscribing to the entire 
normative framework expected from the countries 
within the EU. To facilitate this turn, an attempt 
should be made to ind a common denominator in 
their approach to international afairs. These minimum 
principles, acceptable to both Russia and the EU, can 
be deined as the basic package of the Westphalian 
system: sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, and great 
power management of global issues.3 
The following chapter examines what those common 
principles between Russia and the EU could consist of, 
and explores how this modiied approach can facilitate 
cooperation between Russia and the EU on several 
issues on the global agenda. Speciically, the focus will 
be on Syria, Turkey, the Middle East, and China, as well 
as non-regionally speciic topics such as international 
trade, terrorism, and migration.
 
SyrIA
The case of Syria is perhaps the most important 
current example of differences and potential for 
cooperation between Russia and the EU. There has 
been a fundamental diference in Russia and Europe’s 
perceptions of the causes of the Syrian drama. 
The EU saw the uprising against Assad as a legitimate 
expression of popular discontent. Moscow’s view was 
more aware of the complex nature of Syria, with its 
ethnic and religious diversity sitting uncomfortably 
alongside a close-knit ruling group in charge of a strong 
army and security apparatus. Combined with intricate 
regional rivalries between the Gulf states, Turkey and 
Iran, the swift demise of the Syrian regime was seen as 
unlikely and – given the likely rise of extreme Islamic 
groups in its place – undesirable.
The Syrian case has allowed the Kremlin to pursue a 
policy that exempliied its core principles in international 
affairs: the priority of stability over revolutionary 
change, and state sovereign rights over humanitarian 
intervention.4 At the centre of Moscow’s criticism was 
the West’s interventionist agenda of democratisation 
that has made the situation in the Middle East worse 
– from Iraq to Libya and Syria. President Putin5 has 
consistently argued that the known devil of secular 
authoritarian states is the only efective structure to 
keep religious fundamentalism at bay.
A compromise over Syria has been hindered by these 
fundamental disagreements about the causes of the 
conlict. The immediate removal of Assad has until 
recently been a non-negotiable condition for the West, 
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while Moscow sees the current regime as the only force 
able to defeat IS. However, in the aftermath of the Paris 
attacks by the IS, some EU members, notably France, 
are moving closer to Moscow’s position of side-lining 
the issue of Assad’s fate for as long as it is necessary in 
order to defeat IS.
This might provide the beginning of a broader 
realignment of EU-Russia relations. The key would be 
to focus on practical solutions to a shared security 
concern, in this case destroying IS. In order to achieve 
this, there will have to be a division between primary 
goals (defeat of the IS), medium goals (the end to the 
Syrian civil war), and long-term goals (the establishment 
of democracy in Syria). To achieve the irst two goals, a 
compromise with Russia is inevitable. This will require 
re-assessment of the EU’s order of priorities in foreign 
policy, speciically the role of its normative goals. This 
may create a precedent on formulating a new model 
for dealing with Russia.
 
turKEy
Relations between Russia and Turkey, the EU’s two largest 
neighbours, have been forced on to the international 
agenda after the shooting down of a Russian warplane 
by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015. Mediating 
the fallout might require considerable efort because 
the incident was not a tragic misunderstanding, but a 
logical development from the two countries’ diferences 
over Syria. 
Turkey, with its 2 million refugees, remains the key to 
the EU’s attempts to manage the refugee crisis. At the 
same time, Turkey’s main objective, preventing the 
establishment of a Kurdish state, as well as support for 
some controversial rebel groups in Syria pose serious 
dilemmas for the EU. Worryingly, the shooting down of 
the Russian warplane can be seen as a Turkish attempt 
to impose a no-ly zone in Syria along its border, at the 
very time when Western opinion has been shifting 
towards Russia’s position on Syria.
At the heart of the current standof with Turkey is 
Moscow’s belief that secular authoritarian rulers are 
the only efective bulwark against radical Islam in the 
Middle East. The Kremlin genuinely feels the threat of 
radical Islam to its domestic security and international 
order. This puts it at odds with Ankara’s position of 
promoting religious revival in the Muslim world under 
its stewardship.
In both Russia and Turkey, the EU faces similar dilemmas 
over the principles guiding its foreign policy.6 President 
Erdogan’s politics are underpinned by Islamic revival, 
his aspirations as a leader of the Islamic world are 
evident, for example, in his open support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria. The openly stated desire 
to restore Turkey’s leading role in the region and the 
world has clear parallels with the Russian behaviour in 
Ukraine and the post-Soviet space.
The EU’s approach to foreign policy is based on 
expanding its community of values.7 Russia, on the 
other hand, protects the Westphalian system based 
on state sovereignty, non-intervention, diplomacy and 
great power balance. As a result, the EU’s normative 
expansion has been securitised by Russia, seeing it and 
its derivatives such as human rights, democracy, and 
civil society, as a direct threat to the established system 
of sovereign statehood. Turkey is closer to Russia on 
these issues even if it is not so open about it.
Russo-Turkish relations are likely to occupy the EU’s 
foreign policy because of the impact they will have 
on the current refugee crisis and the conduct of the 
Syrian civil war. In addition, energy politics, the issue 
of EU enlargement and the Ukraine crisis, particularly 
with regards to the issue of Crimean Tatars, who are 
historically close to Turkey, are also likely to be afected. 
The EU’s role should be that of a mediator between 
Russia and Turkey, as stabilising those relations is a key 
component in enhancing security and stability in the 
EU’s immediate neighbourhood. 
 
tHE mIDDLE EASt
The fundamental danger in the Middle East is 
the collapse of the state as the dominant actor in 
international and social order. Relatively robust in the 
Middle East until 2003, the state as the core actor is 
being overtaken by non-state elements such as IS or 
violent anarchy, as has occurred in Libya.8
Both Russia and the EU have shared interests in 
preserving the basic building blocks of international 
system in the Middle East: state sovereignty, territoriality, 
and recourse to diplomacy as the prime means of 
solving disputes. For this to work, the EU needs to 
accept Russia’s emphasis on limits to intervention on 
normative grounds, and engage itself in great power 
management as a pre-condition for addressing the 
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challenges in the Middle East, including efective action 
against international terrorism.
In this context, Iran’s nuclear deal can serve as an 
example of successful cooperation between EU 
members and Russia on a shared security problem. 
It was achieved by focusing on clear objectives and 
accepting diplomacy as the main medium for reaching 
a compromise. As a consequence of Western sanctions 
being lifted, Iran is emerging as a potential replacement 
or counter-balance to Russia as a principal gas supplier 
to Europe. However, in dealing with Iran the EU would 
have to cooperate economically with a regime that 
does not share its core values to an even greater degree 
than Russia. 
Egypt is another example of a problematic 
transformation in the Middle East. The Al Sisi regime 
is friendly with Russia for exactly the same reason that 
it has strained relations with the EU: the normative 
break in understanding political legitimacy between 
the EU and Russia. For the former, popular expression 
is all important; for the latter stability and preservation 
of secular state structures are paramount. However, the 
dangers to the very basis of the modern international 
order across the Middle East should help the EU 
and Russia agree on a minimal agenda of restoring 
sovereignty, and related principles of territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the domestic afairs of other 
states as the lynchpin of the international law. This 




One of the most important long-term factors arising 
from Russia’s current estrangement from the EU is the 
impact it has on Russia’s relations with China.9 This has 
repercussions for the general balance of power in the 
world and might signiicantly afect the EU’s economic 
and political security.
Diferences in Russia’s approach to China and the EU 
are best summarised by the absence of a normative 
dimension in Beijing’s foreign policy. As a consequence, 
this has enabled Russia to build closer relations with 
China than the EU, even though the Kremlin is well 
aware of the strategic challenges presented to Russia 
by the rise of China. 
There are several reasons for Russia’s nuanced approach 
to China’s presence in the former Soviet space. First, 
it can be argued that this is a case of Russia joining a 
project it cannot resist. Acceptance by Russia that China 
is stronger economically means it is seen as crucial to 
build relations with China, amicably manage its rise, and 
derive beneits from a special relation with it.
Second, in contrast to the EU, Russia and China have 
no ideological basis between for intrusion into each 
other’s internal afairs. Consequently, there is no need 
to fend of demands for improving democracy and 
allegations of human rights abuses that have often 
been the stumbling block in EU-Russian relations. On 
the contrary, China is willing to acknowledge Russia as 
an equal – at least verbally – and eschews the moralising 
tone typical of the EU’s approach. 
Not being able to exclude both China and the West 
from the former Soviet space, the Kremlin seems to 
prefer China because it is more comfortable with 
it ideologically, it ofers an appearance of equality, 
and is willing to delegate to Russia pre-eminence in 
political and security spheres. This will allow Russia to 
consolidate its hold on Eurasia at the expense of the 
US and the EU. This poses a signiicant challenge to 
the EU’s ambition of creating a stable neighbourhood 
and may require further re-assessment of its relations 
with Russia in a wider context of world politics, 




The near universal acceptance of free market 
globalisation has been the key Western achievement 
of the modern era.10 The EU should safeguard and 
promote this achievement, which is being undermined 
by politically motivated economic sanctions that 
inevitably create a negative link between globalisation 
and national security. 
The politicisation of the only universally accepted 
element of globalisation – free trade and economic 
liberalisation – leads to further securitisation of 
international trade and inance by Russia, already seen 
in a range of economic legislation. However, there is 
a wider problem of entrenching the idea of inherent 
potential danger in dependence on Western markets 
and inances by non-Western countries in general. 
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The EU should re-consider whether its security and 
prosperity is better advanced by entrenchment of 
Western institutions as the main standard around 
the world, or if economic sanctions can be used as 
an efective tool in foreign policy, which necessarily 
would undermine universal acceptance of Western-led 
globalisation. The issue of mutual dependence, and 
whether it enhances or endangers security, has not 
disappeared from the EU-Russia agenda. 
There is a clear need for a more predictable system in 
international trade, particularly as there is a danger 
of the re-emergence of trading blocs as the principal 
forms of economic organisation of the world economy.11 
Within this context, continuing tension between the 
EU and Russia may prompt the latter to strengthen its 
ties with China to a much greater degree than Moscow 
would have found comfortable otherwise. The key is to 
agree on some basic principles which would safeguard 
Western-led globalisation, while removing incentives 
for non-Western countries to create rival systems to 
protect themselves against any future Western threats.
 
concLuSIonS
The current juncture in foreign afairs poses many 
dilemmas for the EU and its member states. In the two 
crises dominating its foreign policy agenda, Ukraine 
and Syria, the EU is constrained to ind a new model 
for dealing with the rapidly changing world. Russia 
presents opportunities for revamping the EU’s foreign 
policy on a more sustainable basis for two, seemingly 
contradictory, reasons. 
Russia’s failure to fully democratise since 1991 means 
that it has a normative chasm in relations with the 
EU. This includes resistance to basic principles the 
EU is aspiring to embed in international relations: 
equality, human rights, democratic principles, and 
liberal rights of individuals. A challenge for the EU 
is to deal with a country which openly questions its 
fundamental values.  This is particularly di cult because 
the extension of these values to the rest of the world 
has been regarded by the EU as a guarantee of global 
security and prosperity.12 
Yet there is an opportunity too. Despite the gap in 
understanding the underlying principles of international 
organization, Russia is historically and culturally closer to 
the EU than most countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
It retains and promotes the classical approach to 
international affairs, broadly based on realism or 
pluralism, whose elements are necessary for a more 
sustainable and pragmatic foreign policy.13 The EU 
could beneit from rediscovering the core basics of 
international system by focusing on managing tensions 
between states through agreeing on common rules 
and principles, rather than by imposing its core values 
onto the rest.
A re-establishing of an agreement on some basic 
rules and institutions of international system, which 
will be acceptable to all international actors, could be 
an important step in building a secure international 
environment for the EU and the world. Finding a modus 
vivendi with Russia could, therefore, serve as a workable 
model for the rest of the world.
 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. The EU needs to develop a downgraded, 
‘values-light’ agenda for dealing with Russia 
on global issues. The focus should be on 
solving concrete challenges over the short to 
medium term, for example in Syria, which are 
achievable regardless of Russia’s acceptance 
of the normative framework expected from 
the EU or those aspiring to join it. 
2. A common minimum set of shared principles 
in international relations needs to be agreed 
upon. These minimum principles at present 
can be deined as the basic package of the 
Westphalian system: sovereignty, territoriality, 
diplomacy and great power management of 
global issues.
3. The EU could beneit in practical terms by re-
balancing its foreign policy towards agreeing 
a pluralist framework between states with 
diferent interests and values, rather than 
prioritising the spread of its core values on 
the others. This should allow the EU to maintain 
its soft-power advantage over the long term. Ŷ
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External Actors in  
EU-Russia Relations:  
Between Norms and space
Richard Sakwa
the breakdown in relations between russia and the Eu is one of the most signiicant events of the last quarter century. the end of the cold War confrontation and the fall of the berlin Wall in 1989 promised 
the creation of a ‘Europe whole and free’, as enunciated in the ‘charter of Paris for a new Europe’ adopted in 
november 1990.1 Instead, on the 25th anniversary of the dismantling of the ‘iron curtain’ across Germany and 
Europe, a new era of confrontation and division once again divides the continent. between 1989 and 2014 
Europe endured a 25 year crisis in which none of the fundamental problems of European security or global 
order were resolved and instead the continent very quickly plunged into a ‘cold peace’, a term irst used by 
boris yeltsin at the budapest meeting of the oScE in December 1994. In 2014, the ‘cold peace’ gave way to 
what can be called the ‘little cold war’. this is not a full-scale new cold War, since it lacks the fundamental 
ideological contestation of the original or its global reach, but it does mimic some of its practices and has 
restored dividing lines across Europe. 
How can we explain this betrayal of expectations? This 
chapter will outline four main processes: the tension 
between the normative and spatial ambitions of the EU 
which came to a head over Ukraine, the conlict between 
Atlanticist and Eurasian perspectives of European 
development, the failure to devise an adequate mode 
of reconciliation between wider and greater European 
agendas (which itself is a symptom of the failure of 
aspirations of pan-European integration of the sort 
enunciated by Mikhail Gorbachev for a ‘common 
European home’), and inally the appearance of new 
multilateral associations that act as alternative poles of 
attraction to balance what is traditionally described as 
‘the West’. Although the Russia-EU relationship remains 
an important one, these four processes dilute the 
intensity of the link. In the inal section, some of the 
lessons are considered. 
 
bEtWEEn normS AnD SPAcE
The EU is today typically portrayed as a post-modern 
entity committed to a post-Westphalian agenda of 
universal values accompanied by a set of normative 
principles. These norms are the basis for the EU’s 
conditionality in dealing with external actors and its 
neighbours. Although internally the EU may have 
assumed some of the characteristics of a neo-medieval 
polity, with overlapping jurisdictions and no settled 
sovereign centre, externally in recent years it has been 
assuming an increasingly hard spatial coniguration. Its 
frontiers are mostly governed by Schengen regulations 
establishing a common external border regime, and the 
pressure of refugee and migratory lows has prompted 
a wave of wall-building.
Decades of enlargement have pushed the EU into 
uncharted territory, in both symbolic and political 
terms. The expansionary dynamic through accession 
has now slowed, but there is no inalité in either spatial 
or normative terms. The EU remains an ambitious 
transformative agent in what are increasingly contested 
neighbourhoods. It is this which has brought the EU into 
confrontation with Russia. This is a conlict that neither 
side wanted, and which both sides sought to avoid. The 
EU devised various neighbourhood policies to ensure 
that the outer limits of EU territory did not harden into 
new lines of division. Romano Prodi, the president of 
the European Commission, declared that “I want to 
see a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the Union and its 
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closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia 
and the Black Sea.”2 Cross-border cooperative networks 
were established, notably the Northern Dimension 
programme between Finland and Russia.
The tension between the universalistic aspirations of 
the EU as a post-modern norm-based project and the 
physical manifestation of the EU as a territorially-based 
entity introduces a permanent ambiguity in relations 
with external actors. The duality means that the EU 
employs a range of traditional diplomatic and other 
instruments while at the same time exercising a dynamic 
of conditionality that tempers realist interactions. The 
EU’s dualism – between norms and space – became 
increasingly delineated when relations with Russia 
soured and they began to contest for inluence in 
the so-called ‘shared neighbourhood’, the traditional 
borderlands between the two major zones of Europe 
in the intermarium between the Baltic and Black seas. 
For the EU, pragmatism and idealism are entwined in 
often uncomfortable combinations, while for Russia the 
traditional mix of conlict and cooperation gradually 
gave way to a more antagonistic relationship.
Nowhere is this clash between norms and spatiality 
seen more vividly than in the case of Ukraine. No other 
external actor has so poisoned relations between Russia 
and the EU. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis has fundamentally 
damaged the development of both the EU and Russia, 
to the extent that we can talk of Ukraine as the nemesis 
of a united Europe. But the Ukraine crisis is only the 
symptom of a larger failure to establish both the 
institutions and processes that could have fostered 
trust and genuine interdependence between Russia 
and the EU. Instead, on a whole series of issues, ranging 
from the energy relationship to neighbourhood policies, 
a pattern of antagonistic dependency emerged. These 
antagonistic relationships served both side’s needs, but 
neither saw them as leading to the creation of some 
sort of partnership community.
AtLAntIcISt vS contInEntAL 
PErSPEctIvES
The tension between the normative and spatial 
configuration of EU-Russian relations has been 
exacerbated by the deep embedment of the relationship 
in larger constellations of power. On the western side, the 
EU is part of the broader Atlantic system. This means that 
relations between Moscow and Brussels are constantly 
mediated with an eye to Washington. This is not to 
suggest that Brussels lacks agency or is unable to devise 
its own policies, but it does mean that on fundamental 
issues of security and foreign policy trajectories, the EU 
is constrained by alliance commitments. In other words, 
the EU is part of what some would call the hegemonic 
Atlantic system. This is the order combining, on the one 
hand, a normative narrative of liberal internationalism 
based on the rule of law and a network of rule-based 
institutions, and on the other hand, the NATO security 
system defending a speciic territory although with larger 
ambitions. Once again norms and spatiality are in tension.
On the other side, Russia sought to develop as a 
traditional great power. Although not without its own 
normative dimension, above all the stress on state 
sovereignty and the defence of legitimately-constituted 
government, this is primarily an approach to international 
politics that is based on interests and traditional patterns 
of diplomatic interaction. Russia thus faced a double 
dilemma in engaging with the EU. 
First, there was the relationship with the multiple 
agencies and bodies based in Brussels accompanied 
by a diverse pattern of interactions with the individual 
member states. What for the Atlantic alliance was 
praised as solidarity and unity in the Ukraine, notably 
in the imposition of sanctions, for Russia is perceived 
to be a type of subservience of the EU to American 
strategic concerns. In particular, Germany and Russia 
had long enjoyed a type of ‘special relationship’, which 
saw a series of intense bilateral contacts as well as the 
deepest economic links between any EU country and 
Russia. Germany’s active lobbying for sanctions and 
the exertion of the necessary disciplinary measures 
against some of the more recalcitrant EU members 
came as something of a shock to Moscow. It should 
not have done, since modern Germany is a child of the 
Atlantic system. The country was rebuilt after the war 
with Marshall Aid, and its constitution relects precisely 
the principles enunciated by the Atlantic Charter. The 
uniication of Germany was achieved as part of the 
Atlantic system, and Germany has become the European 
anchor of the Atlantic system, while at the same time 
emerging as the voice of Europe.
Second, as if this was not complex enough, relations with 
the EU as a whole were mediated by the larger Atlantic 
context. Atlanticism is founded on principles that seek 
to move beyond classic balance of power concepts to 
institutionalise Wilsonian idealism. This is a universalistic 
ideology, one of whose speciic manifestations has 
become support for democratic transformations 
accompanied in recent years by support for regime 
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change. Not surprisingly, Moscow’s aversion to what 
became known as ‘colour revolutions’ only reinforced 
its conservative defence of legitimism. 
Equally, the American plan to install elements of a missile 
defence system, initially intended to be placed in Poland 
and the Czech Republic, brought geopolitics back into 
the heart of the continent. Russia understood that to a 
degree the EU was a post-sovereign entity, yet the plan 
to install a system that was perceived to be a direct threat 
to Russia’s security only reinforced its misgivings about 
what the loss of sovereignty could lead to. Post-sovereign 
normativity appeared to come into direct contradiction 
not only with territorially-based security systems but 
with the very existence of Russia as a sovereign state. 
Both its norms and space appeared to be under threat. 
Plans to establish the TTIP were perceived by its critics 
in Moscow as some sort of  ‘economic NATO’, deepening 
the gulf between Atlanticist and continental visions 
of Europe. Matters became all the more complex 
when some of the new East European post-communist 
member states looked to Washington and NATO to 
ensure their spatial integrity. In other words, traditional 
spatiality was prioritised over normativity. Rather than 
overcoming the logic of conlict, which the EU had done 
so successfully earlier in normalising relations between 
France and Germany, the EU appeared to become part of 
a system perpetuating traditional conlicts in the eastern 
borderlands. The EU worked hard to socialise the new 
member states in the ways of peace and reconciliation, 
but these endeavours were in the end undermined by its 
own embedment in an Atlantic system that in part shared 
these values but which was also part of a hegemonic 
global power, operating according to a very diferent 
logic. Geopolitics and post-modern normativity make 
very uncomfortable bedfellows. 
contInEntALISm AnD tHE cLASH  
oF IntEGrAtIonS
The EU is at the heart of a dynamic concept of ‘Wider 
Europe’, a vision based on Brussels extending in 
concentric rings ultimately to encompass the whole 
continent. The stalling of the enlargement process 
placed an increase premium on the transformative 
agenda for the EU neighbourhood. The arc of good 
governance, economic liberalism and societal welfare 
was to be projected ever further to the East. This was 
an obviously attractive prospect to those living in the 
shadow of authoritarianism, corruption and poverty, 
but it also came at the cost of forcing a choice on the 
lands in between. Like the EU, Russia is also enmeshed 
in larger external constellations of power. Two of these 
are continental in aspiration and shape Moscow’s 
relationship with Brussels. 
The irst is the idea of Greater Europe, which draws on 
pan-European ideas of establishing some sort of political 
community from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Greater Europe 
advances a multipolar vision of the continent, with more 
than one centre and without a single ideological lavour. 
This is a more pluralistic representation of European space 
drawing on a long European tradition including Gaullist 
ideas of a broader common European space from the 
Atlantic to the Paciic to Mikhail Gorbachev’s dream of a 
‘Common European Home’. Putin is heir to this tradition 
and even to this day repeatedly refers to the idea of 
Greater Europe, as does his foreign minister, Sergei 
Lavrov. Although inspired by geopolitical interpretations 
of territorial space, the Greater European idea seeks 
to ind ways to overcome the logic of conlict that 
inevitably arises from geopolitics.3 
The second external orientation shaping Russia’s 
relationship with the EU is the increasingly complex 
plan for Eurasian integration. In his major programmatic 
article on the subject Putin lauded the success of the 
Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which 
was completed on 1 July 2011, and the imminent 
creation on 1 January 2012 of the SES with the three 
countries including standardised legislation and the 
free movement of capital, services and labour. Putin 
outlined plans for the enlargement of this project and its 
evolution into the EEU and eventually a Eurasian Union.4 
The EEU formally came into existence on 1 January 
2015 and currently has ive members: Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia.5 
In the 1990s the implicit condition of Russia’s 
engagement with the EU was that it would not try to 
create a substantive alternative pole of integration 
around itself in Eurasia. In the twenty-irst century the 
attempt to create just such a Eurasian pole was both 
cause and consequence of the growing gulf with the 
EU. Nevertheless, Putin insisted that the EEU was not an 
alternative but a complement to European integration. 
The idea is that it would become one of the pillars of 
Greater Europe, along with the EU, and thus provide a 
multilateral framework for engagement with the EU. 
In 2015, bilateral discussions between the EU and the 
EEU were encouraged by Angela Merkel and others.
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Coming into existence at a time of confrontation with 
the Atlantic community, the inherent tensions in the 
EEU project have been exacerbated. None of its three 
founding members – Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
– are comfortable with the loss of sovereignty that 
regional integration involves. Even Putin’s enthusiasm 
waned when confronted by the di culty of ensuring 
foreign policy coordination with EEU partners and their 
lukewarm support for Russia’s positions during the 
Ukraine crisis. The EEU proved to be a poor instrument 
to advance the greater European agenda, and instead 
was in danger of consolidating the long-term rift with 
the EU.  
GrEAtEr ASIAnISm AnD 
GLobAL muLtILAtErALISm
There are two more external constellations of power that 
play an increasing role in shaping Russia’s relations with 
the EU and which potentially overshadow traditional 
representations of European continentalism. The irst is 
the emerging Greater Asianism, with an increasing focus 
on Russia’s bilateral relationship with China,embedded 
in a larger system that includes Central Asia. The 
emergence of a Greater Asia stretching from Minsk to 
Shanghai, with numerous sub-complexes, represents 
a powerful new framework for Russia’s engagement 
with the EU. The tectonic plates have moved apart, and 
Europe is now divided into two. 
Normative and geopolitical factors are driving Russia 
and China together. China engages with states in a 
traditional realist manner, while the emergence of 
what is perceived as a type of neo-containment in 
the Asia-Paciic region reinforces China’s attempt to 
ind alternative routes. This is what lies behind the 
New Silk Road project and its accompanying plan to 
invest in transport infrastructure to bridge the region 
between China and the EU. A number of grandiose 
schemes have been mooted for the construction of 
super-fast transport links between Europe and Asia, 
and there has even been talk of building a maglev line 
from Beijing to Berlin. China at present is not greatly 
concerned about increasing its political inluence in 
Central Asia, a sphere in which it is willing to concede 
to priority to Russia (at least for the time being), but 
when it comes to economic matters, China’s growing 
preponderance places it in a league of its own. For Russia 
there are both opportunities and dangers, accompanied 
by the fear that Russia will become a ‘raw materials 
appendage’. As far as China is concerned, alignment 
with Russia reinforces its particularist claims to a unique 
developmental path, and strengthens its defence of 
the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. 
Neither state is ready to establish a formal alliance 
or start any substantive balancing against the West, 
yet both states see a range of dynamic advantages 
in strengthening their cooperation. In the long term, 
energy, transport and strategic cooperation, as well as 
political coordination, entail the creation of a formidable 
power constellation that may come to rival the West.
The second alternative to Europe-centred 
developmental scenarios is the development of pan-
Eurasian and non-western globalism. The SCO was 
founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001 as a regional 
cooperative association. Its initial priorities included 
joint measures to counteract terrorism and extremism, 
and fostering cooperation in education, energy, oil and 
gas, transport, and communications. The SCO focuses 
on three areas of cooperation: regional security, the 
economy, and culture. Its membership comprises 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey are ‘partners 
for dialogue’, a sort of enhanced partner status, while 
Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan have 
observer status. India and Pakistan for the irst time 
were represented at prime ministerial level at the SCO 
summit in Ufa on 10 July 2015 and are on the way to 
full membership.
Alexander Lukin argues that the SCO initiative was 
given added momentum by the behaviour of the West:
 “Thus, while the US was celebrating its victory 
in the Cold War and Francis Fukuyama was 
announcing the “end of history”, China, India, 
Brazil and many other states in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America were eyeing the situation with 
concern. Had the US shown more restraint, 
developments would have taken a diferent turn. 
But Bill Clinton and especially George W. Bush 
chose to consolidate American successes and 
seek total US dominance in the world. Europe 
was unwilling to navigate an independent 
course and followed in Washington’s wake”. 
Above all, for Lukin, “The united West increasingly took 
on the role of the world’s policeman, substituting its ad 
hoc decisions for international law”.6 The organisation is 
not directed against the West, since its participants in 
one way or another are part of the Western system and 
beneit from it, but its members increasingly coordinate 
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their responses on major policy issues. With a Secretariat 
in Shanghai, the SCO is increasingly becoming a pole of 
attraction for countries far beyond its original Moscow-
Beijing axis. 
Equally, from being no more than a catchy acronym, 
the BRICS countries have begun to institutionalise their 
relationship. Although it lacks a permanent secretariat, 
it does have the makings of an organisational structure. 
BRICS is a loose association of countries that share certain 
interests, but it is not a formal international alliance. 
Nevertheless, the depth of the normative congruence 
is often under-estimated, focused on creating what is 
considered a more legitimate international system and 
one in which power relationship are more balanced. 
Policy proposals include plans for reform of the UN 
Security Council, to bring in Brazil and India at the 
minimum, as well as changes to the Bretton Woods 
institutions of international economic governance, 
notably the redistribution of voting shares in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The association to date has a strong South-South 
orientation, but Russia’s membership ensures that it 
also represents a powerful East-South bloc to rival the 
hegemony of the North. The body brings together 
both developed and developing countries that have, 
for example, pursued common strategies in the 
WTO and the G20 to create a fairer order concerning 
agricultural trade policies. All of the BRICS countries 
are deeply enmeshed in the Atlantic system, and thus 
engagement with the association is far from exclusive. 
Just as with the bilateral Russo-Chinese relationship, so 
the development of multilateralism within the BRICS 
framework creates yet another ‘island of separatism’ 
that challenges the EU’s and American dominance 
of the international system. At the same time, the 
BRICS is developing as a creative forum for new forms 
of engagement with the EU, and thus becomes an 
instrument to temper the potential for conlict. 
These developments are accompanied by a range of 
initiatives for pan-Asian integration encompassing 
Russia, China, South Korea and many countries in 
between – variations of the Silk Road idea. The intensity 
and scope of these plans for spatial integration vary 
greatly, yet all are groping to find a formula that 
brings together various combinations of states in 
post-European integrative endeavours. The degree 
to which a substantive degree of sovereignty will 
be ceded to the institutions of integration remains 
fundamentally contested. Together they suggest an 
alternative architecture to that of Wider Europe and 
ofer some substance to the idea of Eurasia and Asia 
aligning along a diferent axis to that of the West. The 
surge in macro-continental regionalism relects the 
attempt to ind mediating institutions in a world lacking 
the stable bipolarity of the Cold War, and aspirations to 
overcome the asymmetries in the international system 




Putin’s disillusionment with the West and Europe has 
entailed not simply a shift to a greater Asian orientation, 
but also by a much more substantive attempt to give 
shape and substance to a re-energised vision of Russia 
as a bicontinental power.7 Russia sought to avoid being 
ground between the EU and the rising powers of 
Asia. Hence the EEU initiative was a way of mediating 
relations with both the EU and China. While there has 
been an estrangement from the West in strategic and 
political terms, Russia has certainly not turned its back 
on Europe. Equally, the greater intensity of engagement 
with Asia, and in particular China, does not entail a 
shift from ‘strategic partnership’ to a far more exclusive 
‘strategic alliance’, despite the calls for just such  a bond 
following the chilling of relations with the West. 
Russia’s Greater Asian focus is driven by the perception 
that the West as a concept, a geopolitical actor, and 
a cultural project is showing signs of unravelling, 
accompanied by the rise of new geopolitical 
representations of ‘the East’. Predictions about the 
imminent demise of the West are premature, yet its 
relative standing in the world is clearly being challenged. 
The EU’s normative impetus is now over-shadowed 
by perceptions of geopolitical threat. Nevertheless, 
despite the hostile rhetoric, the Kremlin understands 
that the West retains an extraordinary cultural and 
economic dynamism. Yet the East is also reinventing 
itself, and is beginning to ofer an alternative that 
is particularly attractive to the traditionalists within 
Russia. Even after the present crisis over Ukraine, 
Russia’s relations with the EU will not be able to return 
to anything like the status quo ante. Given Russia’s 
increasing orientation towards multilateral bodies such 
as the SCO, BRICS and various Silk Road endeavours, 
as well as increasingly close relations with China, a 
fundamental strategic rethink by all parties is required. 
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PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. The breakdown of the European security system can only be overcome by a new ‘politics of transcendence’, 
of the sort outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War. This encompasses a review 
of threat perceptions, the establishment of equal and inclusive institutions and processes, and the 
acknowledgement of geopolitical and ideological pluralism.
2. Russian foreign policy needs to become more strategic and less inluenced by Cold War threat perceptions. 
Above all, denunciation needs to give way to engagement, not only with Atlantic institutions but also with 
domestic pluralism, and on this basis a more dynamic and self-conident approach should be devised. 
3. The Atlantic and Eurasian tectonic plates in Europe have moved apart, yet both sides are fated to share a 
common landmass. Only a new and shared pan-continentalism can heal the rift, based on a reinvigorated 
vision of Greater Europe, accompanied by mutual recognition of past mistakes and the reciprocal forging 
of a new progressive European identity.  Ŷ
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Is Meaningful Cooperation 
Between the EU and Russia 
still possible?
Cristian Nitoiu
more than two years since ukrainian citizens went to the maidan square to express their pro-European attitudes and desire to get rid of systemic corruption, we can argue that the continental crisis spawned 
by these protests was part of larger trend in Eu-russia relations.  Even though during the 1990s and early 
2000s Europe and russia experienced a mild honeymoon, relations between them never transformed into 
meaningful partnership. this was a time of compromise and ignorance. on the one hand, russia realised 
its declining position in the international system and sought recognition as an equal from the Eu (and the 
West). this made the Kremlin willing to compromise and accept some of the Eu liberal agenda. on the 
other hand, the Eu hoped that a modern and liberal russia was well within reach, and failed to notice the 
resentment which  russian society developed towards the West. moreover, during Putin’s rule the Eu ignored 
most of the warning signs which showed that russia was not willing to compromise anymore, creating an 
increasingly deep chasm. the ukraine crisis seems the ultimate expression of this rift, with both Europe and 
russia sticking to apparently immutable red lines. Hence, for the past two years stalemate has been the best 
description for the state of Eu-russia relations. 
More than anything the Ukraine crisis highlighted the 
fragility of the partnership between the EU and Russia. 
The little trust that both sides worked rather reluctantly 
to build for the past quarter of century was shattered 
in a few months. The dichotomy between conlict and 
cooperation was, before the crisis, a usual appearance in 
the literature on EU-Russia relations.1 Now, the emphasis 
on cooperation has almost but disappeared, most voices 
on both sides seeing relations in rather stark conlictual 
terms. In the face of uncertainty regarding each other’s 
intentions and actions the EU and Russia chose the easy 
way, assuming the worst in each other. 
Both felt that the other was actively trying to change 
the status quo in the shared neighbourhood, and that 
it had to act with a irm hand in order to prevent this: 
the annexation of Crimea, the war in Eastern Ukraine, or 
the sanctions imposed by the EU are prime examples. 
Nevertheless, Europe and Russia have a long history 
of living together and adapting to each other’s needs. 
While the Ukraine crisis seems to have damaged EU-
Russia relations beyond repair, there is still cause for 
hope that future meaningful cooperation is possible. 
More than anything, their close proximity will make 
Europe and Russia partners in facing a more disordered 
and unstable international arena. How they will adapt 
to this changing regional and global environment 
will undoubtedly determine the future of EU-Russia 
relations. Cooperation will only be possible if Europe 
and Russia choose, in times of uncertainty, to increase 
their dialogue rather than curtail it. The latter choice 
could mean the start of a New ‘Cold War’, with the 
nuclear danger looming over the European continent. 
In what follows, this concluding chapter identiies 
the main current issues of contention in key areas of 
EU-Russia relations and puts forward a series of 
practical recommendations.
1  Cristian Nitoiu, ‘EU–Russia relations: between conlict and cooperation’, International Politics, Volume 51 no 2, 2014, 
           pp. 234-253. 
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KEy ArEA pRoBlEMs RECoMMENDATIoNs 
tHE SHArED 
nEIGHbourHooD
The EU and Russia have developed two 
mutually exclusive integration projects 
which they continue to promote in 
the shared neighbourhood. This has 
not only led to a zero-sum game, but 
has also put  states in the region in 
the di cult and dangerous position 
of choosing between two giants. 
Construed as exclusive integration 
projects, neither can be properly 
implemented, and countries in the 
neighbourhood will continue to be the 
ultimate losers. Russia sees the region 
as an area where it has privileged 
responsibilities and part of its sphere 
of interest. This in turn makes it view 
any move by the EU in the region as 
infringing on its vital national interests.
Cooperation between the EEU and 
the EU should be sought by both 
sides. On the one hand, Russia 
should abandon its claims of having 
‘natural’ interests in the shared 
neighbourhood. On the other hand, 
the EU should take seriously the EEU 
and start discussions for a possible 
free trade agreement – or ways in 
which the two integration projects 
could be made complementary. 
PoLItIcAL 
rELAtIonS
Up until the Ukraine crisis both the 
EU and Russia constantly avoided 
discussing issues that could potentially 
cause conlict. This led to a very lax and 
supericial strategic partnership which 
Brussels and Moscow upheld only 
symbolically. Moreover, EU member 
states rarely found agreement on 
how act towards Russia; a situation 
which mostly weakened the EU and 
gave Moscow incentives to develop 
a divide et impera approach.
The strategic partnership should be 
revamped and moved from pure 
symbolism, with precise areas of 
cooperation carved out. It should 
be based on cooperation in areas 
were both Russia and the EU are 
freely willing to bind themselves. 
Russia especially has to show more 
commitment than in the past for 
such a strategic partnership. At 
the same time, the member states 
should avoid encouraging Russia to 
seek individual deals that damage 
the EU’s common approach. 
EuroPEAn 
SEcurIty
Russian rhetoric has for many years 
argued that the post-Cold War 
security environment on the European 
continent has never been settled. 
According to the Kremlin, this has 
allowed the EU (and the West) to 
constantly change the rules of the 
game against Russia’s interests: the 
expansion of NATO, the independence 
of Kosovo, or the intervention in Libya 
are some examples frequently used. 
For its part, the EU has constantly 
criticised Russia for not respecting its 
security commitments on the continent 
(which Moscow sees as illegitimate). 
In order to overcome these two 
incompatible positions, Europe and 
Russia should go back to the drawing 
board and start dialogue on a security 
framework which takes into account 
the current challenges of world politics. 
Particularly, Russia here would have 
to renounce zero-sum thinking and 
reverse its militaristic attitude – as 
well as those member states which 
advocate for strengthening the 
presence of NATO on their territory. 
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KEy ArEA pRoBlEMs RECoMMENDATIoNs 
EconomIc 
rELAtIonS
Economic ties between the EU and 
Russia have mostly relied on the 
energy sector. The EU has not sought 
to diversify cooperation with Russia, 
seeing it (as it does most of its partners) 
as a consumer market. In this context, 
EU sanctions have hit Russian people 
hard, even though they might not have 
had a crucial efect in weakening the 
Russian economy. However, sanctions 
have been mild and less extensive 
than those imposed by the US.
The EU should consider making its 
sanctions regime either more lax or 
more stringent; the current situation is 
only harming the Russian people, but 
not really inluencing the Kremlin. In 
a more long-term perspective, the EU 
should also focus on helping Russia 
develop its economy in a sustainable 
manner rather than encouraging 
Russian consumer industries. 
EnErGy 
rELAtIonS
The Kremlin has been very critical 
of the EU’s diversiication strategy, 
which it sees as a move against 
Russia’s vital national interests. On 
their part, Europeans have argued 
that this move is motivated by the 
pattern of Russian use of energy as 
a political tool which has constantly 
left small states very vulnerable. 
Rather than slowly moving from 
Russian energy to other sources, 
the EU should ensure that the costs 
for the Kremlin to use energy to put 
pressure on other states are very 
high. At the same time, Russia should 
treat smaller European states as 
equal economic partners and not use 




 The EU and Russia share two very 
diferent views of international relations 
which have the constant potential 
to lead to deep disagreements. On 
the one hand, the EU emphasises 
liberal integration and multilateralism, 
while on the other Russia values 
sovereignty, stability, and pluralism in 
international relations.  For Moscow 
this translates into a rigid interpretation 
of international law, which it upholds 
loudly  when it is in alignment with 
Russian interests.  More seriously, the 
two have contrasting views on the 
legitimate use of force in international 
relations, where the Kremlin sees the 
use of military power as a day to day 
occurrence in world politics, and the EU 
only as an extreme emergency measure. 
Russia should try to have a more 
nuanced understanding of the use of 
force, especially in terms of protecting 
its own citizens living abroad. The 
EU should also not be dismissive of 
Russia’s approach to international 
relations and dismiss it as uncivilised. 
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KEy ArEA pRoBlEMs RECoMMENDATIoNs 
IDEoLoGy The EU and Russia also advocate 
two very diferent types of political 
systems, which are not complementary; 
the Ukraine crisis was partly caused 
by the collision of the promotion 
of the two political systems. The 
Kremlin emphasises stability and 
conservative values, the EU liberal 
values and democracy. Both see each 
other’s values as inferior, but the 
EU has had the active ambition to 
unilaterally impose its values on Russia 
and the shared neighbourhood.
Primarily the EU should refrain from 
exporting unilaterally its norms in 
Russia and the shared neighbourhood. 
Conversely, the Kremlin should be 
more open to accepting liberal values 
to be equal to conservative ones. 
SocIEty The last ten years have seen in both 
Russia and the EU the rise of various 
far right nationalist groups. They have 
advocated  Euroscepticism in the EU, 
while in Russia for a militarist society, 
anti-Western feelings, or conservative 
values. The incorporation of these 
views into oicial Russian rhetoric and 
policy has led to the gradual isolation 
of society and the development of 
anxiety and paranoia regarding Europe.  
References to history, with an emphasis 
on the ‘Great Patriotic War’ or ‘Western 
betrayals’, are pervasive now in the 
Russian public sphere. In the same vein, 
in the European public sphere Russia 
is portrayed as a perpetual aggressor, 
with Putin the ultimate villain. 
The EU should consider whether the 
sanctions regime is further radicalising 
Russian society. The Kremlin should 
refrain from encouraging citizens to 
look to the past in order to legitimise 
the current militaristic atmosphere in 
the country. Shared cultural ties should 
be emphasised rather than scattered 
historical episodes of mutual betrayal. 
GoInG ForWArD: LEArnInG 
to cooPErAtE AGAIn
Most probably the EU and Russia will initially rediscover 
how to cooperate by ignoring the events of the Ukraine 
crisis. Dialogue will start on broader global issues such 
as the ight against terrorism, Iran, North Korea, Syria, 
or the refugee crisis. These are issues which are unlikely 
to elicit diametrically opposed views from Europe 
and Russia. The French willingness to cooperate with 
Moscow in Syria in the wake of the Paris attacks last 
autumn is testimony to the inclination of Europeans 
to gloss over the Ukraine crisis in order to tackle the 
‘crisis of the day’. 
Nevertheless, meaningful cooperation which is not 
merely symbolic will only occur if the EU and Russia start 
constructing a dialogue on the thorny issues which in 
the past they cautiously avoided e.g. security, energy, 
ideology, etc. If such dialogue is not established in 
the near future we might be gradually slipping into 
a New ‘Cold War’, which, according to Prime Minister 
Medvedev’s speech at the recent 2016 Munich Security 
conference, has already started. Finally, in restarting 
dialogue and cooperation both the EU and Russia 
should not overlook the interests of the states in the 
shared neighbourhood. Rather they should treat 
them as equals, and aim not make deals that increase 
vulnerability in the region.  Ŷ
AA Association Agreement
APEc Asia-Paciic Economic Cooperation
ASEAn Association of Southeast Asian Nations
brIc Brazil, Russia, India, China 
brIcS Brazil, Russia, India,  
                   China and South Africa
bSEc  Black Sea Economic Cooperation
cEE Central and Eastern Europe
cFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
cIS Commonwealth of Independent States
cSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
cSto Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DcFtA Deep and Comprehensive  
                   Free Trade Area  
EaP  Eastern Partnership
Ecu Eurasian Customs Union
EEAS  European External Action Service 
EnP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
EP European Parliament
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
Eu European Union 
FtA Free Trade Agreement
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ImF International Monetary Fund
IS Islamic State
mrA Mutual Recognition Agreement 
nAto  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PcA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
SES Single Economic Space
Sco Shanghai Cooperative Organisation
tAnAP Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
tAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline
ttIP Transatlantic Trade and  
                    Investment Partnership
ttP Trans-Paciic Partnership
uK United Kingdom
un United Nations 
uS United States of America
Wto World Trade Organisation 
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